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# The Nature of Psychological Warfare

by  
Wilbur Schramm

assisted by  
Daniel Katz  
Willmoore Kendall  
Theodore Vallance

Best Available Copy

Revised 1 January 1951



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
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G-3 OAO CSD (9 Dec 53)

7 December 1953

SUBJECT: Technical Memorandum OAO-T-214, "The Nature of Psychological Warfare"

TO:

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FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF (7, G-3)

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John C. McNeil  
Colonel, AGO  
AGO, G-3, AGO for Research,  
AGO, G-3, AGO for Research

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The Director  
Operations Research Office  
The Johns Hopkins University  
6410 Connecticut Avenue  
Chevy Chase, Maryland

Technical Memorandum CRO-T-214



# The Nature of Psychological Warfare

by  
Wilbur Schramm

assisted by  
Daniel Xps  
William Kendall  
Theodore Vallance

**OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE**  
The Johns Hopkins University      Chevy Chase, Maryland

**Project  
POWOW**

Revised  
1 Jan 1955

**PREFACE**

The need for manuals for use in training of personnel for psychological warfare operations was discussed in several interested agencies in the spring of 1951. Several other major requirements for research needed in relation to psychological warfare were considered at the same time. A conference held at the Human Resources Research Institute of the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base at that time was the occasion for initial consideration of ways and means of providing for these needs.

The Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare of the Army took an active interest in the problems presented, and in the upshot it was agreed that the Operations Research Office should undertake to play the coordinating role and provide major effort for the provision of training manuals, while some other projects were undertaken by other agencies.

The preparation of training manuals is not an ordinary or normal task for an operations research agency. The Operations Research Office would not regard the preparation of such manuals on military subjects in general as part of its proper mission for the Army. At the time in question, however, it was a fact that the small staff engaged in operations research in psychological warfare in the Operations Research Office was the only such staff available to undertake such a task. It was also a fact that the lack of such training manuals as were desired reflected the lack of organization of knowledge and theory of psychological warfare, which was a hampering circumstance for operations research in the subject as well as for planning and operations in the same connection.

The preparation of a training manual presents a number of problems that permit no direct and precise scientific solution. At what level of knowledge and intelligence and interest on the part of the student should the text be aimed? How far should the text take sides in matters on which leading experts are in controversy? How far should the beginning student, whatever level is assumed, be led into the technical refinements of the

problem in an initial study course? How far should he be made an expert himself, or how far should it be assumed that he will be subject to varied assignments of which psychological warfare may be only one and a temporary one at that?

We will not claim pretentious certainty concerning the assumptions we have made as to the answers to these questions. We have tried to prepare what amounts to an intelligent and intelligible text for students of college caliber who do not have previous serious background in the subject and who are not embarking on professional careers or seeking graduate degrees in this particular field.

It should also be mentioned that we have no illusion that the present text can stand, or should stand, as too good to be improved. It should serve especially as a focus for critical consideration of what such a text should be, of how it can be improved, of tests as to its adequacy, and of improved versions based on further experience.

This volume is one of three that were undertaken at the start of the program two years ago. It is meant as a general introduction to the principles and practice of psychological warfare. The second volume will be concerned primarily with the media of communication—leaflets, radio, etc.—and the third will constitute a casebook of practical examples of psychological warfare techniques.

George S. Petter

Chevy Chase, Md.  
May 1953

## CONTENTS

	Page
<b>PREFACE</b>	v
<b>PART I—WHAT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IS</b>	
<b>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE</b>	3
Psychological Warfare in Other Times—Psychological Warfare in Modern Times—Psychological Warfare as Communication—Definitions of Psychological Warfare—Terminology of Psychological Warfare—Classification of Psychological Warfare—Relation of Psychological Warfare to Policy and Command—Summary—References—Additional Collateral Reading	
<b>PART II—HOW PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE WORKS</b>	
<b>CHAPTER 2 THE MESSAGE</b>	31
Summary	
<b>CHAPTER 3 RECEPTION OF THE MESSAGE</b>	35
Attracting Attention to the Message—Getting the Meaning Across—References—Additional Collateral Reading	
<b>CHAPTER 4 RESPONSE TO THE MESSAGE</b>	71
Nature and Growth of Attitudes—Kinds of Attitudes—Process of Changing Attitudes—Attitude Change and Action in Groups—Attitudes into Action	
<b>PART III—HOW PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IS USED</b>	
<b>CHAPTER 5 USES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE</b>	101
Power Goals of Psychological Warfare—Chief Responses Sought by Psychological Warfare—Psychological Warfare as Part of a Total Operation—Summary	

## CONTENTS (Cont'd)

	Page
<b>CHAPTER 6 BACKGROUND OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DECISION</b>	190
Policy and Objectives—Operations—Intelligence—Summary	
<b>CHAPTER 7 FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DECISION</b>	224
Deciding on the Campaign—Deciding on the Purpose—Choosing the Target—Selecting the Channel—Devising the Message—Timing the Campaign—Evaluating the Product—Summary	

## PART IV—CODA

<b>CHAPTER 8 A FINAL WORD</b>	287
<b>FIGURES</b>	
1. How the Owl Became a Cat—Visual Rumor	66
2. Sociogram of Squadron A	136
3. Sociogram of Squadron B	138
4. Chinese Communist Surrender-Mission Leaflet	180
5. Chinese Communist Surrender-Mission and Distrust-of-War-Aims Leaflet	182
6. American World War II Surrender-Mission Leaflet Linked with a Tactical Situation along Entire Front	184
7. American World War II Surrender-Mission Leaflet Linked with a Particular Local Tactical Situation	186
8. Eisenhower World War II Surrender-Mission Safe-Conduct Pass	187

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Part I

WHAT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IS

SECURITY RESTRICTED INFORMATION



## Chapter I

## INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Psychological warfare is one of the means nations use to promote their policies and objectives vis-à-vis the outside world. Nations have been waging it ever since there have been nations (although psychological warfare does happen to be a new name for it), but it has only recently come to be regarded as a distinct government activity that ought to be performed by specially trained professionals. Perhaps the most effective way to give an over-all view of psychological warfare is to sketch it briefly in action in ancient and modern times, relate it to communication theory, then define it and its terminology, classify it by missions and apparent source, and, finally, relate it to policy and command.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN OTHER TIMES

History and literature are full of examples of the use of psychological warfare (or, more briefly, paywar) many of them dating back to a time long before the term itself came into use.

One of the earliest literary accounts of the use of paywar is found in Homer's Iliad. Troy, a stoutly defended walled city, had been besieged for years by a sea-borne invasion army from Greece. The two enemies had reached a stalemate. Many of the heroes on both sides had fallen. When the impasse seemed unbreakable, the Greeks hit upon a stratagem. They built a huge wooden horse and placed it before the gates of Troy. Then they boarded their ships and sailed away—ostensibly for Greece. The Trojans supposed that the Greeks had given up the siege and had left the horse as a gift of peace. With wild rejoicing they opened the gates of the city—as the Greeks had guessed they would—and brought the horse inside to be the center of a victory celebration. When the party was over and the Trojans were sleeping it off, the Greek troops who were hiding in the horse came out—for the horse had been

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made hollow, and big enough to hold a group of men. They came out of hiding and opened the gates of the city to the Greek army, which had sailed stealthily back by night. The Greeks won a complete victory. "Trojan horse" is still used today to indicate a deception, and "beware the Greeks bearing gifts" has been a common adage for 2500 years. Today, as in the days of Hector and Achilles, military commanders still use the paywar of display or planned deception.

Probably as old as the story of the Trojan horse is the Biblical account of Gideon's use of paywar in his successful defense of Jerusalem against the vastly superior forces of the invading Midianites. Gideon was aware that his army would be overwhelmed if he were to commit it to open battle with the enemy. He therefore picked 300 men and equipped each with a trumpet and torch, an earthen pitcher being placed over each of the torches to conceal its light until the appropriate moment. Under cover of darkness Gideon placed his small force in a circle around the enemy. At midnight, when the Midianite guard was being changed, Gideon ordered the pitchers smashed to expose the lighted torches. At the same time, each of the 300 sounded his trumpet. Aroused from their sleep and believing themselves under attack, the Midianites fell into panic and fought with each other in the darkness. The survivors fled in confusion, and were hunted down at will by the Jews. This use of deliberately induced panic is perhaps the earliest in recorded history.

In China the Emperor Wang Mang, when he was trying to put down some rebels, collected all the animals from the imperial menagerie and took them along in the hope that they would intimidate the enemy. The rebels attacked first, however, and in the excitement of battle the animals got loose and panicked Wang's own troops. Wang thus became the victim of one of the Communist techniques of paywar, namely, that of "depressing and unnerving the enemy commander." Says Paul Linbarger: "It undermined his health; he drank to excess, ate nothing but oysters, and let everything happen by chance. Unable to stretch out, he slept sitting on a bench." The incident also serves as a reminder of how paywar sometimes boom-rangs.

Temujin, the Genghis Khan, is commonly believed to have achieved his conquests with limitless herds of wild Tatar horsemen, who overran the world by sheer weight of numbers. It now seems certain, however, that the sparsely settled countryside of inner Asia could not possibly have produced such herds. The empire of the Khan was conquered by bold military inventiveness.

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plus the application of paywar in many forms. The Mongols used rumor, display, and other paywar techniques to increase their reputation for numbers and ferocity and thus frighten their enemies. Even today, historians still fail to appreciate the lightness of the forces, the resourcefulness of command, and the military paywar genius with which the Mongols hit Asia and Europe seven centuries ago. It remains to add that, like the Nazis, the Mongols never learned to adapt paywar to peaceful ends. They neither made friends of the conquered populations nor converted them nor replaced them. They merely ruled for a few years, and then went back where they came from. The successes and failures of Mongol paywar point up the importance of clearly understanding that, even if paywar is used efficiently and well before and during the shooting, one must still know how to use it as an implement for peace.

Much of the paywar of the American Revolution is familiar to all of us, although we have not usually thought of it as such. Davidson has called attention to the extensive use made of paywar by the colonists in organizing and accomplishing the Revolution. They used songs, plays, newspapers, sermons, pamphlets, and periodicals. Even the Declaration of Independence was used, and with remarkable effectiveness, for paywar. Thomas Paine, the greatest pamphleteer of the American cause, merits careful study as a master of the written word for paywar purposes.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN MODERN TIMES

In the twentieth century the process of paywar remains essentially what it was when Gideon defeated the Midianites, but like many other human enterprises it has become infinitely more complex. The development of mass communication—broadcasting, world-wide wire news services, mobile printing presses, motion pictures—provides instruments of paywar previously undreamed of, as may be seen from the scale on which they were used in World War II as compared with previous wars.

No one who lived through or read about the collapse of France in 1940 will ever forget the Nazi development of paywar as a major weapon of attack. The Nazis' use of radio, the press, group meetings abroad, agents, display, "fifth column" terrorism, and, once violence had actually begun, screaming dive bombers—the memory of these is terrifyingly familiar to all of us. The Nazis gave the first full-dress demonstration of what paywar can accom-

plish with the new tools of mass communication and the new weapons of military warfare. And once the meaning of what they had done came to be understood, all the major combatants who had not already done so were compelled to institutionalize paywar in their own arrangements for war.

The term "psychological warfare" came into use in the United States in the early days of World War II, largely to denote certain government-sponsored operations undertaken before Pearl Harbor. It was thought that these operations might meet with greater popular and Congressional approval under that name than if they had been given the name that was at that time most common, that is, propaganda. The first American peacetime paywar agency was set up in 1941 by a Presidential order establishing the Office of the Coordinator of Information. The text of the authorizing order makes, curiously, no mention of the dissemination of information. Ostensibly, for political purposes, the COI had been organized to collect information. However, it was understood (though never written down) between the President and William J. Donovan, who became Coordinator, that a foreign information service would be established within the COI to beam short-wave broadcasts to foreign countries. As a note on public and official sensitivity to the term "propaganda," it is a matter of record that the first official public document using this term did not appear until March of 1943. This was an executive order defining the respective missions of the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services. Since that time the greater inclusiveness and appropriateness of the term "psychological warfare" has been clearly recognized, and it is the term commonly used today.

A listing of some of the activities, full or part time, of American paywar personnel during and since World War II will illustrate how widely inclusive the term has become. American paywar has been involved not only in radio broadcasts, news releases, and printed publications but also in such activities as the delivery of surrender leaflets by artillery shell and bomb, the delivery of messages by loudspeaker to enemy troops, the V for Victory campaign, the sonic deception cover plan for the Normandy invasion, the making of documentary films and their exhibition on mobile projection units to liberated peoples, the exchange of students and professors with foreign countries, the erection of dummy guns and vehicles to confuse enemy air reconnaissance, and the appointment of a lieutenant general to command an invasion force made up of decoy stockpiles and false radio signals. This last activity is such an interesting example of paywar deception that the story deserves

telling again. When Lt Gen Lesley J. McNair was brought to England in 1944, it was planned to make the Germans think he had been appointed to command an invasion base. They were allowed to hear radio messages to and from this supposed base, and to observe what looked like Allied efforts to conceal its stockpiles from aerial observation. Actually, the base was completely imaginary, merely a part of the cover plan for OVERLORD (that is, the invasion of Europe). Yet the Germans were so completely deceived by the maneuver that several divisions were withheld from countering the Normandy invasion in order to meet McNair's imaginary army when it should strike. Needless to say, this tour de force of psywar contributed greatly to Allied success in holding the beachheads.

The tactics of hostile psywar may be illustrated from any conflict situation. For example, consider a fight between two schoolboys. They threaten, swagger, and grimace, each in the hope of scaring the other out and thus winning the victory without fighting for it. You will notice that even this elementary "psywar" is closely related to direct action; it requires the threat of action before it is effective. If neither boy backs off, the boys may go from the stage of psywar to the stage of direct action. Fists fly. Even in the midst of a fist fight, however, psywar is part of the conflict. The deft motions of head and shoulders, shifting glances, side steps, jabs, and feints are communicating deliberately misleading messages to the opponent, with a view to putting him at a disadvantage. Less subtle forms of psywar are the taunting words tossed back and forth. Action is used, some of the time, as a psywar symbol rather than for its direct result. One boy eases up, backs up, protects himself. He is trying to communicate a message that he is tired and frightened. The encouraged opponent presses his apparent advantage, rushes in, relaxes his caution. When he leaves a big enough opening, the little psychological warrior suddenly steps forward and swings a punch to his opponent's unprotected nose.

There may be yet other psychological operations going on as the two boys pummel each other in the school playground. One boy may be trying to communicate messages to other boys on the lot that will persuade them to accept him as a leader. The other may be trying to impress a girl who has shown signs of liking the curly headed lad in the front seat.

From a schoolyard scrap to the Nazi "strategy of terror" or the Communist propaganda of world revolution is a long step. Yet the principles are the same. Substitute, for the boys, nations;

for the girl, a neutral nation whose help and friendship are coveted; for the conflict situation in the schoolyard, a conflict of aims, wants, or needs in which the fulfillment of the national policy objectives of two nations are in conflict. In such a situation between nations, as in Newtonian physics, it is impossible for two bodies to occupy the same space at the same time, and so, in one degree or another, there is war. The term "cold war" has come into our language as a recognition that war sometimes exists between two nations before "the reciprocal application of violence"—the classical definition of war—takes place. As von Clausewitz said, war is merely "politics continued by other means." Only when it has matured into reciprocal violence is it recognized by a formal declaration of war. And when the shooting war is over, action must still be taken and messages communicated for the purpose of consolidating the victory.

Thus paywar may be used in time of peace or time of war. It may be directed at one's enemies or one's friends. It is likely to be used whenever a nation's leaders believe that the communication of express or implied messages will help promote its policies or attain its international objectives.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AS COMMUNICATION

Ten years of intensive experience with paywar and the history of several thousand years of military campaigns in which, as we have seen, symbolic (that is, message) warfare invariably played a part, give us a body of practical knowledge on the methods, use, and administration of paywar. Our knowledge of the theory of paywar, however (that is, our knowledge of the body of principles by which we can predict how a given target in a given situation will respond to a given act of paywar) is derived from the human sciences.

Paywar is not a science in the sense, for example, that physics or psychology may be called sciences. It is an application of science with a strong admixture of art. The reason for speaking of it as partly art will be understood if you recollect that a large part of paywar must be written or spoken or designed or displayed. The reason for speaking of it as an application of science you will grasp at once from what it has in common with another area of military study, namely, ballistics. Ballistics is the specialized study of those physical laws that relate to the firing of weapons. It uses the basic physical formulas of mass, gravitation, distance,

and velocity to determine the most effective construction and use of guns and projectiles. Ballistics is therefore an application of science, that is, the application of the disciplined knowledge of physics, mathematics, and chemistry to a special area of problems. And just as ballistics depends on the physical sciences, paywar depends on what we may call the "human sciences."

The basic process in paywar is communication. Its basic theory is therefore communication theory. In the last hundred years the human sciences, notably psychology, sociology, anthropology, and political sciences, as they have developed and perfected their own central disciplines have had to give increasing attention to the problem of communication. Education, journalism, advertising, public opinion measurement, human relations, labor relations, military morale studies, and community studies have all served as laboratories for developing a body of theory about communications. Study by study, experiment by experiment, research has analyzed what happens when people communicate with one another, formulated hypotheses about the process involved, and achieved greater and greater skill in predicting its effects and laying down rules as to how to achieve this effect rather than that one.

Increasingly complex experiments with animals and human beings have, over many decades, helped to clarify the relations of stimulus to response that lie at the heart of all communication. A special case of this is the long series of studies of human learning, out of which have come the "laws" of frequency, reward, readiness, belongingness, intensity, primacy and recency, and reinforcement; the systematized knowledge of learning and forgetting curves, and of motivations to learn; and the several systematic theories of learning that seek to combine experimental knowledge into a structure of principles. There have likewise been many studies of the symbols of communications, the "meaning of meaning," and the problems involved in communicating symbols from one culture to another or from one person to others. In connection with the growth of the so-called "mass media," there have been innumerable studies of communication behavior—which communications the recipients choose to receive out of those communications available to them, and their reasons for choosing them. There has been a long series of studies of collective behavior: the nature of publics, masses, and crowds; the processes of group consensus; the ways in which new forms of group behavior, new goals, new leaders come into being; and, especially, the kind of group behavior that is associated with social unrest, fear, in-

security, and hostility. Parallel to this have been studies of inter-group conflicts, and especially of the position and behavior of minority groups in society. Attempts have been made, especially in military and industrial situations, to analyze the nature of morale and the reasons for "high" and "low" morale. In the course of long study of cultural change, researchers have given attention to the question of how attitudes and opinions are formed, how public opinion arises and how it is changed, and to such manifestations of public opinion as voting behavior. The way rumor operates in a society is another of the numerous communication processes that have been studied at length. Increasing attention has been given to differences between cultures, particularly the different ways things are done, the different values and symbols, and the different group relations that are characteristic of different nations and peoples. Finally, communication channels, attitude formation, group relations, collective behavior, leadership roles, and the other manifestations of communication to and within a society have been examined in their relation to the functioning of political systems.

This, then, is the body of knowledge from which we derive, as well as it can be derived in the present incomplete state of research, a theory of paywar; and it is this accumulating research that we draw on in Part II of this volume. The practice of paywar is the application of this theory in the light of all available knowledge about policy and objectives, situations, capabilities, and targets.

A word of caution is in order at this point. Although research is accumulating very fast in the human sciences, our knowledge of many problems and processes in paywar is very slender. A student or practitioner of paywar must therefore be always on the lookout for new findings and always wary of trusting too confidently in old practice. There will doubtless be many important research developments in this field in the next few years.

Having reviewed the background of paywar at some length, we are better prepared to define it

#### DEFINITIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Psychological warfare is sometimes so defined as to imply that it always involves the deliberate use of "symbolic communication." The difficulty with any such definition, indeed with most definitions of paywar, is that it leaves out too many things that



are demonstrably the business of psychological warriors—unless we use the term "symbolic communication" so broadly as to deprive it of its normal meaning. When UN airplanes roared over Korea in the months after the Communist invasion of 25 June 1950, for example, they must have been recognized, and were intended to be recognized, as tokens of the power and determination of the free world to resist Communist aggression. To the extent that they were intended to be so recognized they were, clearly, intended to communicate a message to occupied South Korea and to the momentarily triumphant invasion troops, and were flying what were, in part at least, psywar missions.

When one of those planes dropped a bomb on a Communist gun emplacement it was not, of course, waging psywar against that gun position; it was engaged in direct military action. The Communist soldier who was shot through the head in the course of the attack was not the victim of psywar, he was the victim of direct military action. But this does not invalidate our point, which is that psywar must be so defined as to recognize that almost any military action may have a psywar aspect. A bomb on a gun emplacement may help persuade another gun crew to run or surrender. Machine-gun bullets on a Communist convoy may help persuade anti-Communists in occupied territory to resist. If these things happen incidentally, without being intended by the attackers, they probably should not be called psywar. But if they are intended to be understood as conveying such and such a message, they are psywar.

The key words in any realistic definition of psywar would, on the above showing, have to be communication and message. Psywar is the communication of messages, whether expressly or (as in the instances just noted) by implication. A leaflet and a radio broadcast communicate an explicit message; a show of naval force off the coast of a small country which has been remiss about its obligations under international law is an implied message. In each case the idea is to accomplish something by means of a message that would otherwise have to be accomplished by the use of force or not at all. And in each case the something to be accomplished is behavior on the part of the recipient that, in the communicator's view, will forward his nation's policies or render more probable the achievement of his nation's objectives.

There is another pitfall into which we can easily slip when we attempt to define psywar. We might argue like this: as its very name indicates, psychological warfare is a form of warfare, nations use it against their enemies, for the purpose of weakening

their will to fight and resist; to speak of its use on a friendly country, or to speak of its use in peacetime, is to abuse language. From a strictly dictionary point of view this may be a sound point. Practically, given certain widely accepted usages of the term "psychological warfare," it leads to all manner of nonsense. The Voice of America (VOA), for example, is a peacetime agency; its broadcasts are aimed by no means exclusively at potential enemies (besides which a potential enemy is not an enemy); it often seeks not to destroy but to build up the will to fight and resist; it thinks of itself as conducting a psywar operation, and students of psywar habitually think of it as America's major bat in the psywar field. Yet a definition based on the line of argument summarized at the beginning of this paragraph would require us to take no notice of VOA's operations in this volume.

The reader will already have guessed the general shape of the definition to which we have been leading up: psychological warfare is the whole range of functions performed by psychological warriors, whether inside or outside duly constituted psywar agencies. (The pilot of a plane flying a psywar mission is engaged in psywar and is, for the moment at least, a psychological warrior.) It is, admittedly, a "circular" definition, but it has the advantage of excluding nothing that the psychological warrior ought to think of as part of the over-all enterprise in which he is engaged. And it will allow us to give due weight to certain facts that cannot, for the reasons just mentioned, be overlooked in a working definition of psywar without creating difficulties. We can, for example, bear in mind that the normal end product of any psywar operation is explicit verbal messages, whether written or spoken, and yet give due weight to the fact that sometimes the messages are implied, as illustrated in the next paragraph. We can bear in mind that psywar is often "waged" in peacetime, "against" friends, "for" constructive purposes, and yet give due weight to the fact that one very important type of psywar is waged in wartime against enemies, mostly by soldiers, not civilians, and for purposes that are destructive or even lethal. The one thing we must be careful to do in using so broad a definition of psywar is to be clear with ourselves—and with our readers—as to the type of psywar we are speaking about at each point in our discussion.

We have said that psywar is one of the means nations use to promote their policies and objectives vis-à-vis the outside world. The other means, which we have already noticed in connection with bombing raids, are by no means always easily separable from it. They include such things as war, military aid, blockade.

financial aid, diplomacy, and withholding diplomatic recognition. In all these—and we have deliberately moved back and forth between hostile and friendly means—we have forms of action that may or may not have an intended message content, and insofar as they do have a message content may have a greater or lesser one. We may give economic aid to France because we wish it to be economically strong or because we think the giving of it will communicate to Frenchmen a message: "The United States is rich and generous, and for you not to be its allies would be foolish and ungrateful." The US diplomat abroad may decline an invitation to a cocktail party at the Swiss Embassy because he does not wish to encounter the Belgian charge until he has had further word from Washington, or because he wishes to signal a nonverbal message to the Swiss Embassy: "We dislike certain things you are doing and propose to avoid you until you refrain from them." A good example of an implied message is "Operation Magic Carpet":

#### AIRLIFT FOR ALLAH\*

The Koran orders all the faithful, except slaves, women without companions and those who cannot afford the journey, to make the *hajj*, the holy pilgrimage to Mecca, at least once in their lifetime. Last fortnight, as the season of the *hajj* drew near once again, more *hajjis* (pilgrims) than ever before—*hajjis* from Turkey, Iran, Iraq and most of the desert cities and oases of North Africa—followed the Koran's injunction and swarmed into the Lebanese city of Beirut, the usual waystation on the road to Mecca. Each clutched in the voluminous folds of his *thram* (the pilgrim's sheetlike uniform), an airline ticket to Jidda, the airport nearest the holy city.

There were good reasons for the unusually large turnout. For one thing, the ordained day of the pilgrimage's start this year fell on a Friday, and a pilgrim who makes the *hajj* on Friday (the Muslim sabbath) is seven times blessed and sure to achieve heaven. For another, Saudi Arabia's King Ibn Saud, whose oil-rich country includes Mecca, had lifted the usual tax of \$52 per pilgrim. Agents of the three local airlines began selling tickets to Jidda like hot cakes. But when the holdere turned up in Beirut, they found that there were not nearly enough planes to carry them. The *hajjis* began piling up in Beirut's streets, in the mosques and at the airport.

They didn't complain. They didn't protest. They just waited. Forbidden by Islamic law to wear hats on *hajj*, they sat huddled hour after hour under the broiling sun, certain that Allah, in his wisdom, would somehow get them to Mecca. Lebanese peddlers did a land-office business selling umbrellas against the fierce heat. "Allah, *hajjis* [but of the way, pilgrim]!" cried airport attendants. The huddled groups moved aside, returned and continued to wait—for men on *hajj*, no pilgrim ever turns back.

\* Estimated at 100,000, the number of pilgrims to Mecca each year is a constant. For years, the number of mortal deaths is usually less than that number, the difference being covered by the faithful to be made up by a smaller number of pilgrims.

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SECRET **RESTRICTED** INFORMATION

**Miracle in Washington.** On Thursday, with the holy days just a week away, desperate airline officials appealed for help to Harold Minor, able US Minister to Lebanon. Minor promptly dashed off a "night action" (named urgent) cable to Washington, pointing out that here was a real chance for the United States to make friends in the Arab world. Something of a miracle then happened: the State Department got the point. At Rhein-Main airport in Frankfurt, Germany, at Khmeimim Field in Tripoli, at Orly Field in Paris, US airmen were suddenly alerted for special duty. Three days later, the first of 13 huge US C-54s landed at Beirut's airport. Next morning Operation *Magi* was under way.

Each clutching a box lunch (bread, olives, cheese, fruit) crisscrossed in haste by the American Friends of the Middle East (organized by US Congressman Dorothy Thompson), the *Aggiss* were hustled aboard the big planes, 10 to a flight. All day long the transports shuttled back and forth to Jidda. One old man, deaf and blind at 83, was led aboard a plane by his son. "This is help sent by Allah," the son told the US pilot. "We are united together today by love and faith." Another passenger on the magic carpet provided by the United States was transable old Jewish Kabbalist, Iran's bitterly anti-American religious leader. He rewarded dog-tired Pilot Captain Alfred Beasley of Atlanta and Lieut. Angelo Rizzo of Washington with wet kisses on both cheeks.

Five days later the last of 1783 stranded pilgrims was loaded aboard the last flight. The airlift had traveled a total of 121,500 miles. Some of the US airmen had spent 27 out of 30 hours in the air, but the trips had been more than worth it. The pilgrims' airlift had done more good than any other act of the United States' otherwise fumbling and unimaginative action and inaction in the Middle East. It was the one success US diplomacy could claim in a week of continued unrest. The Iranian oil dispute with Britain had dragged on for more than a year, while Iran slid to the edge of bankruptcy, chaos and Communism, hanging on the cliff like Pauline in her peril; last week the United States and Britain tried to settle the mess and were flatly turned down by Iran's Moslemdeh.

It would take a lot before Arabs would forgive the United States for its help to Israel, but Operation Magic Carpet might well be the beginning. "Speaking for myself and 10 million Arab Moslems," Lebanon's Mufti Aloys told Minister Minor, "I would like to say that this is the turning point of American relations with the Muslim world. This aid has been sent to governments, but to people. It is neither military nor economic but spiritual."

Then he issued an unprecedented order: this year, the *Aggiss* were to include the American people—infidels though they are—in their prayers.

We may, in short, think of the means nations use in furthering their objectives as a continuum stretching from direct action without any message content whatever to sheer message without any direct-action content whatever. In practical terms one end of the continuum is a punch in the nose; the other is a series of words which seek to accomplish a desired aim without fighting for it. At one end of the continuum is the Communist attack on Korea; at the other is Communist propaganda about "slave labor" in the United States. At the extremes, therefore, the two kinds of action are readily distinguishable one from another. In the middle they are barely distinguishable, and nowhere on the continuum is one kind of means entirely isolated from the other. Communicated

by news and rumor, the Communist attack on Korea served as powerful psywar on other populations in Asia. The slave-labor line was related to potential revolution in non-Communist countries.

## TERMINOLOGY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Some of the vocabulary of psywar consists of words used in a sense with which you may not be familiar. It may be helpful to be sure you understand such terms as "source," "target," "message," "medium," and "symbol" before going on to Part II of this volume.

The source of psywar is simply the person or organization that originates the message. Thus the source of the material on the VOA is the Government of the United States. The purported source of the material on Nachtsender 1212, a radio station the Allies operated for psywar purposes during World War II, keeping up the pretense that it was a clandestine station within Germany, was a group of Germans, while its real source was an Allied psywar operator.

The target of psywar is the individual or group to whom the psywar message is directed. The target of surrender leaflets may be an opposing enemy unit. The target of Nachtsender 1212 when it broadcasted recipes for cooking waste materials was the German housewife, who, it was hoped, would become furious at the thought of Germans having to serve up and eat such swill. The target may be smaller than the total audience which receives the psywar material. And the effective target may be smaller still, because some who receive it may turn a deaf ear to it.

The message of psywar is always a symbol or a series of symbols that is to be communicated to the target audience with the intention of inducing (a) a specific and desired reaction that will lead to (b) specific and desired behavior on the part of that audience. The message may be as simple as the V sign of World War II or as complex as Wilson's Fourteen Points, which were powerful psywar in World War I.

By a "symbol" (and we know from the preceding paragraph that most psywar is symbolic communication) we mean something that substitutes in the communication process for an object, a process, or an idea. Obviously a dog cannot be communicated. But the idea of a dog can be symbolized by the word "dog" and communicated readily. Similarly, a Bronx cheer is a symbol of an attitude that can be readily and effectively communicated. A picture of a lake in the woods may serve as a symbol to communicate the

nature of a summer vacation, and in this case literally a picture would be "worth a thousand words." You will notice an important characteristic of symbols, namely, that they always represent the original object, idea, or experience at a high level of abstraction, or, to put it another way, at a level of reduced cues. All the sensory cues one would get from the object "dog" (shape, movement, color, sound, smell, touch, etc.) are replaced by the single visual stimulus that one gets from seeing the three letters d-o-g. This is the quality that makes symbols easy to misinterpret; that is, a symbol can mean to a given individual only what his experience has taught him to connect with it, and no two persons, certainly no two distinct cultural groups, have ever had exactly the same experience. More of that later.

By media, we mean the communicative devices for carrying a message from source to target. Among others, they include broadcasts, news, leaflets, the "slower" printed media (magazines, books, etc.), posters, meetings, motion pictures, loudspeaker operations, rumor, agitation, display, and events planned or staged with a view to their psywar effects.

These terms are all common to communication study. Other terms, such as "black" and "white" operations, and "political," "tactical," "strategic," and "consolidation" psywar, are peculiar to psywar and will be treated at somewhat greater length in the following sections.

## CLASSIFICATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

### By Mission

The process of psywar, of course, is a single process. There is no sharp distinction between the basic principles that should govern the conduct of psywar against enemy troops as contrasted with psywar against enemy civilians, or as between the principles governing the conduct of peacetime psywar as contrasted with wartime psywar. Nevertheless it is useful, for some purposes, to distinguish between four kinds of psywar (the fourth, consolidation, is sometimes lumped together with the third, political):

Tactical psywar is directed at specific enemy units in a specific battle situation in the combat zone and is, or should be, integrated into the tactical planning for that situation. Its distinguishing characteristic, then, is its specificity. For whereas strategic and political operations admit a considerable amount

of generality both as to target and response, tactical paywar is just as specific as a bayonet charge or an artillery barrage. Its usual mission is to induce enemy soldiers to surrender, whether individually or collectively (that is, in units). It can also be used, however, to lower the morale or the will of the enemy troops to resist, or to mislead the local enemy command in such a way that he will take some tactical step that, particularly if we are expecting it, we can exploit to our advantage. Tactical paywar, like strategic paywar but unlike political, is almost always unfriendly. The exception would be dropping leaflets on the troops of America's allies, a regiment of ROKs, for example, that has been surrounded by the enemy and needs encouragement.

Strategic paywar is ordinarily directed behind the lines, either to civilian or to military groups. It is integrated into the over-all military plan for the war as a whole, or at least for some important phase of it, a theater for example, with a view to payoff in the indefinite rather than the immediate future and on a broad rather than a merely local scale. A typical tactical paywar operation might be leaflets directed at a unit of enemy troops, urging immediate surrender. A typical strategic paywar operation might be a series of broadcasts or leaflets dropped on the residents of an industrial section within the enemy's country, in an attempt to cut enemy war production by spreading disaffection among, for example, industrial workers.

But no sharp line can be drawn between the two. The leaflets dropped in the enemy's industrial zone might have the further purpose of immediately affecting supplies to a sector of the front where we are about to attack, which would make them partly tactical.

The term "political paywar" is best reserved for operations that are not integrated into any military plan, although they may, like many broadcasts in recent years from General Headquarters, Far Eastern Command, be conducted by the military. Their purpose, as already indicated, is at least as often friendly (to the immediate target, anyway) as unfriendly; and they are less likely than tactical or strategic paywar to call for any specific action by the target audience. Often they merely attempt to build up desired attitudes on the part of the population of the target country, or this or that political, social, or economic group. Sometimes they attempt to set group against group within the target; equally well, however, they may attempt to bring about a rapprochement between inimical groups, by calling attention, for example, to some alleged common interest they have hitherto ignored. Much of the "cold

war" is political paywar. If it is related to the future military plans of the antagonists, it is not related to them so directly as tactical and strategic paywar. Typical examples of political paywar are the broadcasts of the United States and the Soviet Union to the Near East, the Stockholm "Peace Petition," the Berlin blockade, the American Information Centers throughout the still-free countries, the program of exchange of persons between the United States and Europe, and our recently suspended Russian-language America.

Consolidation paywar (which is often, and quite legitimately, considered a part of political paywar) is needed when the shooting is over but the victory is not yet consolidated. One of the hard lessons the twentieth century has to teach is that military victory does not end a war. Often, it would seem, greater skill is required to "win the peace" than to win the war. In Japan since 1945 it has been necessary for the United States to use its paywar know-how to the full in an attempt to give new direction to the Japanese people's goals and activities. Any future US military victory will impose a similar—perhaps even greater—necessity upon our occupation authorities, probably, though not necessarily, with constructive purposes like those which have governed recent US occupations, and the occupation plans will undoubtedly call for carefully integrated paywar operations. There, indeed, lies the best reason for distinguishing between political and consolidation paywar. The latter, like tactical and strategic paywar, is part of a military plan.

#### By Apparent Source

Paywar operations, whether tactical, strategic, political, or consolidation, may be white, gray, or black, depending on the apparent or ostensible source of the messages communicated.

White paywar is "overt." Its source is not concealed in any way; usually, indeed, this type of paywar emphasizes its source, so that its effectiveness depends in large part on the authority and prestige of that source. The news broadcasts of the BBC during World War II are an excellent example of white operations. At the outbreak of hostilities the BBC had a long-standing reputation for objective and truthful newscasts. During the war it made every effort to capitalize on this reputation by maintaining the same program formats, call letters, and identifications, and took pains to call attention to itself as the originator of the news, commentary, and entertainment it carried.



Surrender passes are another classical example of white operations. In the European theater in World War II, surrender passes were printed with a handsome bank note type of border; the great seals of Allied nations were handsomely displayed; the signatures of the commanding generals were shown—all to make the passes look like official documents, backed up by the Allied governments, and cause the enemy's troops to feel that they were certain to be honored by Allied soldiers.

Loudspeaker operations against enemy units are an example of white tactical psywar.

The use made of President Roosevelt's speeches—particularly the "Four Freedoms" speech—in World War II was white psywar in its purest form. These speeches were communicated to the enemy audience by every available medium, from radio broadcasts to leaflets to phonograph records, as pronouncements by the President of the United States, in an attempt to capitalize on his popularity and prestige.

Black psywar operations are "covert" operations. The intention in such operations is to pass off the material communicated as messages from some source other than the true one. Since its true source is not revealed, black psywar can do things that white psywar could not possibly do without injuring the sender's cause. For example, here is a leaflet that was distributed among American troops on the Western Front (with the typical errors):

Military authorities demanded a nationwide war on VICE. They got a sham battle—a polite blood testing campaign which would not alarm babies and socialism and parent-teachers association.

Nevertheless, police raided a large number of cabarets, dance halls, and joints in 21 small, medium, and large cities. These raids showed that of the 20,000 women investigated, a staggering proportion had venereal diseases.

Over 80% had V. D. 21% were prostitutes. Of the 70% nonprostitute women, 61% were pickups, 15% were girl friends, 17% were girls under 20 years.

91% were wives of men serving in the armed forces. AIRROAD.

Both groups were mostly members of the growing band of "V" girls, who declare that they feel a patriotic compulsion to console troops.

IS YOUR GIRL AMONG THEM?

YOU CAN'T TALK V.D. OUT OF EXISTENCE. IT IS THERE!

The real source of this leaflet was a German propaganda unit, but the pretended source was the US Army. The leaflet had nothing to do with stopping VD among troops; its real purpose was to lower morale among American troops.

A classical example of black psywar on the air was "Operation Anne." The following brief account of its activities is by H. H. Burger:

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Somewhere in Luxembourg, in a secluded house which once belonged to the Gestapo, the American Twelfth Army Group had installed a small group of men: writers, experts, spongers and radio technicians. They formed the staff of the Maubacher 1212 (Night Radio Station 1212). Their task was to win the enemy's confidence, to gain the reputation of being a reliable and necessary source, by giving absolutely correct information about the military situation at the front.

In the course of events "Annie" became quite a girl. Slowly but surely her personality developed. She was thoroughly feminine. In innocent tones she would speak about the fact that the Reich's cartographical institute was short of maps numbered 315 to 318, which were badly needed for national defense. And suddenly you would, if you were German, find yourself asking why the institute was asking for maps of Westphalia, still more than 300 miles inside the Reich.

Then again she would turn into a good housewife and advise you on the use of the oddest waste material for cooking and eating and you would wind up by asking yourself furiously, if you were a German, why you should be forced to cook such stuff.

A net of party directories and phone books, captured near Trier, provided the writers with the material for a very successful attack.

Late one evening a small town was captured near Gladbach-Rheydt, an important party stronghold. At that time the capture was known to Annie only. At 2:30 a.m., 1212 came in with a flash: A call for help by the party headquarters of the town already in our hands. All listeners in Gladbach-Rheydt were requested to call party headquarters or all known party functionaries—phone numbers and addresses were given—and urge them immediately to dispatch five trucks, manned by reliable party men, to rescue their comrades and important party documents. They were to proceed along a prescribed route. Only Annie knew that this route was already controlled by American troops. That night the Gladbach-Rheydt local of the Nazi party lost five precious trucks and five good drivers.

The features had a widely varying character. Sometimes they were eyewitness reports, breathless stories by getaway men. Sometimes they were general observations on the course of the war, never pro-Party, but always pro-German. They were pieces full of hurry, shortness, full of ifs and buts, very much the sort of pieces a German military critic would write about the failures, the blunders, and the dark consequences. But 1212 never sneered, was never sarcastic. It was always desperately and sadly honest about every lost position, every lost division, and ultimately the lost war.\*

The term "gray" is used to refer to covert operations in which the recipient is not told the source; the sender conceals his own identity, but does not "hang" what he is sending on anybody else in particular. In this area fall the propaganda of rumor, news credited to "usually reliable sources," "high military circles," "it is said that," etc. The Germans, during the Nazi occupation of France, for example, ran several magazines and newspapers in Paris. They did not describe themselves as German controlled and often took the French side of an argument, but they proved to be convenient channels through which to communicate the German propaganda line when necessary. Again, for example, unsigned leaflets, which theoretically might have been prepared either by

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the enemy or by dissident elements within the ranks of the receiving audience, are gray propaganda. Thus we see that the distinction between gray and black is not so sharp as that between black and white. Gray is perhaps best regarded as one form of black psywar.

If a theme or an idea that white is trying to get across can be echoed or reinforced or corroborated by genuinely deceptive black or gray, the target audience is more likely to give it credit. Thus a judicious combination of white and black is sometimes very effective. However, for reasons we shall see below, use of this procedure calls for great caution on the part of the sender.

### **RELATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE TO POLICY AND COMMAND**

This brief survey of what psywar is would be incomplete without a further word concerning the relation of psywar to national policy of all kinds—military, political, economic, etc. Psywar is always a means to some end set by policy, and we shall think more clearly about it if we conceive of the ends always being set not by psychological warriors but by another group of people altogether, namely, the policy makers. Skillful psywar, on that showing, is psywar that takes the policies laid down by the policy makers and does the best possible job of implementing them by messages to the target audiences. This point is worth emphasizing because endless confusion results whenever it is ignored, as it is when, for example, people blame the unpopularity of the Nazis in the German-occupied portions of Russia in World War II on "bad" psywar, when they mean merely that the Nazis and their policies displeased the Russians. The policies that it is psywar's task to implement may be good or bad, wise or unwise, calculated to please the target or displease it, consistent or conflicting, stable or shifting. Psywar's job is to take them and do the best it can with them. (The fact that psywar personnel often do make policy, especially in the absence of directives from higher authorities, is beside the point. The fact that a surgeon often drives his own car does not abolish the distinction between surgery and chauffering.)

One reason that confusion of the kind noted above (for example, blaming Nazi psywar for decisions made by Nazi policy makers), makes the relation between psywar and policy one of the most complicated and tricky parts of psywar theory is this: Psywar personnel are, or should be, the personnel best qualified to say in advance what the psywar consequences of a proposal will be.

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or what the paywar consequences of a current policy actually are. Giving expert advice on these points is, in that sense, a paywar function, whether the policy makers ask for it or not, or, having asked for it, use it or do not use it. Policy, in other words, has a paywar aspect, just as it has an economic and/or fiscal aspect (about which the policy makers are wise to consult their economic advisers). A nation is, moreover, in a bad way if the predictable paywar consequences of a policy are not taken into account before it is adopted. It is also in a bad way if paywar personnel are not in position to inform the policy makers as to what policies would predictably produce the most favorable paywar consequences. But the real policy decisions, the decision, for example, as to whether to adopt a policy despite its probable psychological impact on paywar's target audiences, are under our system a political function that belongs to elected officials and their immediate appointees.

When a nation sets about activating policy, obviously the first requirement is intelligence regarding the target. A planner must know what are the "given conditions" that he must modify in the direction of policy goals. Paywar, like military action and all the other instruments of policy, must therefore work in the closest possible cooperation with intelligence. When policy has specified the desired goals and intelligence has appraised the existing situation, then a nation's paywar group is ready to go into action. Its paywar group must, of course, function in close coordination with the other striking arms of policy—the military, the foreign service, etc. Bold words alone, without the Nazi forces behind them, would never have made a "strategy of terror." Clearly no paywar, no matter how skillful, from the Western Allies could be counted on completely to predetermine the actions of the Soviet Politburo, although paywar coordinated with NATO, economic measures, and diplomatic policy unity may accomplish something to that end. No paywar without supporting military power could by itself have secured the surrender of Japanese troops on Pacific Islands. It is in the area of the crucial margin that paywar is likely to be effective. If paywar could not by itself beat the Nazis, it could still deceive three German divisions and thus make the beachhead invasion easier. If paywar by itself could not defeat the Trojans, it could at least get the Greek army into position to do so. In this marginal area, paywar can often tip the scales between failure and accomplishment, opposition and cooperation, reconstruction and chaos.

The distinction between policy and paywar emerges as all the more important when we ask, "How does one evaluate a paywar operation?" Like all other instruments of policy, it must be eval

uated in terms of its effectiveness in furthering a predetermined policy. A military campaign, an economic boycott, or a treaty is "good" if it advances policy, "bad" if it does not. No matter how brilliant the strategy, how airtight the boycott, how skillful the negotiations, still the instruments fail if they do not move events toward the desired goals. So it is with psywar. No matter how attractive the leaflet, how scintillating the radio program, how large the parade, how widespread the rumor, it is good psywar only if it shows maximum possible results in modifying the behavior of its target in the direction of policy goals. There is no other test, and if we confuse policy and psywar we are left with no test at all.

## SUMMARY

Psywar has been used with considerable effect since at least the beginning of recorded history. Perhaps modern psywar operations were developed during World War I. However, the pace and scope have increased greatly since those days. From more or less optional use by amateurs, some talented, others less so, the world has progressed to a state in which self-preservation alone demands the most intense psywar pressure that a large body of trained professionals commanding immense resources can bring to bear. Unfortunately for the efficient performance of this task, important knowledge of the theory of psywar is almost entirely lacking. Applications of existing knowledge have been fairly well recorded, but relatively little effort has been made to find answers to numerous fundamental questions, and consequently the questions go unanswered or are answered provisionally by guesses.

You should remember that psywar is basically communication. Consequently, communication theory is all we have on which to build psywar theory. It follows then that psywar may be defined as communication of a message, which may be explicit or implied, in order to bring about some action. Considered more broadly, psywar may be defined as the whole range of functions performed by psychological warriors. You should remember that psywar may also be friendly rather than hostile, despite the contradiction in terms.

Besides communication of the message, psywar operators are concerned with the source, target, medium, and symbols.

Psywar may be classified first by mission and then subdivided by apparent source. According to its mission, psywar is

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said to be tactical, strategic, political, or consolidation. Any of these may be further subdivided into white, black, or gray paywar.

Finally, you should understand clearly and never forget that paywar operators do not make policy. The mission of paywar is to carry out the policies formulated by the policy makers.

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SECURITY **RESTRICTED** INFORMATION

**Part II**

**HOW PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE WORKS**

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SECURITY **RESTRICTED** INFORMATION

## Chapter 2

**THE MESSAGE**

Consider the framework in which paywar operates. A policy has been stated. Intelligence has been gathered and a target has been determined upon. A directive has been issued, specifying the target, the general thematic content of the message, and the desired result. The paywar officer sits down to construct his message. But he knows that before he can succeed in arousing the kind of behavior he wants as a result of that message, he must accomplish three things:

In the first place, he must get a hearing. In psychological terms the message must succeed in getting attention. This is not easy, because there is great competition for attention. At any given time we have available to us far more than we can look at, far more than we can listen to, far more than our senses can possibly transmit, and we must make a choice. In the case of paywar the choice is often prejudiced because people distrust "propaganda," or because the target government puts a penalty on paying attention to enemy messages, or because it is hard to deliver a strong signal to a distant target. But unless this step is taken, unless the message attracts attention, then none of the other steps are possible.

In the second place, he has to get his meaning across. In psychological language, this is the problem of perception. This is not an easy step, either, because words and pictures do not mean exactly the same thing to all persons. Furthermore, people tend to read into a message what they want to read, or what they have been accustomed to, so that what the target individual gets from the message may be very different from what the paywar operator tried to put into it.

In the third place, he must get the response he wants. He must depend on his message to arouse, in the individual who receives it, energy to push that individual in the desired direction. The desired result may be action (for example, surrender) or attitude change that underlies and affects action (for example, lowered

morale, which makes a soldier fight less effectively). Surrender and lowered morale, of course, are only two among many possible aims of paywar and an enemy army is only one of many possible targets. But if the goal is change, the paywar operator must reckon with barriers obstructing the kind of behavior he wants to arouse. Supposing that his purpose is to accomplish surrender, he may find that group morale is very high in his target (as was found in the German Wehrmacht) or that surrender is not within the honor code of the target army (as was found in the case of the Japanese before the formula was changed from "surrender" to "cease resistance"), or that close surveillance by political officers (as in the Communist armies) makes surrender very difficult. A target can respond only through channels that are available to it and in relation to the barriers that it faces.

This is the process by which every successful act of paywar works: message; attention in relation to competing stimuli, perception in relation to the target's frame of reference, needs, and motives; and response in relation to existing attitudes, barriers, and channels. Now let us look harder at this process.

Messages are to paywar what troops and firepower are to military warfare. But when troops are committed they may be recalled, or their orders may be changed and their tactics altered. When a message is sent, there is no recalling it, no changing it. Every person who has ever written a propaganda leaflet or given a propaganda broadcast has felt the peculiar helplessness that comes when the writing or speaking is done and the message is irretrievably sent. It is out of the sender's power, operating on its own. Will it get a hearing? Will it mean to the receiver what it is intended to mean? Will it accomplish what it is designed to accomplish? Many a paywar operator has worked a little longer, expended a little more loving care on his message, because he realizes these questions can't be rethought once the message is on its own.

In terms of the paywar process, what is a message?

At the source, it is a symbol or a collection of symbols. It may, as we have seen above, be verbal or nonverbal, though most of our discussions in this book will deal with verbal messages. It may be a collection of words for print, or it may be a collection of words for broadcast. It may be the V for Victory sign, the scream of German dive bombers, nostalgic music sent to soldiers far from home, or a picture of a sexy girl distributed to troops in the front lines. It may be a controlled event. Gromyko staking out of a UN Security Council meeting is a symbol with real meaning in the Russian plan of paywar. Communist army maneuvers

near the border of non-Communist countries serve as symbols of Soviet power and threat. When Theodore Roosevelt sent the American fleet around the world he was communicating a psywar symbol. As a matter of fact, nearly every weapons system has its symbolic importance quite apart from its direct and coercive effect. For example, the Communists have never let the people of Asia forget that we used the A-bomb only on Asians, and future uses of atomic weapons will certainly have implications beyond the amount of destruction they accomplish and the amount of retaliation they will bring upon us.

All messages, whether events, words, pictures, or sounds, have certain typical characteristics, and it may be well to review those characteristics as they are seen at the source. For one thing, a message is not directly coercive, as is, for example, a bayonet charge, an economic blockade, or a break in diplomatic relations. A message must accomplish its purpose by communicating symbols to the minds of men, not by mutilating their bodies, starving their stomachs, or restricting their movements.

Because a message operates by symbols it has great advantages and great disadvantages as compared with coercive methods. It has the advantage of being swift and portable and relatively inexpensive. A message, that is, can be sent immensely farther and faster than an armored division, at relatively little risk to life or limb, and at relatively little cost in materiel or manpower. On the other hand the effect of an armored division in action is direct and immediate and may be evaluated much more easily than the effect of a broadcast or a poster. Furthermore, because a message works by symbols rather than by direct coercion and because it must be so highly portable, it must operate as a kind of shorthand. It must use signs to represent ideas and material things. And the difficulty is, as is brought out in a later section of this book, these signs do not always mean the same to all people. There is an all-too-high probability of their being misread.

At the source, then, a message is a symbol or collection of symbols made and controlled by the sender. Whether the symbols take the form of an event, electrical impulses released in the air, or ink printed on paper, they are shaped at the source and sent out in the direction of the target.

At the target, a message presents itself as a stimulus-event. It is merely one of the countless stimulations that present themselves to the senses of the members of the target audience and compete for their attention. Whatever the message accomplishes it must accomplish through the process of stimulation and response within the human organism.

A central problem of modern psychology has been to try to bridge the gap between stimulus and response. To do this, of course, it is necessary to understand both the so-called "situational factors" that affect the response, and the qualities or characteristics of the responding organisms that cause different individual organisms to respond to identical stimulation in different ways. We know that the process is not simple. It is not easy to separate and measure the effects of complex environment on individual behavior. It is not easy to separate out the qualities of personality that enter into a given action. Yet the basic nature of the problem is apparent. Consider, for example, the different ways in which a regular Army sergeant and a US senator will react in the presence of a full colonel. Consider the different ways in which a victorious army and a trapped squad will react to surrender propaganda. These are relatively easy differences to explain, as compared to those that must be considered when we are devising a message that, for example, is to bring about disloyalty or subversion in persons who live in the heart of a distant country.

Yet this is the kind of thing psywar has to do. If the problem of psychology is to say with accuracy and consistency what it is about people that accounts for the differences in their reactions to common situations, then the problem of psywar is to apply that knowledge. That is, psywar must be able to predict with reasonable accuracy and consistency what kind of stimulation (what message) applied to what kind of people in what kind of situation will cause them to react in a specified way. In the following pages, therefore, an effort has been made to gather together what psychology and the other social sciences have to contribute to an understanding of that problem.

## **SUMMARY**

A message is, at the source, a symbol or a group of symbols, verbal or nonverbal, made and controlled by the sender. It can get its response only by first communicating symbols to the minds of men; that is, it must first get a hearing. At the target a message is a stimulus-event, among many competing for attention, that can bring about an action only by causing stimulation and response within the human organism.

In brief, a psywar message, to be effective, must get a hearing, be understood, and bring about the desired response.

## Chapter 3

**RECEPTION OF THE MESSAGE****ATTRACTING ATTENTION TO THE MESSAGE**

By attracting attention we mean getting the recipient to do so much as look at or listen to the message. How long he looks at it or listens to it and what he thinks of it are matters that are considered in later chapters. Unless we can get his attention to begin with—and this is not easy to do from outside, which is the position from which psywar operations are conducted—the question of how long and how fruitfully we keep it does not arise.

Human beings can only sample the sensory world. So much is available to us that we can select only a tiny fraction. How much we miss we begin to realize only when we acquire a new interest that opens a different corner of experience. When we learn to fly an airplane, for example, we find ourselves noticing things about the wind, the clouds, and the sound of an engine that we had never paid any attention to before, although the stimuli had always been there if we had only selected them.

The importance of a stimulus, whatever its form, depends on how the stimulus relates (a) to other conditions or events in the external world and (b) to conditions within the person whose sense organs are being stimulated. Because of these two sets of conditions, it may happen that a small amount of stimulation may sometimes attract more attention than a very large amount. For example, a football player will listen far harder for a number spoken softly by his quarterback and react far more violently to that small stimulus than he will to the much louder sound of a truck passing a shady spot where he is drinking lemonade. When we are flying across the country, we are likely to pay careful attention to a line of distant clouds in the west that we might never notice if we were going about our business on the ground. Thus the problem of getting a person to pay attention to a stimulus is by no means solved by



merely delivering a large amount of stimulus to him and letting it go at that.

Because of the conditions under which a paywar operator has to work, what has just been said is especially applicable to the attention-getting problem. His target, as the operator must constantly remind himself, receives a great excess of stimulation, from which it will select only a small amount. In the paywar business, competing for attention has grown more difficult as the mass media have grown larger. The growth of motion pictures, the development of high-speed printing along with the increase of literacy, the development and spread of radio, and now the advent of television have all come along within the last fifty years to fight for man's eyes and ears. The average American is said to spend about twice as much time on the mass media as he did thirty years ago; and to have perhaps fifty times as much material to choose from. The average Arab, the average Chinese may not spend so much time on them, but the competition for even their attention is much stiffer than it was.

So the paywar officer has to work within a glutted market, has to fight against the target's own restrictions on and defenses against propaganda, and has to offer his message to a rather complex selection system that depends both on conditions within the recipients and conditions about them as the message is received. What principles will be of use to the paywar officer as he tries to get his message attended to?

#### Availability of Message

It is obvious that the stimulus must be delivered to the target before attention can be expected. It should also be clear that, other things being equal, the more readily and easily available the message is the more likely it is to attract attention.

When studying language habits of human beings a few years ago, Zipf<sup>1</sup> developed the "principle of least effort," which he later applied to many manifestations of human behavior. This principle, in brief, is that human beings will try to minimize the over-all average rate of their work expenditure per unit of time and consequently to expend the least effort possible in view of their needs and expectations. You can test this on your own mass-communication habits. Are you not more likely to listen to a station which comes in with a clear signal than one which makes you strain to hear? Are you not more often inclined to read a story in a magazine at home than to walk ten blocks to the library?

But, you will say, there are times when you do insist on listening to a faint station, or do walk a long way to the library. This also is an important fact for paywar operators. When the Communists occupied Seoul, anti-Communists who still had radios would crawl under the floors of their houses and wrap the radio and themselves in stifling bed quilts so that they could listen a few minutes a day to the UN radio. They would stealthily pick up UN leaflets, although they could pretty well count on being killed if caught picking them up. The lesson to learn here is that availability and need are relative; that is, everything else being equal, the residents of Seoul would have taken the easier way, selected the mass communication that was easily available, and taken as little risk as possible. But everything else was not equal. Zipf would say that these people were considering their future problems at the same time as their present problems and trying to minimize their effort over the long haul. By doing the more difficult thing now, they expected to be able to save effort and trouble later. Another way to say it is that these persons felt within them an urgent need to receive UN messages.

The paywar operator can usually count on at least two groups of people—his special friends and his special enemies inside the target country—to maintain a high level of attention to his messages. They need to hear what he has to say, to make use of it pro or con, the one group because it is ammunition for them, the other because they need to counter it. In Seoul, for example, both the clandestine anti-Communists and the Communist monitors could be counted on to try to listen to our radio output. From the great mass of people inside the target country, however, paywar can expect no such interested attention. For them, therefore, availability of the message is the important thing—the strength of the signal, the convenience of the hour, the place where the leaflet is dropped, the location of the picture.

Even with the interested audience of friends, of course, a readily available message is more likely to get through than one that is not readily available. For example, many of the anti-Communists in Seoul felt they could dare to listen only ten minutes a day at most. This left it up to American paywar operators to enable them to hear, and hear the needed message, without wasting precious time. If they had to spend five minutes tuning in, or five minutes waiting for the program they needed, half a day's communication time would be wasted. If there were many days when the station could not be heard, or the program was not the one needed, the effort and risk would soon cease to seem

worth while. Hence availability is a first requirement, both with friends and enemies.

### Differentiation of Message from Background

A person cannot respond to all aspects of a stimulus situation alike; if he did, his behavior would be wholly disorganized. Each of us tends, rather, to organize his attention in what psychologists call the "figure-ground relation." One part of a stimulus pattern tends to stand out clearly—this is the figure; the rest is perceived as background. We tend to respond to the figure rather than the background, although the background may influence the way in which we respond.

Thus, paywar operators need to have as clear a grasp as possible of the answer to the question: what are the qualities of a stimulus-event (for example, a message) that are likely to differentiate a figure clearly from its background?

Here are a few principles that emerge from research on the figure-ground relation:

The larger of two areas tends to be seen as the ground, the smaller as the figure. Designers of successful book jackets and advertisements make use of this knowledge by placing a relatively small amount of type on a relatively large background. In paywar terms, this means that chances of getting attention are being squandered—other things being equal—when a leaflet is nearly all text and graphic, or when a poster does not make use of ample white space to contrast with its message.

A complete and closed design is more readily seen as figure. A person will use his imagination, once his attention is fixed on an uncompleted figure, to complete it—as the well-known Rorschach "ink blot" tests show. But our concern here is with how to get attention to begin with, that is, how to get people to perceive as figure the particular thing we want to communicate. The verdict of experimental psychology on this point is that an uncompleted design is less likely than a complete or nearly complete design to stand out as figure. For paywar this means, other things being equal, that representational pictures are more likely to gain attention than abstract ones; simple closed layouts in a poster are more likely to be seen as figure than less simple, more cluttered ones; clear type is more likely to be seen as figure than dull or broken type. Remember once again that the discussion here is about attention, not about meaning and not about making people think. There may be good reason to use abstract art on an in-

complete design for other purposes. All we are saying for the moment is that they may not be so heavily counted on to get attention.

The brighter of two areas tends to be perceived as the figure. This is usually true even when the darker area is smaller than the brighter, especially when the brighter area is toward the center of the visual field. One notable exception to this principle, of great importance to the paywar operator, is the case of black type on white paper, which does get attention, as we all know, whether theoretically it is supposed to or not. Usually, however, attention goes to the brighter area, so that a leaflet's or poster's chances of getting attention can often be much improved by putting a spot of bright color into the display. The details embedded in the darker areas will not attract much initial attention; to begin with, therefore, we attract attention to the bright area, hoping to arouse enough interest to send the reader on to examine the darker areas next.

Some colors are more effective than others in making one part of an area stand out as figure. Color will ordinarily attract attention away from black and white, as many experiments with advertising have shown, and some colors will attract attention from other colors. For example, an orange picture or sketch will be more readily seen as figure against gray or white than a red picture or sketch, and a red unit surrounded by gray or white is more likely to be seen as figure than a blue one. In other words, the paywar operator can get attention by contrasting carefully selected colors.

What colors have the highest attention-getting value? In one experiment Adams<sup>2</sup> exposed four colors at a time for very brief periods, and the observer was required to report which color he noted first. The results indicate that orange was seen most frequently (21 percent of the time), with red, blue, black, green, yellow, violet, and gray following in that order. However, in this experiment the brightness (absolute amount of reflected light energy) of the color samples was not fully controlled, and this somewhat reduced the reliability of the results.

What combinations of colors attract attention best? Another group sought to determine the maximum distance at which words printed in different-colored inks and on different-colored papers could be read. (Distance thus became an index of discriminability rather than initial attention getting value. The subjects were instructed to look at the papers.) The results indicate that of 11 combinations the most effective were (in order) blue on white,

black on yellow, green on white, and black on white. The least effective were orange on white and red on green.

Two other observations may be noted briefly: To the observer, red hues seem to be closer than others, and darker colors seem uniformly heavier than lighter ones.

Let us add a note of caution regarding the data on color attractiveness. Such differences between colors may not be common to all persons; that is, we might get different results from observers from different cultures. This remains to be seen, especially since there are some indications of consistency from culture to culture, for example from Japanese to American, which suggest that the same color-preference scale is common to all cultures. Other indications suggest that the language and concepts used in some cultures in responding to color stimuli may make it difficult for their members to discriminate colors at all, or at least may alter the color-preference scale. For the time being it would seem wise to examine any available cultural data concerning the specific target we are aiming at before committing a paywar operation to any particular colors or combinations of colors as means of getting attention.

Most of the research on the figure-ground relation has been done in the field of vision not that of sound. Yet some of the tried and tested devices of the orator for gaining emphasis are in the nature of separating figure from ground. For example, the good speaker knows when to use an increase in loudness and a rising inflection to call attention to an important phrase. He can set off with a brief pause the word or phrase to which he wishes to attract special attention. He knows how to change his rate of speech and to say the important point slowly and impressively.

The paywar planner, of course, can delegate responsibility for figure-ground problems to his producers and announcers. He can in large part delegate another set of auditory figure-ground problems to his sound engineers. The latter problems have to do with how to get speech to be heard clearly as "figure" against a background of noise. Research indicates that there must be a considerable ratio of speech energy to noise energy before speech becomes readily intelligible. Exactly how great this ratio must be is an engineering problem. But one concern of the paywar planner certainly must be to see that enough energy is gotten into the loudspeaker or the radio signal to overcome noises and jamming. Background conditions will vary the demands on the signal. For example, Miller<sup>1</sup> in 1947 found that speech is more readily intelligible against high-pitched sounds (900 to 4000 cycles

per second) than against low-pitched ones (20 to 1100). This means that a loudspeaker will probably require considerably more power to be heard above artillery than above equally loud small-arms fire. There is also good reason to think that a language such as English, where the consonants are very important, will require loudspeakers that are strong in the high frequencies. This is because consonants are usually higher frequency sounds than vowels. In a language where less of the meaning is carried by consonants there would be less need for loudspeakers to be strong in the highs.

Whether in visual or auditory paywar, contrast is obviously the subject under discussion. The problem that is being posed is, how can we attract initial attention to a paywar message by causing it to contrast with the rest of the target's environment? And it is worth noticing that we really have to do with two levels of contrast: that between figure and ground within the message itself, and that between the message as figure and the target's environment as ground. In general a sharper figure-ground relation within the message will serve to attract attention to the message as against competing messages; an advertisement that makes good use of white space or of color contrast will, other things being equal, attract more attention than one that is less varied. And the principles of figure-ground relation within the message will, in general, apply to the relation of message to environment as well.

The paywar planner therefore needs, and must try to get from intelligence, as nearly complete a picture as possible of the background against which his message must attract attention. He will then try to design his message so as to contrast with that background. There might, for example, be an advantage in using a paywar radio announcer with a slightly "foreign" accent; in the ears of members of the target audience this would be in contrast with the other sounds competing for their attention (although the value of attention would have to be balanced against the resistance the unfamiliar accent might arouse). A spot of bright color can be counted on to attract initial attention to a leaflet. For the same reason, music will serve as bait for radio commentaries or for loudspeaker messages, and a bright and snappy headline, perhaps one with a new twist, will serve as bait for a run-of-the-mine news story. In 1940 the Germans dropped on Paris carefully prepared leaves symbolizing the falling of French soldiers, and they were more conspicuous because they were dropped not in autumn, when falling leaves are common, but in springtime. The contrasting bait, let us notice, need not always be brighter or louder or more exciting. In some situations a calm quiet voice

on the radio will contrast in the desired manner if the other voices being heard are excited and emotional. And it is hardly necessary to say that there are occasions when paywar must avoid any great contrast—for instance in black propaganda, which needs to be sluiced unobtrusively into the common information diet of the target.

Nevertheless the thing the paywar operator must rely on most for gaining attention for his message is sheer intensity of the stimulus. The intensity should be appropriate to the conditions in the target audience's environment. Intensity by itself contributes to the likelihood of getting attention. A loud signal on the radio, a booming voice from a speaker are examples. Both the Communists and the Nazis have made good use of this principle. The Russians in North Korea would often plaster a whole wall full of identical posters, thus creating a gigantic splash of color and mass. Huge parades and more-than-life-size statues have been used for attention-getting purposes by all totalitarian movements. (The gigantic curtains of light that served as backdrops for some of the Nazi party rallies will never be forgotten by anyone who saw them.) Yet there is not a simple 1 to 1 relation between intensity of stimulus and the effect on the target. Several other factors must now be considered.

#### Other Important Factors

Amount of Previous Stimulation. According to Weber's law, in order to produce an increase in the amount of effective stimulation we must not merely increase the physical magnitude of the stimulus but must increase it by an amount proportionate to the amount of the initial stimulus. Increasing a weight from 90 to 93 grams may make it noticeably heavier for the man holding it; it does not follow from this that increasing it from 93 to 96 or from 115 to 118 will also make it noticeably heavier. What matters is the ratio between the added stimulus and what it is added to, not the absolute amount of the added stimulus. With weights, experiments show that the increase must be not less than a thirtieth part of the weight being held in order to be noticed.

Weber's law has important implications for paywar even though no paywar operator is likely to be concerned very often with the weights his target audience can lift. For the principle involved can be restated so as to apply to other senses as well as the kinesthetic. It tells us that there are definite limits to the use of intensity to gain contrast. For, if each competitor for attention merely tries to talk louder or more excitedly than the others,

before long all competitors will merely be screaming. If the competition for size and brightness is intense, soon differences in size will become imperceptible and all shades of brightness will look merely garish. The more paywar intensity is competitively increased, the farther it will have to be jumped every time in order for the jump to be noticed. And, this being the case, a smart planner learns to rely on other devices for attracting attention.

It is self-evident that paywar can be most economically waged where—or when—the mass of competing stimulation is relatively small—in paywar during the lulls between battles, for example, or in political paywar against civilians who are chronically inactive.

Repetition. One way of manipulating intensity is to accumulate it, that is, by repetition. Seldom does the paywar operator expect one or two messages to accomplish his total purpose or even catch the attention of large segments of his designated target. He knows it can't be done, no matter how strongly his messages may be delivered. He must therefore repeat his message, preferably with enough variation to avoid monotony. In short a message that would be barely noticeable in the mass of other activities if communicated only once may, if repeated many times, eventually command a high degree of attention.

The nature of the relation between repetition and attention as it applies to sensation and behavior has not yet been studied much even under laboratory conditions. There are, however, good reasons for believing that such a relation exists. Frequent and consistent, though minor, interferences with whatever a person is doing tend to build up a state of tension, and this eventually requires him to do something about it. The first thing he does usually is to pay attention to the stimulus situation that is interfering.

In order for the effects of repeating an individually ineffective stimulus to accumulate into something that does catch the attention of target-audience members, the repetitions must be closely spaced. A daily dose of a small leaflet, an idea planted regularly in a newspaper, or a suggestion artfully reiterated over the radio may scarcely be noticed in the first days or weeks. But it may well build up to something that is regularly attended to and thus become a jumping-off point for further ideas.

The effectiveness of repeating a given intensity of stimulation may be greater if there are unconscious sets, or states of readiness, that dispose the recipients to react in line with the stimulation. There is ample evidence that a repeated stimulation does



build up a set to react to it and that this is true even if the person being stimulated is wholly unaware of it. For example, an experiment by Ross and Farrell<sup>1</sup> made use of five-letter anagrams, that is, disarranged letters that can be rearranged into a word. A special (experimental) group was put through practice sessions where they were asked to solve 20 anagrams that could be solved only by using a word associated with nature (for example, enklq, which can be turned around only into quake). The group members were not told of this limitation, nor did they notice it in the course of the experiment. After the initial series of 20, they were given a further 20, all of which had several possible solutions (for example, dacre, which could be rearranged to spell cedar, radic, or card). A second, or control group, was then given this second series of anagrams, without having had prior experience with the anagrams involving nature solutions only. By comparing the two groups, it was clearly shown that practice with the nature-solution anagrams had established in the subjects of the first group a set to solve the second ambiguous series predominantly in terms of nature-related words. Other experiments by the same workers showed that sets could be established for other kinds of solutions as well, and that the occurrence of the nature set in the experiment just cited was not a chance affair. The interesting point here is that these sets had all been built up without the knowledge of the people concerned. They had merely solved the problems, without realizing that all the solutions had something in common. But as far as the point of the experiment is concerned, the enforced repetition of the nature set in the preliminary series had paid off.

The paywar uses of this device are numerous and valuable. The hint that the war was not going very well for Germany, that all was not well, and that important facts were being bottled up by the German leaders were repeated over and over again on "Annie's" radio station during World War II. The message was so sluced into Annie's output that it would hardly be noticed the first time a listener heard it. Its purpose, which it undoubtedly achieved with many listeners, was to build up a set, and as a result of it more and more suspicion that the good news was not so good as it sounded and the bad news worse than official news releases pictured them to be. Similarly, when a Japanese ship had been sunk but the sinking not yet admitted by the Japanese admiralty, we could quietly ask—and keep on quietly asking—"Where is the (naming the ship)?" The Japanese would either have to do something about the accumulating stimulus or accept the consequences as regards the set of the radio listeners.

Timing and Spacing The paywar operator can manipulate his intensity factors advantageously also by varying the parts of his message within time and space. The skillful advertiser knows how to build a campaign to a crescendo, varying the emphasis frequently from point to point to avoid monotony and retain attention, and so building to a point where all the appeals and arguments come together. The skillful designer knows how to lead our eyes around a display, attracting attention first, then directing it. Research with eye cameras<sup>5</sup> indicates that the spot where we usually look first on a page, an ad, or a poster is slightly above the middle and slightly to the left. From there, as we scan the display, our eyes typically move upward and to the left and then in a clockwise direction around the whole thing. This is not always the case, of course. Sometimes a clever attention-getting device will make us start elsewhere on the page or scan in a different pattern. But if you look at any collection of tested advertisements or posters you will notice how many of them have the attention-getting picture or headline above the middle and to the left. The good paywar designer uses the same device in his printed display materials: he so arranges his materials on a leaflet or poster as to take advantage of the clockwise motion of the eye and thus control to some extent the order in which his reader attends to the materials included. At least that is what he does for audiences that read from left to right, for we do not know whether the same principles apply to audiences who read from right to left (like the Arab peoples) or from top to bottom (like the Chinese). Let us repeat our word of warning: most of the research we can report here has been done in America and on Americans. It should be applied to other and different peoples only after making use of all available information on their communication habits. In approaching a new target audience the paywar planner, in other words, should not take it for granted that they are like us. His best bet, if he is not certain, is to ask these basic questions: How do experts in the target country use communications to further their ends? How do they design printed materials? How do they time combinations of messages on the radio? Of course the experts in the target country might be wrong or at least less right than they would be if their social science research were as far advanced as ours, but their guess is likely to be better than ours.

One service which the paywar operator can perform by way of directing attention is that of indexing his message. All mass communication indexes its content, although not always by a

table of contents. A newspaper, for example, indexes by means of headlines and provides a judgment of relative importance by varying their size. Radio indexes by cue words within programs and sometimes relies on "Flash!" or "Bulletin!" to rouse attention quickly. An index of this kind gives a key not only to content but also to relative importance. And the indexing, of course, is within the power of the operator to control.

Relation of Stimulus to Needs. Another way to manipulate the intensity of communicated messages is to relate them to what the person who is to receive them needs. A person who does not have a need related to the stimulus he is receiving is not likely to notice that stimulus unless it is extremely strong; a person who does have a need related to the stimulus is likely to notice the stimulus even though it is of low intensity. We shall want to talk about this later in its relation to perception and response. But it will be sufficient to point out here that advertisers have used this knowledge for years in their struggle for attention. They always try to make the headline or the illustration ring a bell by tapping one of the basic needs of the audience. That is why you often see pictures of nearly nude women attracting attention to advertisements for such not-too-closely-related things as motor oil. The needs of a person, of course, change from time to time. A sex-starved man after a full meal is more likely to notice the picture of a female form than an illustration of a beefsteak; in fact it would take a very prominent picture of a steak to attract him at all under those conditions. In any case a paywar message can immensely increase its likelihood of getting attention by relating itself to the known needs of the target. If the members of the target audience are nostalgic or bored, they can be attracted by familiar music or pictures or news from home. If they are being kept in the dark as to war developments and curious for news, they can be attracted by a battle map.

If you have any doubt that the intensity of stimulation is increased by relating a message to a person's current needs, test yourself. How do you react even to a very small reference in a newspaper to a speech you have made, to a casual reference to a fire in progress near your home, or to the name of your home town in a list of names otherwise unattended to during a newscast?

Relation of Stimulus to Target's Personal Experience. The intensity of a stimulus may be varied also by relating it to what a person knows. If he has had experience with that kind of stimulus material in the past, he is likely to have his pattern of response to it set up. For example, we have just mentioned the attention-getting value of information about one's home town, or of some-

thing else that is close to a person's experience. An item about the enemy soldier's home town is likely to attract his attention, other things being equal, even if it is a very small item; a very large item about an unfamiliar place is less likely to attract it. On the other hand his experience with a given kind of subject matter may have led him to want to avoid it in the future. He may react to it in terms of boredom or disgust or suspicion. Thus some radio listeners at the present time seem to turn off their attention during certain painfully familiar commercials. Similarly, American soldiers listened to Tokyo Rose's disks but tended to resist or ignore what she said.

It is worth noting that, if a message does not fit into the target's educational and cultural background, the chances of getting attention for it are small. It might be difficult, even through the strongest message, to impress illiterate Chinese Communist troops with the idea that their radar equipment is not functioning well for some obscure reason. And it was discovered long ago that when we talk in rather general terms about democracy and freedom to most Asiatic audiences, we attract very little attention, because these concepts, as we use them, tap nothing within their experience.

### Summary

What does all this mean to the paywar operator who wants to attract attention to his message? First of all he must try to make his message easily available. In the second place he must so design and construct the message as to make it contrast with the environment in which it is to be received. The principles of figure-ground relation will help him here. He will try to take full advantage of background space, completeness of design, brightness, and color differences. Most particularly, he will try to use a color that will stand out. The foregoing, of course, applies only to printed messages. In broadcast messages he will try to be sure that he is getting enough energy into the signal to overcome noise and jamming and that he is using the right frequencies and so making his words intelligible. He will try to see that his announcers make use of tested devices of speech for obtaining contrast and emphasis. Finally he will manipulate his messages so as to derive the advantages of intensity of stimulation without always having to use sheer physical intensity (which, he knows, requires larger and larger increases in order for them to be noticed at all). Instead of relying only on loudness and size,

he will use repetition. He will vary timing and spacing for maximum cumulative impact. He will try to relate his message to some current need of his target, since this will greatly increase the effective intensity of the message; and he will be careful to keep his message within the cultural experience of his target for fear there will be no attention to it at all.

## GETTING THE MEANING ACROSS

### The World around Us and the Pictures in Our Heads

In the early twenties, Lippmann<sup>1</sup> introduced his widely influential book on public opinion with a famous chapter entitled "The World around Us and the Pictures in Our Heads." This chapter tried to describe man's relation to his environment;—in particular, Lippmann was interested in the way man gets the information on which political decisions are made. He cited the fact that a public figure is many different things to many men, and that two nations can attack "one another, each certain that it is acting in self-defense, or two classes [can be] at war each certain that it speaks for the public interest." Then he continued with a much-quoted statement: "They live, we are likely to say, in different worlds. More accurately, they live in the same world, but they think and feel in different ones."

Lippmann came to the conclusion that every man thinks and feels in a different world from the world of every other man. Every man constructs a pseudo environment between himself and his real environment. He does not deliberately falsify his environment. But his own experience is never exactly like that of any other observer, and he interprets any new experience in terms of his previous experience. Only a small part of his experience, moreover, comes to him direct from environment. The great bulk of it filters through news services, textbooks, reports, tradition, custom, gossip, and rumor. These do not give him a full and accurate account of the things they speak to him about—not necessarily because of any deliberate choice on anybody's part not to do so but because of

...the artificial censorship, the limitations of social contact, the comparatively meagre time available in each day for paying attention to public affairs, the distortion arising because events have to be compressed into very short summaries, the difficulty of making a small number of people

a complicated world, and finally the fear of facing those facts which would seem to threaten the established routine of man's lives.<sup>5</sup>

In an eloquent passage, Lippmann tells how man builds a picture in his head of the world beyond his reach:<sup>6</sup>

The world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind. It has to be explored, reported, and imagined. Man is no Aristotelian god contemplating all existence at one glance. He is the creature of an evolution who can just about span a sufficient portion of reality to manage his survival, and snatch what on the scale of time are but a few moments of insight and happiness. Yet this same creature has invented ways of seeing what no naked eye could see, of hearing what no ear could hear, of weighing immense masses and infinitesimal ones, of seeing and separating more items than he can individually remember. He is learning to see with his mind vast portions of the world that he could never see, touch, smell, hear, or remember.<sup>7</sup>

This is the state of affairs psywar is up against. It deals with a target audience that has little direct contact with its political environment but builds up mind pictures of that environment and makes decisions on the basis of those pictures. We may assume that the pictures are not precise representations of reality. Worse still, no two members of the target audience have pictures in their heads that are exactly alike. The nature of those pictures, however, and the respects in which groups of men hold approximately the same picture, are among the most important facts the psywar operator needs to know. For what he is trying to do is to modify the pictures in certain persons' heads. He knows what picture of political reality he wants them to have. But in order to get his way about that he needs to know what picture he has to change, and which persons or groups of persons have what picture in their heads, so that he can plan the changes he seeks to bring about. Most important, assuming that he can get attention for his message at all, he needs to know what happens to a message after it has been communicated and, in general, how new messages become parts of the pictures in people's heads.

We perceive the world in terms of its meaning to us. The psychologist ("perception" is his term) means by perception the interpretive response an organism makes to a stimulus. Our perception of a stimulus is the meaning that that stimulus has for us.

#### Individual Perception

This, then, is the first thing to remember about perception: the individual always tends to perceive the world in terms of its meaning to him. Krech and Crutchfield<sup>8</sup> give the example of an

<sup>5</sup>Reprinted by permission of author and publisher.

aviator who lands in a primitive country where no airplane and no white man have ever been seen before, that is, where people have had no experiences with either. The complicated machine and the light-skinned man with the parachute on his back will not, however, be meaningful to those people. Far from it; they will at once relate the new experience to whatever frame of reference they have that will help explain it. Perhaps the flying machine will seem to them a kind of bird. Perhaps the strange man who can fly through the air will seem to them a god. In any case they will somehow manage to classify and interpret the new experience in terms familiar to them. And the resultant classification-interpretation will be its meaning for them.

A flight operations officer searching for an airplane lost in the heart of Africa would, of course, interpret the event in question, both plane and pilot, very differently; it would never occur to him that the latter was a god before whom he must bow. Perhaps the point will be clearer if we ask ourselves how a garage mechanic and a physician would perceive an automobile accident at which they both happened to be present. Each would be receiving essentially the same physical stimuli as the other. But their interpretive responses would be as different as chalk and cheese. The physician might see injured people, with a smashed automobile as background. The mechanic might be seeing the broken parts of the car and turning over in his mind the problem of getting the car moving again, for his natural response puts the injured people in the background. Bring an insurance adjuster, a new-car salesman, a reporter, and a priest to the scene and we will have four more responses, four more structurings, each different from all the others and each dictated by the experiences and interest of the individual involved.

Take another example. Imagine an American tourist and a native Mexican at a bullfight. What will each perceive? The American "is likely to perceive and stress the pain to the animal, the messiness of the scene, and the flies. The Mexican fan, on the other hand, might perceive and stress the skill of the performer, his daring or fearlessness, the fine technical points involved, and even the fine spirit of the bull in putting up such a good fight."

In each case, the observer is selecting a certain part of his immediate experience. The doctor selects the broken human bodies, the mechanic the broken cars. In so doing they distort the experience because they emphasize parts of it unequally. They may even add to the experience; many a witness to an accident,

In his excitement, believes he has seen something that in point of fact has not happened at all. And they relate experience to their previous experience, their needs and goals. The doctor will relate it to his medical training, the mechanic to his mechanical training, the salesman to his occupation of selling new cars, the priest to his vocation of saving souls. This is the way perception works. It is functionally selective. It selects so as to structure experience meaningfully for the perceiver. In selecting, it tends to distort, add, relate.

Take an example from paywar. During World War II this country made a series of highly expert films on the subject "Why We Fight." One of the films was "The Battle of Britain." Consider now how that film might be perceived by an Anglophobe who thought England had led us into war, by an internationalist who believed England had saved all Europe by holding the Nazis back until we could get ready, and by a pro-German who believed that we were on the wrong side. The Anglophobe would tend to select and emphasize the parts that showed England's lack of preparedness and the great stocks of supplies that had to be shipped in from America. The internationalist would tend to select the parts that showed the bravery and skill of the Royal Air Force and the stoical courage of the bombed British civilians. The pro-German, on the other hand, would probably see the picture in terms of the mistakes of the German campaign, and of what might have been. The Anglophobe would probably interpret the treatment of the British as unduly favorable, the internationalist as accurate and moving, and the pro-German as lying and propagandistic. The German air generals who appeared briefly on the screen would look fiendish to the internationalist, heroic and commanding to the pro-German, and pretty much like the British generals to the Anglophobe.

### Organization of Experience

A second thing to remember, then, is that we structure experience in a meaningful and functional way. Each of these men, as he watched the film, would be selecting and structuring the experience so that it would have meaning to him in terms of what he already knew and believed. The English psychologist Bartlett<sup>2</sup> said many years ago that "It is fitting to think of every human cognitive reaction—perceiving, imagining, thinking, and reasoning—as an effort after meaning." It is characteristic of



people everywhere that they want to live in an organized world, where sense data will mean something and new experiences can be related to something familiar and stable. The older people get, the stronger is this need for consistency in meaning (hence the growth of conservative political, economic, and social attitudes with age). These habits of dealing with consistencies in environment become crucially important. Thus when something new, different, strange is encountered, the easiest thing to do is to react to it in a way that will give it meaning, and let us feel we can cope with it. This dispels insecurity, makes us feel at home.

Another way to look at what was happening when different persons experienced "The Battle of Britain" or the auto accident or the bullfight is to say that each was structuring the experience functionally, that is, so that it would work for him. The Anglophobe, for example, was selecting material that would strengthen his mental set of dislike of England. Each in his own way was selecting that which would meet his needs, agree with his moods, strengthen his already existing mental sets.

There is a great deal of research evidence to back up this view of how perception works. McClelland and Atkinson<sup>2</sup> observed groups of sailors from a submarine school; one had been fed only 1 hour before; the second had gone 4 hours without food; the third had gone without food for 16 hours. The men were told that the purpose of the experiment was to find out what objects they could see in very poor light. They were put in a darkened room and shown a screen on which an operator projected nothing at all, although he went through the motions of operating a projector. Five seconds after each "slide" had been "exposed" the experimenter gave the subjects a broad hint that could be interpreted in a number of ways: "Three objects on a table. What are they?" or, "All the people in this are enjoying themselves. What are they doing?" When the answers were collected and checked it was seen that the longer the subjects had been without food, the more likely they were to give food-related responses. That is, the "people" were likely to be enjoying themselves eating; the three objects on the table were likely to be hamburgers, etc. Hunger also increased the size of the imagined food objects. For example, when the hint was "An ash tray and a hamburger—which is larger?", in the hungriest group 75 percent of the subjects said the hamburger was larger, whereas in the least hungry group exactly half the subjects said the hamburger was larger, and half said it was smaller.

Bruner and Goodman<sup>10</sup> in another well-known experiment used two groups of children, one from well-to-do families, the other from poor families. Asked to estimate the size of coins, the children from poor families overestimated the size of common coins, and the wealthier children did not. Each group, in perceiving the coins, was deeply influenced by its needs and its sense of values.

A simple experiment by Murray,<sup>11</sup> which you can try out yourself, shows the effect of mental sets on perception. Groups of young girls were asked to describe the picture of a man under two different sets of conditions: before and after they had participated in a game of "murder." The two sets of descriptions were significantly different. After the game the girls saw in the picture a much more vicious, dangerous, malicious man than they had seen before.

Many experiments have been designed to show the effects of mood on perception. In one of the more complicated of them, subjects under hypnosis were asked to describe a number of pictures. First the subjects were hypnotized, then the proper mood was induced—happy, critical, or anxious—and then the pictures were shown. After describing the pictures the subjects were told that they would forget all about what had happened, were brought out of hypnosis, and then hypnotized again. This time another mood was induced but the same pictures were shown, this procedure being repeated until they had described the pictures in each of the various moods. The results? The descriptions differed amazingly under the different mood-hypnosis conditions. Looking at the same picture the same subject might give these three descriptions under the different conditions:

(Happy mood) "Complete relaxation. Not much to do—just sit, listen, and relax. Not much at all to think about."

(Critical mood) "Someone ruining a good pair of pressed pants by lying down like that. They're unsuccessfully trying to study."

(Anxious mood) "They're listening to a football game or world series. Probably a tight game. One guy looks as if his side wasn't winning."

This is what perception does to "facts." The paywar operator must keep this in mind and make allowance for it. As Krech and Crutchfield<sup>1</sup> say, "There are no impartial 'facts.' Data do not have a logic of their own that results in the same perceptions and cognitions for all people. Data are perceived and interpreted

in terms of the individual perceiver's own needs, own emotions, own personality, own previously formed cognitive patterns."

Another way to say this is that individuals organize experience in terms of their established frames of reference. Lippmann<sup>8</sup> spoke of the pictures in our heads as "stereotypes" of experience. Today we are in the habit of calling them "frames of reference." Whichever term is used, what is being said in effect is that a new perception does not live a life of its own. Instead it promptly becomes a part of the organized framework of other perceptions that we have been building up all our lives. Thus, as we have seen, primitive tribesmen see an airplane descending in their midst, and their perception of it immediately becomes a part of their organized perceptual world. They think of it as a bird. They have to interpret it in terms of what they know. That is the frame of reference within which the plane has meaning for them.

Let us take another example. A Hindu, looking at a picture of a bull, would probably classify it in terms of a religious frame of reference; a Korean farmer might perceive it in terms of the farmwork it could do; a Spaniard might put it into a sporting frame of reference; a Texan would probably see it against a framework of cattle raising.

Frames of reference have much to do with the different ways people evaluate the same paywar message. Mention of a farmer with five acres of land might bring expressions of pity from Americans, expressions of envy from most Asians. Our description of freedom of the press has repeatedly been characterized in quite different and unflattering terms by Communists, whose frame of reference involves a wholly different concept of the press. Obviously it is important for the paywar operator to learn as much as possible about the frames of reference within which his messages are likely to be perceived. However, this is often difficult to do, and many mistakes result from doing it poorly. A classical instance here is a German leaflet used in World War II. The illustration was a bedroom scene, which is theoretically good bait for frustrated soldiers. But the bedroom was depicted much more luxuriously than any bedroom the average GI had ever seen, and the leaflet lost all its force because the readers related it to fiction or the movies or the "very rich," and not to themselves.

There are four characteristics of the way our frames of reference operate that are of special importance to paywar.

One of these is that we tend to organize experience so as to group characteristics of people and events. Thus most of us have ready-made reactions for use in evaluating other racial and eth-

nic groups. Americans tend to think of the British as stuffy, and the British to think of the Americans as crude. Americans tend to think of orientals as "inscrutable," and white Americans tend to think of Negroes as musical, carefree, irresponsible, and able to stand deprivation better than whites. These ready-made reactions save us a lot of time in evaluating people and social situations. You don't have to pause to study the new German resident down the street if you already have a picture in your head that tells you Germans are intelligent, efficient, stiff, and basically cruel and unfriendly. If you then meet your German neighbor and find that he is really kindly, friendly, and a little awkward, you simply classify him as an "exception."

The fact that these groupings are so common and so easy to establish is a fact that has been used since time immemorial for paywar. A good example is a series of cleverly contrived leaflets, available in World War II leaflet archives, in which the Nazi propagandists tried to exploit the American stereotype of Jews. The leaflets were episodes in the unpleasant career of "Sam Levy," who was back home making money hand over fist and seducing the sweethearts of soldiers. The Communists have tried to inculcate in people all over the world a stereotype of Americans as "capitalists, imperialists, aggressors," carefully devised so as to group together under the heading "Americans" all the characteristics that the Communist dictionary defines as reprehensible.

This, as the reader will recognize, is the invariable procedure in the type of propaganda known as "name calling." Understanding it will, furthermore, help us to see the role of "glittering generalities" and "transfer" in paywar. The Communists, where their propaganda has been successful, can evoke an instant and negative reaction by calling the name "Capitalist"; Americans, where theirs has been successful, can do as much by calling the name "Communist." Similarly, the word "socialism" has assumed for many Americans a stereotyped meaning that is quite different from the meaning the word evokes, for example, in England. On the other hand, Americans tend to respond very favorably whenever they hear "the American way" or "free enterprise" or "America First" or "freedom of opportunity," even if they are used with a very high degree of generality. The point is that everyone has "built in" these ready-made reactions and tends because of them to put a great many things under the same tent that do not necessarily belong together. Everybody does it, and the process is the same whether, like the victims of Communist propaganda, we are deceived as we form the stereotype, or, like the recipients of US propaganda, we are

told the truth. The point is to associate what you want to tear down with some hated symbol (the Nazis, for example, constantly in their home propaganda associated the American Government with Jews) or to associate something you want to build up with some favorable symbol (a lofty ideal, a revered tradition out of the past, etc.). This is making use of the phenomenon of grouping to transfer the evaluation of the known symbol to the unknown.

But the next characteristic of frames of reference, even more important for paywar, is that we tend to organize experience so as to resist any change in strong structures. Suppose that a Russian has learned through many years of Communist teaching to perceive Americans as greedy and money-mad aggressors who want to colonize the whole world. Suppose he then listens, on the short-wave radio from far away, to an American who assures him that we really seek only peace and friendship, and have no territorial ambitions. Will he promptly change his stereotype of Americans, or will he organize his perceptions of the broadcast so as to leave his previous perceptual organization intact? Almost certainly the latter. He will interpret the broadcast as "propaganda" or "lies." For once we build up a strong organization of meanings we tend to resist any change in it. We are likely to reject or distort any meanings that would be at variance with some previous perceptual structure that means a lot to us.

There is a great deal of research on this topic. For example, one significant experiment came out of an effort sponsored by the American Jewish Committee to combat anti-Semitism by means of cartoon propaganda (Cooper and Jahoda <sup>14</sup>). To check on the effectiveness of the effort, cartoons were submitted to a number of people, including known anti-Semites, all of whom were asked for an interpretation of the cartoons. Some of the cartoons featured a "Mr. Biggott" as the anti-Semitic villain, and others depicted anti-Jewish actions in various situations. These were intended to remind anti-Semites of their own practices, on the theory that prejudiced attitudes, thus exposed to light, could be identified and held in abeyance. The interpretations obtained from prejudiced persons, however, showed a result quite different from that intended. Take, for instance, what happened with a cartoon showing the hospitalized Mr. Biggott demanding "only sixth-generation American blood" for his transfusion. This was seen by some prejudiced subjects as a sketch of a socially inferior person striving for social status, and by others as one of a foreigner or of a Jew. In other words the cartoon failed to achieve

its central purpose, that is, to get each of them to identify himself with the stickler for sixth-generation American blood. A cartoon showing an anti-Semitic congressman being favorably impressed by and wanting to hire for his new party an applicant with a record of window smashing, race rioting, and jail terms, likewise mis-carried with the anti-Semites, some of whom said, "It might be anything crooked... might be a new labor party. That shady character makes me think so," or "It's a Jewish party that would help Jews get more power." And so on.

A direct onslaught on anti-Jewish attitudes would doubtless have been even less successful; most prejudiced people in our society don't like to admit their prejudices; those who do admit them defend them openly. Hence the cartoons have to be subtle to have any effect whatever. We have seen that the effect was frequently not that intended. Indeed the cartoons, once distorted, seem to have served as further support for the prejudices they were supposed to expose and destroy.

The paywar moral that the above experiment should drive home is this: paywar usually wastes its time and energy when it goes directly against strong structures, and that is what paywar is doing when, for example, it tells the enemy that his motives are bad or that he has made a mistake in getting into the war or that the American ideology is a good one and his a bad one for all mankind, etc. Messages that run so directly counter to motivational trends within the target audience haven't a ghost of a chance of being taken seriously and in the manner intended. And friendly paywar can make the same mistake; a major difficulty we have been up against in building NATO is that our European friends are reluctant to accept any facts or ideas that point to the likelihood or even the possibility of a third world war. They believe that World War III, if it comes, will destroy everything they value, themselves included, and that the building of large armies somehow makes World War III more probable. Paywar planners have to learn to recognize such strong structures within the target audience, and to attack them by indirection.

An experiment by Knapp<sup>13</sup> some years ago required college students to recall statements they had read concerning the expansion of Communism in Western Europe. There were two assertions, represented by equal numbers of statements: first, that Communism was gaining ground, second, that it was losing ground. The students who were opposed to the spread of Communism in Europe tended to recall better the statements that were anti-Communist, and vice versa.

Studies of prelection and voting behavior by Lazarsfeld<sup>14</sup> and others seem to indicate that strongly motivated Democrats tend to ignore Republican campaign propaganda, and strongly motivated Republicans tend to ignore Democratic campaign propaganda. A news story that treats the two viewpoints impartially, or presents facts favorable to both sides, runs up against a tendency on the part of each reader to seize upon the points favorable to his side and pass up those favorable to the other side.

The same behavior has been observed in rumor studies. Allport and Lepkin<sup>15</sup> in one study showed that people who opposed the program of rationing during World War II were much more prone than others to believe and repeat rumors alleging extravagant use of gasoline by high officials, or extravagant use of butter at army bases, etc. Such rumors were thus given a more or less favorable reception according as they agreed or disagreed with strong structures that the recipients were trying to defend.

The meaning of all this for the paywar operator needs to be repeated over and over again. A paywar operator is taking a great risk, as far as getting his message across is concerned, if he makes a frontal attack on perceptual structures that are strongly held by members of his target. Better to canalize or divert: "We can agree on most things, but let me suggest something to you," "You have done fine so far; now the next step is..." Better to make a flank attack, or enter under a friendly banner. For example, the paywar operator is much more likely to get a favorable perception if he can quote a friendly authority or transfer a respected sanction to what he has to say.

Another implication for paywar is the great importance of reliable and valid intelligence concerning the target. You need to know what structures are strong. You need to know what symbols and sanctions you can call on for help, and what names, if any, you can call. Propaganda randomly planned in ignorance of such knowledge may well do more harm than good.

A third thing to remember is that we organize experience in terms of proximity and similarity and often confuse this with cause and effect. This is a way of describing another device we have for combining experiences for easier handling. We organize together things that come to our attention about the same time or that seem to us to resemble each other in some significant way. We are not talking now about events or things that are similar, or close together physically, but rather about those that are similar or close together psychologically. Now what we select as being close together psychologically will be determined in large part

by our needs, knowledge, and moods. Thus, as Krech and Crutchfield<sup>7</sup> say, a child who has just been spanked may tend to organize "fathers, bullies, and castor oil" together as sources of pain and frustration. A mechanic may tend to organize power lawnmowers, automobiles, and propeller airplanes together because they all have reciprocating piston engines. A superstitious child may organize the fact that he failed to pick up a pin together with the fact that he shortly afterward had trouble with one of his friends.

This quality of perception has two important implications for psywar. For one thing it enables the propagandist to put labels on groups of people or events—"the do-gooders," "the economic royalists," "the Cliveden set," "the station wagon crowd," "appeasement," "imperialism," etc., without going against the usual mental habits of the target audience. That is, the propagandist can use a label in confidence that the similarities or proximities he directs attention to will dispose many members of the target audience to organize the persons or events together under the proposed label, without bothering to ask questions about the label.

Equally important for psywar is the fact that similarity or proximity often lead to a perception of cause and effect. The superstitious child who neglected to pick up a pin and then had a fight is likely to say that he had a fight because he didn't pick up the pin, although to other persons the two events may seem to have no connection with each other. The President who is in office during an economic setback or a humiliation in foreign relations is likely to be perceived as having brought them about, whether he could have done so or not. This works both ways, of course, and no President is likely to deny that he brought about or maintained peace and prosperity in the way his supporters claim.

For the psywar operator all this means that people aren't able, in the complex conditions of contemporary life, to look very closely at cause and effect. They therefore tend to see cause—or more precisely, causation—where there is only association or coincidence. More especially, they are willing to believe that someone whom they perceive as "bad" has been the cause of almost any "bad" event that has happened anywhere near him; or that someone whom they perceive as "good" has caused almost any "good" event. A rather startling piece of research on this point was done by Zillig<sup>10</sup> in 1928. In this experiment, two groups of children performed gymnastic exercises before their classmates. The groups were carefully selected and trained. One group was made up of children almost universally liked, the other of children al-



most universally disliked, by their classmates. The liked group had been trained to make mistakes, the disliked group to perform the exercises without the slightest error. But when the audience recorded its impressions of the two performances, it was found that the mistakes had all been credited to the disliked group. This was not malicious or dishonest; it is merely an illustration of the way perception works. Acts thought to be "bad" are much more likely to be organized with persons thought to be "bad," and vice versa. The audience really believed it had seen the disliked children make those mistakes. The same thing happens in the technique of "guilt by association" or "innocence by association," when an effort is made to encourage people to perceive someone as "bad" by associating that person in our paywar output with something already perceived as "bad," or the reverse.

The Nazis seized upon the strategic opportunity this offers to propaganda and blamed most of the ill of the world on the Jews. The Communists have used it to put the blame for everything unpleasant on "reactionaries" or on the Western powers. They have been able to convince many people of a connection between disease in Communist Asia and the "bad" Americans, despite the fact that they had to call in something as farfetched as germ warfare to explain the connection.

This does not mean, of course, that coincidence can be substituted for causality with all people at all times. As we have seen above, there may be strong structures of attitudes and beliefs on the part of the target audience that it will refuse to give up. The great majority of the Germans during World War II were committed to the notion that Hitler was "good," and it would have been difficult to persuade them that he was responsible for their ills. (It proved much easier to hang the blame on certain Party men under Hitler.) Moreover, the more a person has been taught to be critical (this usually coincides pretty well with educational level), the less he is impelled by strong needs or drives to accept an organization uncritically, and the more likely he is to look behind the label or the suggestion and study the facts as he is able to get them.

A fourth thing to remember is that we organize experience in terms of the language we have to describe it. By this time, you should have a fairly good idea of what is meant when we say that a message may not mean exactly the same thing to the target that it means to the source. It will be clear to you that this difference in interpretation is not merely a matter of differing definitions of words. Rather, it refers back to differences in experi-

ence, differences in needs, and differences in knowledge. A person tends to read into a message what he wants to, that is, what helps him to preserve his strong structures of needs, understandings, and emotions, in a word, what fits with his previous experience.

Language is, of course, the chief tool we have to use in paywar, but the paywar man cannot remind himself too often that perception of language is always affected by experience. Katz<sup>17</sup> points out that American civilians were at a disadvantage in communicating with returned servicemen after World War II because foxhole experience had no counterpart in unbombed America. Similarly, labor-management controversies are made more difficult by the fact that employers and employees have different ways of life. He says further:

The employer, owner, is superintendent, through his executive function of making daily decisions, and issuing orders and instructions, acquires a psychology of management. He can understand, though he may dislike, a union demand for more wages. But when the union requests, or even suggests, changes in the conditions of work or changes in personnel policy, he grows emotional and objects to being told by subordinates and outsiders how to run his own plant. For their part the workers have little understanding of the competitive position of the employer. Since the employer enjoys a way of life luxurious in comparison with their own, they find his plea of inability to pay a higher wage laughable.

If this is the situation among people who work in the same plant and live in the same city, how wide must the gulf of experience be between representatives of conflicting belief systems and widely different cultures, for example, Russians and Americans? That is why one valuable element in the make-up of an effective propagandist is the ability to think himself into the other fellow's shoes, and why there could be no better training exercise for the propagandist than a series of assignments that would make him assume the role of a member of the target audience. For example, an American trainee might be assigned to write the best papers he could possibly write, from the viewpoint of a Soviet citizen, on "why I love Stalin," or "Americans are warmongers," or "why I love my collective farm." For that is the kind of thing he will be doing, in effect, before every piece of propaganda writing he undertakes. The paywar man must try to develop genuine empathy with the target he is trying to reach; only by doing so can he be reasonably sure of conveying the kind of meaning he wants with the words he can use. This is considered further under Empathy in Chap. 7.

Another feature of language communication that is important for the propagandist is the fact that words sometime separate

themselves from experience altogether. We have very little time or opportunity, what with the busy lives we lead, to check words back against experience and reality. Words thus tend to become more than symbols and acquire a reality (and importance) of their own, quite apart from the realities they symbolize. Quoting Kats again:<sup>17</sup>

Viewed realistically, language as a living process has other functions than accurate communication. It did not arise in the history of the race, any more than in the development of the child, solely in the interests of precise interchange of information. Language as it exists is not the product of scientists trying to perfect an exact set of symbols; it is the product of an arena of everyday life, in which people are concerned with manipulating and controlling their fellows and with expressing their emotional and psychological wants. The prototype of language as a functioning process can be seen in the child's acquisition of words and phrases to extend his control of his environment beyond his limited physical reach. Similarly, adults use language to obtain sympathy, bulldoze their fellows, please or embarrass their enemies, warm and comfort their friends, deceive themselves, or express their own conflicts. Language in operation is often intended to conceal and obscure meaning.

The paywar man must learn very early that paywar is not waged with "facts" but with symbols, and chiefly, as we have seen, with words. These words often acquire emotional loadings. They lend themselves to the propagandist's devices for gaining acceptance, such as the "plain folks" technique by which a message is prepared in a folksy way so as to impress the audience with its homespun and believable quality. They can tell falsehoods or fact with equal eloquence, they can illustrate a point or distract attention from it, or they can exaggerate or play down. In general, fact tends to lag behind the word, because the word is easy to use and the fact is hard to check. Therefore the words themselves can accomplish something, just as, on a different level, a series of unfounded charges in the newspaper will usually accomplish something—because the denial never quite catches up with them.

It is hardly necessary to point out that words, whatever the purpose they are being used for in a paywar operation, need to be words that will be perceived approximately as the sender wishes them to be. The magnitude of the task of choosing the right words for communication between languages (and therefore between the cultures that lie behind the languages) is illustrated by this account:<sup>18</sup>

None of the great difficulties among the diplomats sitting around the international tables here (at the United Nations) arise from the differences in languages, alphabets, and consequently, ways of thinking, and in no tongue is more ingenuity required for accurate, precise translation than in Chinese.

The Chinese ideograph series is one of the world's oldest writing media, but the talk at Lake Success is so full of new ideas, new concepts, and new words that to translate even the basic Chinese itself into Chinese it was necessary to devise almost 2,000 new combinations of characters.

A perfect example of the trouble faced here by Chinese translators is the word "uranium," which has a persistent way of cropping up in diplomatic reports. The translators went into a huddle and came out with a decision to call the atomic base "U-metal." That, however, only started their headaches.

The symbol for "U" was found in the Chinese word for uranium, which in literal translation is the "U-tree." What was just as disturbing, from a purely point of view, was the discovery that the symbol for metal was contained in the first part of the word for "bell," which, literally translated, meant "metal boy."

After some cudgeling of brains, however, the calligraphers came up with the proposal to shave off the "tree" part of the "U-tree" character, discard the "boy" part of the "bell" character, and then in the best manner of diplomatic compromise, join the two alternatives to form a new symbol: "U-metal" is, as we would say, uranium.

One can easily imagine the difficulty of conveying the idea of an atom bomb to a cultural group that has no concept of either an atom or a bomb.

An individual's language is, of course, the product of the culture in which he was raised. More importantly for psywar purposes, language is a tool for getting along with the world, and the meanings that a language conveys depend on the kinds of problems encountered and solved in the recipients' culture. The person who tries to communicate with a person of another language will almost inevitably use some constructions or words that do not mean what he wants them to mean. The result is poor communication, or, in black propaganda, unmasking. Note the inept choice of terms in the last phrase of this sentence from a Japanese black leaflet: "It is advisable in such cases to take full protective measures by use of condoms, protective medicines, etc.; better still to hold intercourse only with wives, virgins or women of respective character." Or this unmodern use of the adjective "sweet" in a Communist leaflet dropped on American troops in Korea: "Cast aside all anxieties! Do not hesitate to surrender to the People's Army! You will then be able to meet again your comrades who have come before you, and soon return to your sweet home."

In all psywar operations that involve different languages, but especially when the language of the target country is dissimilar grammatically to English (or other Western tongues), it is important to have genuine experts in the language on hand—not to assure an accurate word-for-word translation of the English

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message the propaganda writer turns out but rather to assure adequate communication of the idea intended. Languages differ greatly in the rules used to communicate similar ideas—witness the German use of gehen and fahren to distinguish "going-by-walking" from "going-by-being-transported." The Chinese have 17 different nouns referring to kinds of mountains—Tsou, high mountain, and Nyan, for high mountain near a river, for example. The Arabic language has more than five thousand different words referring to horses, and hence it is hard for a Westerner to make accurate horse sense to an Arab. The word "to cause" has no counterpart in the language and thought of the Trobriand Islanders, and its absence is reflected in the general lack of teleological concepts, and of purposiveness as well, in their culture; the idea of working-in-order-to-receive-pay (or other compensation) is without meaning to them, as are questions of "why?" (which they answer merely in terms of "that's the way it has always been"). In the language of the Arapesh of New Guinea, notions of time and time relations are similarly impossible to express.

What we are saying here is not merely that members of foreign cultures may lack an informational basis for understanding a communication but also that their language may lack the concepts—thought vehicles—necessary for them to learn how to understand. Thus it is clear that the propagandist's task in trying to communicate accurately and to avoid looking silly to his audience, in comparison, for example, to the American advertiser's task of choosing exactly the right word or phrase to sell a product, can be monumentally difficult.

### Rumors and Perception

One of the best illustrations of how perception works, and also one of the aspects of human behavior that the psywar operator needs to understand most thoroughly, is the growth and passage of rumors. The most extensive work on rumor has been done by Allport and Postman,<sup>19</sup> who have studied the problem not only by observing rumors in society but by setting up experimental rumor passages in the laboratory. One of the rumors they studied during the war had to do with a Chinese teacher on vacation who, shortly before Japan's surrender, drove his car into a Maine village and asked his way to a hilltop from which he could see a view that a tourist guide had told him about. "Someone showed him the way," say Allport and Postman, "but within an hour the community was buzzing with the story that a Japanese spy had ascended the hill."

to take pictures of the region."

What had happened? Someone told the story. It was told over and over again. And as it passed from person to person, three things were happening to it. So, at least, Allport and Postman<sup>10</sup> concluded from their analysis of the case.

In the first place, it was being leveled. Details were being omitted:

The courteous and timid, but without honest, approach of the visitor to the native of whom he inquired his way, the fact that although he was certainly Oriental, his precise nationality was unknown. Likewise not mentioned was the fact that the visitor had allowed himself to be readily identified by people along the way; and that no one had seen a camera in his possession.

In the second place, the story was being sharpened:

Having accepted their special interpretation of the Chinese scholar's visit, the rumor agents accentuated certain features while minimizing others. The sharpening of selected details accounts for the overblown dramatic quality of the final story. What in the original situation was Oriental became specified as Japanese; what was merely a "man" became a special kind of man, a "spy." The harmless holiday pursuit of viewing the scenery became the much sharper, sinister purpose of espionage. The truth that the visitor had a picture in his hand became sharpened into the act of "taking pictures." The objective fact that no pictures of any possible value to the enemy could be taken from that particular rural location was overlooked.<sup>11</sup>

In the third place, the story was assimilated:

In the Maine countryside resident natives have had little contact with Orientals. Like most Occidentals they are unable to distinguish a Chinese person from a Japanese. They had only one available ruler for Orientals, firmly implanted in their minds by wartime news and stories: the "Japanese spy." No other category was available for the classification of this unusual visitation. A Chinese teacher-on-a-holiday was a concept that could not arise in the minds of most farmers, for they did not know that some American universities employ Chinese scholars on their staffs and that these scholars, like other teachers, are entitled to summer holidays. The novel situation was perhaps assimilated in terms of the most available frames of reference.<sup>12</sup>

This process—leveling, sharpening, and assimilation—seems to characterize the passage of all rumors. You can test it yourself, as Allport and Postman did, by playing a kind of parlor game: write a brief story, then whisper it word for word to a guest, who will whisper it to the guest on the other side of him, and so around the room. When the story comes back to you, compare it with the original. This has been done in the laboratory many times, in the transmission of both pictures (Fig. 1)<sup>13</sup> and words, and the same general principles of perception seem to apply.

<sup>10</sup> Allport and Postman, *The Psychology of Rumor*, p. 10.

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Consider what was happening in the incident of the Chinese teacher. The villagers were trying to give the incident a meaning. They perceived those details that added up to a meaning, selecting some details, rejecting others, distorting some, adding some (for example, the camera). The important question, of course, is this: what controlled their selection? They were obviously selecting in terms of the frames of reference available to them (which did



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Fig. 1—How the Owl Became a Cat—Visual Rumor

not include Chinese teachers on vacation in Maine), and in terms of their needs, moods, and anxieties as of that moment. The war was much on their minds. Japanese were objects of fear, distrust, and hate. Protecting their country was a high value of great importance to them. Their suspicion of foreigners was of long standing. They had been exposed to the Government's campaign for security of information, to spy movies, to the knowledge that cameras were prohibited around defense installations. And all this added up to a frame of reference, in terms of which they perceived this new event. As Allport and Postman<sup>19</sup> put it:

A yellow man—a Jap—a spy—photographic espionage, this idea led to the other with almost mechanical inevitability until the final conclusion emerged. . . . The three-pronged process of leveling, sharpening, and assimilation reflects the rumor agents' "effect after meaning." The facts of the situation, but dimly understood, did not provide the meaning that the espionage visitation required. Hence a single directive idea took hold the spy motif—and in accordance with it, discrepant details were leveled

out, incidents shaped to fit the chosen theme, and the experience a whole assimilated to the pre-existing structure of feeling and thought characteristic of the members of the group among whom the rumor spread."

Rumors are clearly an important weapon of psywar. But let us look at them here only in terms of the perceptual processes they illustrate and of what they mean to the psywar operator who wants to know how a message is likely to be received. For methods of countering rumors see the next section.

### Countering Rumors

If you want to anticipate how an intelligent enemy will defend himself you can look at some of America's experiences in rumor defense during World War II. A good account of these efforts will be found in Allport and Postman.<sup>10</sup>

In general, this country used two kinds of defense against rumor. The government agencies preferred the indirect method of smothering rumors with facts, that is, it did not repeat rumors even for the purpose of refuting them. The theory behind this defense is (a) that "rumor flies in the absence of news" and (b) that to repeat a rumor even for refutation may spread it farther. Therefore agencies like OWI, when they learned of a dangerous rumor, would release facts in answer to it without ever mentioning the rumor.

On the other hand, nongovernmental organizations and civilians put their faith in rumor clinics, which chiefly took the form of newspaper columns or radio programs in which rumors were selected for ridicule and refutation. The theory here was to bring rumors out into the open into a climate of fact and understanding, where they could not flourish. Such evaluation and study of these rumor clinics as was made indicates that (a) there was no evidence that newspaper rumor clinics, filled with ridicule and negation as they were, actually served to spread any rumors farther; (b) however, it was regarded as possibly dangerous to print a rumor in bold-face type, or to repeat the rhythms and slogan-like qualities of some of the more effective rumors; (c) it was felt that radio rumor clinics were more likely than printed clinics to spread a rumor, because of the dial-twisting habits of American listeners, and (d) there was some slight evidence that the clinics impeded the spread of rumor, and no doubt whatever that they succeeded in making their communities rumor-conscious.

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Along with these defenses, of course, there was a poster, newspaper, and radio campaign aimed at security of information. Typical slogans were "Think before you talk," "Enemy ears are listening," "Don't kill her daddy with careless talk." This is standing operating procedure (JOP) for any country at war.

### Summary

For the paywar operator this material illustrates the problems he faces in trying to get his meaning across to the target. The fundamental idea is Lippmann's thesis that all men know their environment in terms of pictures in their heads, which are not exactly equivalent to the world outside. The question, then, is this: how do they form those pictures? That is the problem of perception.

We perceive the world in terms of its meaning to us. Thus, we structure experience—we select, distort, add—but we always structure it meaningfully and functionally. That is, we see things in terms of our needs, our previous experience, our moods. We organize experience so as to make it fit into our frames of reference—and especially so as to resist change in the structure of belief and understanding that we strongly hold. We tend to group bits of experience—people or events—in terms of their similarities or nearness. Finally, we organize experience in terms of the language we have to describe it. Evidently, therefore, different people will perceive different meanings in the same experience, so that it is essential to know as much as possible about the frames of reference, needs, moods, and language of a target if one is to predict with any confidence whether an intended meaning will get across. As one passage quoted in the chapter said: "There are no impartial 'facts.' Data do not have a logic of their own that results in the same perceptions and cognitions for all people. Data are perceived and interpreted in terms of the individual perceiver's own needs, own emotions, own personality, own previously formed cognitive patterns."

In reviewing this chapter the reader will also recall the bases in perception for many devices of propaganda, such as name calling, glittering generalities, transfer, testimonials, guilt and innocence by association, and folkey language; and for the way that rumors grow and spread, and the way rumors are countered.

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## Chapter 4

## RESPONSE TO THE MESSAGE

## NATURE AND GROWTH OF ATTITUDES

The message has been received. It has attracted attention and been perceived, by which we mean it has been given a meaning in relation to the other pictures within the recipient's head. Now the message begins to operate within the realm of attitudes.

Psychologists list attitudes among the intervening variables. They call them "intervening" because, they say, attitudes come between stimulus and response, and help determine the way the individual responds to a given stimulus.

Attitudes are not the only intervening variables. Intelligence, habits, and motives all get between stimulus and response in much the same way that attitudes do. In point of fact, attitudes partly depend, as we shall see, on these other intervening variables, and have no particular advantage as regards determining the nature of responses. But because attitudes are the evaluators among these variables—because they serve to classify the stimuli on the scale of favor-opposition—they are often more useful than the others in predicting what direction the response will take. The internal effect of a stimulus can often be described in terms of attitudes, and attitudes can either facilitate or hinder external behavior which arises as an effect of a stimulus. Therefore it is important for paywar operators to understand something about how attitudes are formed and changed.

What is an attitude? Let us define an attitude as an inferred state of readiness to react in an evaluative way, in support of or against, a given social stimulus situation.

Look at that definition, piece by piece:

an inferred state—We cannot see an attitude. We can only infer it from a person's expressed opinions or from his actions.  
of readiness—Attitudes act like a steering wheel rather than an engine. The attitude is ready, but it doesn't start things. It

steps in to guide the direction of response after the process under consideration has been set in motion by a stimulus.

to react in an evaluative way, in support of or against—This is the heart of the definition. Attitudes are concerned with the pros and cons—the relative values—of living. They represent judgments that have grown up gradually with experience. They are the built-in measuring sticks by which we evaluate new experience. They always have two dimensions: direction, by which is meant where they stand, in relation to a particular stimulus, on a scale from favorableness to opposition; and intensity, by which is meant how strongly they are held, how energetically the holder is prepared to act in the direction they point, how vigorously he is prepared to defend them, etc.

a given social stimulus situation—This completes the picture of attitudes as tools for coping with our complex social environment. Attitudes help us to classify and respond to the great mass of stimulation that comes constantly into our nervous systems from social situations.

#### How Attitudes Grow

Children's attitudes are unstable. Parents and child psychologists know that. Children are fickle. The things they like to do, and the people they like to do these things with, change easily and quickly. This is not surprising. In children the neuromuscular apparatus that mediates learning is not very well developed, and there is no large accumulated backlog of habits to help in the learning of something new. What this means in effect is that it is fairly easy for one day's learnings to be displaced by the next day's. Thus a child's attitudes are constantly shifting and, along with them, his interests and even his abilities, and nothing can put a stop to the shifting except the gradual development, within the child, of a pattern that carries over from one learning experience to the next. The social and psychological conditions affecting a child vary so much from day to day that it takes a long time for him to learn to respond consistently to similar (not identical) stimuli. That is, a child's reaction to Communism or Negroes or religion may be now favorable, now neutral, now adverse, and it takes many occasions for him to learn the kind of reaction that is to be dominant and is to become a stable and generalized part of his personality.

A second reason for instability of attitudes in children is that a child's whole personality structure is rather unstable. A child

can shift fairly rapidly from dependence to independence, from aggressiveness to submissiveness, from politeness to rudeness—and all of these in response to the same individual or situation as stimulus.

Now, then, do attitudes become stabilized? The answer is twofold: (1) As other aspects of personality mature and become more integrated, as the person develops a consistent notion of himself and of the distinction between his own self and the outer world, attitudes become more consistent, and as they become more consistent they also become more completely integrated and perform more smoothly their function of supporting the rest of the personality in its complex relations with the environment. (2) As a child becomes older he adopts—by choice or by force—roles in various social structures or groups. It is through these that he gains his major satisfactions in life. Attitudes act in support of these roles and the structures of which they are a part. As he ages he becomes more closely allied with an increasingly consistent set of groups, and this helps stabilize his attitudes. (When attitudes remain inconsistent into adulthood, they often result in the development of neuroses, which reflect incompatible social needs and allegiances—a phenomenon that Horney<sup>1</sup> calls "the neurotic personality of our time.")

### Basis of Attitudes

The Learning Process. Attitudes are learned. Indeed, the basic principles of learning apply not only to the growth of attitudes but also to the formation of the whole basic set of tools we use for living in society, that is, the personality. Thus it is appropriate to ask, How do we learn?

We learn by building up an association between a cue and a response. A cue is simply a stimulus that stands out from the rest of our environment, as, in an earlier chapter, we spoke of "figure" as standing out from background. We respond to a cue under the influence of a drive and we are, once we have learned, rewarded. That is the basic formula in terms of which practically all human and animal learning can be interpreted.

By a drive we mean a tension that impels us to action. We have biological drives such as hunger, and social drives such as the need to understand our environment. A reward is any state of affairs that reduces the drive tension. Food, for example, would reward us in terms of a hunger drive, it would reduce the drive. Without drives, people would be inert. Without rewards

they would either die (if they failed to satisfy such drives as that of hunger) or they would live a goalless and chaotic kind of life.

Under the influence of a drive, then, we respond to a cue and are rewarded. A hungry animal in a laboratory is given the choice of walking toward a white or a black card. If he walks toward the black card, he gets nothing. If he walks toward the white card he gets food. Soon he associates white (the cue) with food (the reward), and under the impulse of the drive (hunger) he learns to make the rewarding response (that is, to orient himself and walk toward the white card).

Most human learning is more complicated than that, but the general pattern is the same. A child learns to say "please" in the presence of a complex set of cues, including his symbols for the food he wants and the sight of it in his parent's hand. He is told to say "please." If he does so, he is given the food. After a number of such trials, he learns to indicate the food, say "please," and collect his reward. In other words, he learns how to reduce his drive, and when he has thoroughly learned the response we say that he has acquired a habit.

But how does he learn to say "please" to reduce other tensions, for instance, when he wants to go riding with his parents, or wants a nickel to buy an ice cream cone? This is a long step in learning. Exactly how it is thought to happen is a rather complicated and technical matter, but suffice it to say here that the process is one of generalization or habit spread, and of discrimination. After a child has learned to associate the response "kitty" with the cues from his kitten, he will probably call other small furry animals kitty also. Having learned to respond "daddy" he will probably try it on men other than his father. The more nearly similar the cue, the more likely he is to respond to it in the same way. And as a result of trial and error he will learn to discriminate or to refine his habit. That is, he will learn which adult human with trousers, shirt, and tie will reward him when called "daddy." Many trials are necessary before the child learns to discriminate even among such fairly simple cues as these. In more difficult social situations it is correspondingly more difficult to learn to discriminate the cues which stand for alternative courses of action, and to balance the rewards and punishments of related actions.

However, repetition alone is not enough to assure learning. An instance in which simple repetition was depended on without the other conditions for learning being met, for example, by rewarding the response, was recalled by Hovland,<sup>2</sup> Chairman of

the Department of Psychology at Yale: "During the war a number of top advertising men developed a program which suggested every hour on the hour 'Hate the Germans,' but I could never diagram the relationship between that stimulus and the desired response to make sense in the form of a learning paradigm, and I'd predict no desired learning did occur." In this case, no matter how familiar the three words became, there was very little likelihood that they would arouse any of the desired emotion in their hearers.

You can readily see some of the implications of this learning process for the practice of paywar. For example, you want a given target audience to learn the habit of listening to your paywar radio broadcast. You know that if they listen and are rewarded, they will be likely to listen again. If the reward is fairly regular, their response is likely to become habitual. If they are not rewarded, they may not try again. If they are rewarded the first time, but not the second or third, their impulse to respond will probably be extinguished; that is, they will quit listening. But how does the operator make sure that they will be rewarded for listening? He looks for their tensions or drives. What can be done to reduce those tensions? Are they nostalgic for the old music which the Communists have barred? Are they frustrated soldiers lonely for the sound of a young female voice? Are they perplexed and in need of reliable news? The operator's job will be to plan his programs so as to meet those needs, reduce those drives.

Of course, this itself is a rather elementary piece of learning. What is really desired is to teach them more complex responses, in a more complex field of social and political cues. This is discussed in the following paragraphs.

The Developing Personality. A human infant does not exist as a person; he has no self. Even though he may be different from others in strength and loudness and frequency of crying and may be the dearest thing in the world to his parents, he still—as one psychologist has expressed it—"floats about in an undifferentiated absolute." He has learned next to nothing from his environment; he is highly nondiscriminative with respect to the cues he responds to; his behavior is quite general. But as he grows, his biological equipment becomes better organized. He is able to learn from experience, and he does so.

Slowly there develops (we can only conjecture this, for infants cannot talk and tell us about this) a vague distinction between "me" (self) and "not-me" (not-self). When he pinches his toes, there is



stimulation in the toes and the fingers as well, but when someone else pinches his toes, there is stimulation in the toes only—a different situation. As a result of turning, crawling, and falling, the infant encounters stimulation from the environment, each stimulation has in common with all the others the fact that it comes to "self," the same place.

After about a year the child acquires language responses and can begin to use symbols to stand for things. By the time (usually around age two) he is able to respond consistently to a symbol which stands for his own body—his name—it is possible to ask some interesting questions: Where's Johnny? The child will probably point to his nose or chest, somewhere along the line of maximum stimulation. Touch the child's hand and ask: Is this Johnny? The answer is commonly No. Is this Johnny's hand? Yes. Yes it is Johnny's hand, but it is still not a part of Johnny the person. He is vague about himself; he hasn't had enough trials to learn that all parts of his body are parts of the thing to which the symbols Johnny or "I" attach. The discrimination between self and not-self is poor and is not usually very clear until about five or six years of age.

After this time, when the child knows himself, there comes often a negativistic period which is so frustrating to parents and of great interest to psychologists. Having at last learned to discriminate "I" (the self), he begins to value that self (for it brings him a good many satisfactions). He plays with this new knowledge. It never stands out more sharply than when it is resisting the wishes of his parents. The self consists now of a good many things besides the child's body; it includes the habits he uses to gain particular ends, and it includes the drives these habits serve. And, in a figurative sense, it comes to include certain external objects that are important in his habit and motivational systems—his toys, his playthings, his parents, and, occasionally, his brothers and sisters. He reacts to these as though they were part of himself; they are important and are to be defended nearly as much as the symbol that stands for the self as a whole. And the symbol, the given name, for self becomes very important; it is the object of the attentions of others and is directly involved in the punishments and rewards the ego receives. "I" can have feelings hurt at the age of five, but hardly at age three.

This is where repression becomes important. Repression is the process whereby certain responses are forgotten and kept from appearing in overt behavior. Perhaps a case summary will illustrate it best.

An aviation cadet in pilot training was having considerable difficulty in passing his check flights, flights on which he was accompanied by an instructor. Although this was not uncommon in training, this particular case was interesting because on solo flights the cadet was observed to do very well in every respect. But when there was an instructor checking him in the other seat he flew roughly, didn't locate his check points, and performed several dangerous operations. Being strongly motivated to pass, he eventually came to the attention of psychologists at the base. About a dozen interviews finally revealed that the boy had a very strong hatred of his father. This hatred was completely unknown to him beforehand, and much difficulty was encountered in finally bringing him to recognize it. His problem in check-flying seemed to be that he was reacting with antagonism and fear to the instructor (though overtly he said he liked the instructor and got along well with him) as though he were his father. The hatred of his father had been repressed so that he for years was unaware of it; yet the emotional aspect of the hatred persisted and in a number of areas involving persons in father roles had been erratic and generally unsatisfactory to all concerned. (Notice here the operation of stimulus generalization.) After he had made the recognition of the hatred he was able to discriminate between the instructor and his father and was no longer erratic in check flights, eventually passing the course.

This is the outcome of repression. Repression is a learned adaptive response. The boy in childhood had expressed hatred for his father and was punished because our culture does not sanction father hatred. He then expressed nothing in the presence of paternal injustice and was rewarded for "being a man," "exercising self-control," and the like. When he expressed favorable attitudes toward his father, the rewards were even greater. Drive: fear. Cue: father (or symbols of him). Response: active inhibition of hate reactions and favorable verbalizations. Reward: release from fear. Hundreds of trials enabled the boy to learn a favorable attitude toward father (who undoubtedly had some redeeming features). But he could not—or at least did not—unlearn the un verbalized emotional reaction.

Why do we make special mention of repressions? Notice what happened to the cadet when repressed drives were aroused. His behavior was disturbed. If, through anthropological studies or other sources, a psywar operator can learn the nature of the strong repressed drives within the target audience—the ones that are widespread enough to be called "cultural traits"—then he has

an area of operation par excellence. The practical problem remains then to devise the stimuli that will arouse those drives, and others, and direct them for or against the objects or conditions that it is the mission of paywar to affect.

This sort of thing was attempted in connection with World War II propaganda against the Japanese. Anthropological data were interpreted psychoanalytically to indicate that the kind of training given most Japanese males, that which produced their well-known devotion to the authority of the Emperor, was highly repressive training. Each child went through a period of comparative indulgence during his first year. Authority in the form of the father was then invoked, and the child's status was sharply altered. The antagonism thereby generated toward the father tended to generalize to other authority figures but by severe punishments was repressed, while more desirable responses were substituted for it. The basic antagonisms remained but were repressed, and the child's need for security and freedom from fear was satisfied by approval conferred by authority figures. Now the problem for paywar was to find the stimuli which would arouse antagonisms toward certain authorities without at the same time evoking the stereotyped devotion to national figures and symbols.

The validity of the above interpretation of the Japanese, and the effectiveness of the propaganda based on it, are still matters of conjecture. That the mechanism of repression is important in individual behavior problems is no longer questioned. But it remains to be established whether or not propaganda programs made up of stimuli coming from outside a target country can manipulate it successfully.

Development of Social Relations. Most learning and most personality development take place in social situations. Repression is a social product. Therefore let us look at the way a child's developing social relations affect the growth of his attitudes.

Of what importance are group experiences and group membership to the developing personality?

In the first place it is only in the group that a person can encounter language. Language is a uniquely social product. The child learns symbols that stand for the things he plays or works with; he learns symbols for the other people in some group; he learns symbols for what he does and what the others do; he learns symbols that stand for himself and help him to discriminate between himself and things that are not himself. It is the presence of the language symbols that makes possible the discrimination

of his role in the group. Through language he understands the relationship of others to him, for example, in this form: "If I write on the wall, then Mummy will scold." This process of knowing what the next person is going to do in response to one's own action is of the greatest importance in the process by which a child becomes a fully socialized and certified member of a group, and thus in the formation of the child's self. Without language this indispensable communication, which defines roles and figuratively cements the group together, could not take place.

Another consequence of group membership is that there is assured for the child a consistent set of conditions in which the principles of learning can operate. The group provides him with consistent cues. The group provides avenues and facilities for responses to cues. And the group, most importantly, assures the operation of a fairly consistent set of rewards and punishments for responses. This is the most fundamental function of a group, speaking psychologically. It is the existence of a set of consistent cues to and consequences of motivated action that makes possible the assumption of roles and the first steps toward the learning of language.

Through behaving as a group member, then, the individual is enabled to learn three important sets of responses: (1) language responses, which allow communication and facilitate the discrimination of self from others, (2) instrumental responses, or the specific need-meeting skills the individual requires in order to perform his role, and (3) drive-producing responses. The last two classes of responses taken together embrace everything that is included under the label of "personality," and a good many other things as well. Let us emphasize the fact that in the group the person learns most of those responses and drives that outwardly distinguish him from others, and inwardly differentiate him from his others and enable him to know his "self."

**Roles** Several times now we have mentioned "roles" and "role-performance." These are a natural outcome of group living. Groups, as we have seen, are organized and repetitive sets of relations between people. In order for a group to exist, therefore, it must be possible for its members to count on each other to do certain things (such as, in a family, washing dishes) and not others (such as changing the oil in the family car). The efficiency of the group and hence the mutual values derived by the members from the group's existence would be impaired if everyone did or tried to do everyone else's job and did not learn to do a particular thing well—and regularly. Family life suffers if

the five-year-old children insist on doing the cooking and house-keeping or if the mother spends all her waking hours playing cards. Certain things must be done so that the group is able to provide satisfactions for its members and hence to exist. These things, peculiar to the various members, are called "roles."

From the standpoint of an individual the function of a role is to bring consistent satisfaction to consistent motives. From the standpoint of the outside observer of the group the function of roles is (a) to "socialize" the new members and ultimately (b) to cause the members to contribute to the continued existence of the group.

People come originally to occupy positions and to assume roles partly because they are born into an already going society and partly because they recognize roles and positions as means of satisfying motives already acquired. A child born into and growing up in a family finds roles already set up for the existing members. It is in and through role-taking that a person becomes "socialized," learns the ways and means of the group, learns a language, and "interiorizes" a set of values. In fulfilling the role prescription for "child" (whether it be "child in a family of ten," or "only child"), the young human being learns, as we have said, to differentiate himself from the others making up his social environment. And with the development of language he is better able to learn labels for himself, such as "good boy," "older brother," or "tough guy," and to use them as guides in his various role behaviors.

Roles gain in importance with time and become to some extent independent of the immediate group structure. Roles become a part of the person's ego structure, serving not only as a set of tools for providing life's rewards but also as a set of values.

Roles have also the related functions of bringing the person in contact with the cues and the incentives that trigger the motivational systems acquired earlier. At the same time they provide a channel for the satisfaction of these motives. Proper role-playing (meeting role prescriptions) ensures the maintenance of the individual in his position in the social structure, which ensures the meeting of personality needs (as for dependence or dominance), and at the same time ensures survival not only socially but biologically. Small wonder then that roles should become values in themselves. Witness how, when you ask a person who or what he is, he is likely to name some role, such as professor of olericulture, or plumber, and is likely to defend rather strongly the importance of olericulture or plumbing "in the modern world."

Role-taking integrates the person with others in his group. In addition to providing the individual with a personality and a set of values, organized around his major roles, role-taking has significant effects in relating the individual to other aspects of his groups. One such effect is called by a sociologist "taking the role of the other," which means being able to predict what others in the group are likely to do in given situations. Thus, a child gradually learns what his mother's functions are and can anticipate mother's responses to his own behavior. Such ability to take others' roles is the basis of good social adjustment; the social world becomes more familiar, and the person isn't constantly presented with surprising and often threatening reactions on the part of others.

An outcome of knowing what others' roles are is the learning and valuing of the common behaviors of one's group. Just as one's own role patterns become the normal and true way of behaving, the values that are common features of the role patterns of one's associates become commonly valued and commonly defended. To illustrate: it is "normal" in a statistical sense for each Mohammedan child to avoid pigs. Thus it becomes a shared norm and a shared value and is meaningful as a basis of communication only to the extent that it is shared.

Special kinds of attitudes are formed in relation to roles. The storekeeper is ready to act in certain evaluative ways toward the customer. The customer is ready for certain actions toward the storekeeper. Both expect certain actions from one another, and each expects the other to have certain attitudes toward himself; the storekeeper is deferential, and the customer expects him to be so. The customer knows he has certain rights and privileges and knows that the storekeeper knows this too. Both parties thus have definite expectations about one another, and each is ready to act toward the other in particular ways.

Role attitudes are a matter of being ready to act toward others in particular ways. They are therefore very important in the operation of groups. They are actually a part of the role prescribed for the person as his part of the group process. Without them the group does not function well—as witness what happens when a new person joins a committee. There is hesitation and caution until the new person finds an appropriate role for himself and learns what the others' roles are. After that, when everyone knows approximately what to expect of others and what others expect of him, the work of the committee speeds up.

To the extent that one's roles are limited to a very few situ-

ations or relations, one's personality tends to become standardized. There develops in bureaucrats, for example, such a pattern as one investigator has studied under the name "bureaucratic personality." The professor tends to act like a professor, the executive like an executive. They carry these action patterns even over into activities that are not occupational; for example, the professor tends to act like a professor even when he is buying groceries or on a camping trip. And with these roles go, inevitably, certain supporting attitudes. The professor carries favorable attitudes toward patience and thoughtfulness and careful attention to detail; the executive carries favorable attitudes toward quick, decisive action and forceful efficiency. These attitudes are generated within the roles that these individuals play. They act to support the individuals in these roles, and the institutions of which the roles are a part.

### Summary

Attitudes are learned. They are learned, like the other personality tools that help us to adjust to our environment, by discovering which responses to which cues will be rewarded. They develop as personality develops and as we learn to play our roles in society. They develop in such a way as to help us protect or express the enduring aspects of personality, and the rewarding patterns of social relations. Thus they represent evaluative judgments on the likely results of given behavior, and they serve as signposts of responses we are likely to make. Their signs, for the most part, point toward one kind of response, that is, they predispose us to action that will reduce our biogenic or emotional drives, preserve the values we hold, support behavior allowing us to use resources we are proud of, help us structure experience meaningfully, support our role concepts, and preserve our group norms.

Therefore the process of attitude formation begins with the individual's first breath and continues throughout life. His attitude structure, unstable and shifting at first, grows increasingly firm as his personality develops and he finds his place in society. It is into this long-continuing process inside each member of the target audience that the paywar operator sluices his message. The message must go through the same process as the countless other stimuli that have entered into the formation of the audience member's attitudes, that is one reason why it is important for the paywar planner and the paywar operator to understand some-

thing of the learning process, briefly described in the preceding pages. The new message will enter into a situation in which there are old, firm, accumulated attitudes and also relatively new and less firm attitudes. There will be attitudes that are strongly held and others not so strongly held; in general, the more an attitude tends to support the strong structures, the enduring aspects, of the personality, the more likely it is to be held strongly. But there will also be some strong attitudes that have been repressed and are never consciously expressed.

Without anticipating the subject matter of the following sections, it can safely be said here that the psywar message is likely to be accepted more easily if it follows the general direction of existing attitudes. If its purpose is to change attitudes, then it will be exceedingly difficult to change those that are old and strongly held. It will have more success if it works in the area where attitudes are new and not strongly held, though this, of course, is always a matter of more or less. If it can arouse some repressed attitudes, it may succeed in disrupting a personality or a group. If it can give protection to repressed attitudes that are about to be brought out into the open, it may prevent the disruption of a personality or a group. Whatever its purpose and its area of operation, however, the psywar message must be designed to take full advantage of the learning pattern. That is, it must present itself as a cue, a certain response to which will be rewarded. To say it another way, it must be so devised that, if the target individual responds in a certain way to the cue, one of his drives or tensions will be reduced. And if the desired response is really to be learned, it must be practiced. Once will not be enough.

But before this is discussed further, we had better talk about the kinds of attitudes that develop and how these different kinds of attitudes may enter into psywar plans should be considered.

## KINDS OF ATTITUDES

We have talked about the growth of attitudes in general and have said that they tend to cluster around the basic aspects of personality, predisposing us toward action that will protect or express those basic aspects. It will be useful now to discuss some of these clusters of attitudes and to suggest how psywar planners and operators may take each of them into account.



Attitudes Based on Biological Drives

Under normal conditions, the biological drives, such as those toward rest, food, water, air, general activity, or the elimination of waste products, do not play a significant part in determining attitudes, mostly because these drives are for the most part so easily satisfied. It is true that in infancy such drives have a relatively large hour-by-hour influence on behavior and attitudes because the very early years are concerned especially with learning appropriate ways of meeting such needs. Some psychologists and anthropologists believe that many long-run effects on behavior, including attitudes toward authority, stem from the early period during which the child learns to control eliminative functions and other biological drives. But normal living conditions in practically all cultures are such that these basic biological drives are reasonably well satisfied through habits and institutions, so that variations in them only rarely have a significant effect on attitudes.

Take, however, a battlefield, or an area which has just suffered heavy bombing, or any situation where society, or the current social structure, does not provide for reduction of the biological drives. They may suddenly become so strong and insistent that the other so-called "learned" needs are laid aside. Then attitudes may be adapted that support action tending to satisfy the now-dominant biogenic drives.

Here we may draw a useful distinction between sociogenic and biogenic needs and take note of the fact that biogenic needs usually predominate when the chips are down. A study of the effects of starvation was made at the University of Minnesota during World War II, using conscientious objectors as subject participants. Thirty-six conscientious objectors volunteered to be subjected to systematic semistarvation for a period of six months. During this time they lost, on the average, about 25 percent of their body weight, and with the resultant physical changes went psychological concomitants that are of great interest for paywar. For the subject participants knew they were perfectly safe from external harm, were being carefully observed for possible serious consequences to their health, and could terminate their participation in the experiment at will, so that in many respects they were not nearly so bad off as people in a bombed city or a prisoner of war (POW) camp. We might therefore fairly expect the things that happened to them to happen on a much larger scale in bombed cities and POW camps. (Last winter's news stories from Kojima Island are worth rereading in this connection.)

The Minnesota experiment shows now, under conditions of continued starvation, the effects of years of acquiring social habits and values rapidly drops away, exposing a core of self-preservative, biogenically oriented motivation. Keys and co-workers express it this way:<sup>3</sup>

An starvation progressed they became more and more silent, apathetic and immobile. Movements were slow and restricted; stairs were mounted one at a time and the men sat or stood leaning against a wall while waiting. In discussion there was no evidence of confusion of thought or difficulty of expression but the attitude was frequently irritable and morose. Trivial incidents were perceptive of exaggerated annoyance and complaint. Favorite topics of conversation were food, farming and rural life, a fact which was bitterly resented by some of the men.

A frequent complaint was the sensation of being "old."

A number of men were bothered by vivid dreams, particularly of dreams of breaking the diet, with attendant great remorse.

Some of the men were unable to remain on the restricted diet clear through the experiment, despite the fact that considerable interest in the experiment had been aroused in various parts of the country and considerable prestige attached to being a participant in it:<sup>4</sup>

This deterioration of their ethical control was all the more remarkable because these men had shown themselves to be sincere and upright throughout the two or more years of work they had performed in civilian public service before coming to the laboratory. . . . The semi-starvation pressures of hunger was, however, too much—their very beings revolted against the restriction. One of the individuals not only bought food, but also stole some from "locked" storerooms. Another individual sublimated his food cravings by stealing china cups from coffee shops. Although fasting is said at times to quicken one spiritually, none of the men reported significant progress in their religious lives. Most of them felt that the semi-starvation had coarsened rather than refined them, and they marvelled at how thin their moral and social veneers seemed to be.<sup>5</sup>

The intensive preoccupation with food interfered with other activities and occupied most of their leisure time. Work efficiency was cut down, interest in their girl friends all but disappeared, and a common recreation was the planning of how best to enjoy the next meal. Cookbooks became fascinating literature for some of them.

As for their social life per se, there was a decreased interest in other persons, especially persons who were not a part of the starvation experiment. The men built up a strong in-group feeling that excluded practically everyone else, and there was little or no concern with courtesies, with consideration for others (even within the group), or with personal appearance.

<sup>3</sup>U. S. Army Medical Department, *Report of the Minnesota Experiment*, p. 10.

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Reports by observers of other nonexperimental conditions of food deprivation confirm even more vividly the breakdown of well-established value systems with their supporting attitudes, and their replacement by the persistent striving after food. In occupied Germany, one poll of young women showed that they were too much concerned with food to be interested in love and affection. Women and girls of nearly all ages and classes prostituted themselves in return for bits of food. Careful dietary habits and long-established food tastes disappeared completely, and personal and group loyalties weakened or vanished in the quest for food.

In short, even the strongest attitudes toward the institutions of one's society will be shaken or abandoned if those institutions fail to meet such a basic need as that for food. This sometimes provides paywar with great strategic opportunities. It can step into such situations with pictures and words relating to the unsatisfied need and be sure of attracting attention. It can call upon the target audience for behavior x and be pretty sure of success if x promises satisfaction of that need as a reward.

Sex as a biological drive attains importance under conditions of deprivation but only when activities motivated by stronger drives such as hunger do not interfere with sexual preoccupations. Wars being run the way they are, it is impossible for the commanders of an army to see to the satisfaction of all the needs of their men. Even "militarily healthy" troops on full rations are likely to be sexually deprived and hence susceptible to paywar appeals stressing sexual materials. Most particularly, pornographic paywar material may have an effect on attitudes through the mechanism called "projection": sex-hungry soldiers are highly vulnerable to hints or assertions that their women are being unfaithful, and that "4-Fs" and others not really caught up in the war, high officers, government officials, etc., for example, are enjoying their favors. Their own needs are "projected" onto others at the suggestion of the paywar leaflet.

This was the psychology behind the Nazis' use of a pornographic piece featuring a Jewish figure leading "your girl back home" astray, a double-harveled appeal for the sex-hungry anti-Semite.

Pornographic propaganda is, however, more often successful in attracting attention than in eliciting overt action. For the latter purpose the sex drive is a far less effective mechanism to play on than hunger, especially when the paywar operator is in a position to hold out a promise of early reward for the drive for food. True, men will respond, under certain conditions, to surrender leaflets emphasizing the opportunity to get back to the sexual and

other satisfactions of a peaceful homeland. But the combat paywar operator should remember that the sex drive is likely to be dormant among hungry troops and that, in any case, other aspects of personality may oppose extramarital gratification.

For paywar purposes, then, it appears that, first, efforts to change attitudes through appeals to the biological drives of militarily healthy troops cannot be counted upon to produce great results; second, with troops or civilian populations whose food supply is very low, appeals based on hunger motivation may be extremely effective; and third, when the chips are down, biogenic needs are going to predominate over sociogenic ones; that is, it does no good to propagandize a hungry man about democracy if your rival is able to offer him food.

#### Attitudes Formed in Defense of the "Self"

One's self, it has been said, is "the individual as known to the individual." Each person can discriminate between his own body and its behavior and the bodies and behaviors of other people. He knows to some extent his own resources of skills and attitudes and how they can help him to get along in the world. He also has certain ways of doing specific things that are characteristic of him and set him apart from others. For example, some pay the check at a restaurant grudgingly, others take time when paying it to be friendly and "sociable," still others pay it methodically, counting the money carefully and noting and filing the receipt, etc. These resources of skills, and these characteristic ways of carrying out specific acts are variously useful to the person who thus cherishes them and moves to protect them when they are threatened. Thus the self is a value—a complex of specific values—as well as a pool of adjustive resources. And by definition, values are things that we strive to preserve.

One way the individual can preserve his values is to act in defense of the other persons, the groups, and the institutions that are committed to their preservation. That means he must hold attitudes appropriate to such action. One function of an attitude, then, is to provide a basis and guide for action through which the values of the self may be maintained. Suppose, for example, that you have a considerable dependence on religion. That means you value religion and will develop attitudes predisposing you to act in defense of certain religious institutions and their representatives (church, priest, pastor). Now suppose that enemy paywar attacks your church. Your attitudes are likely to set up a rigor-

ous defense. But suppose on the other hand that you are a North Korean Christian, and the Communist regime has taken your church's land, arrested your minister, and made it difficult for you to worship. And then suppose anti-Communist paywar directs your attention to what has happened, denounces the Communist regime, and suggests that you take certain action against the Communists. Are you not likely to react favorably to that propaganda? Religious groups, then, are obvious friendly targets for paywar operations against Communism.

Look at it from the other side of the world. Suppose that you are an American Negro. Suppose that your "self-respect," that is, the attitudes that you have developed in support of your "self," has often been wounded by the actions and culture patterns of white Americans. And suppose that Communist agitators or Communist paywar publications come to you, speaking of "equality," denouncing the treatment you are getting, and inviting you to join a movement that promises you more "self-respect." Are you not likely to look with greater favor than you otherwise might on that propaganda? That is why minority groups in non-Communist countries are favorite targets for Communist paywar.

Or suppose you are a German, and your country is under occupation. You have developed a high skill at printing—designing a page, setting type, imposing it on paper. You have often been praised for this, and you value the skill highly. When the occupation authorities summon you offer your services as a printer. But you are told brusquely that the printers for the occupation forces have come along from America, that no German printers are needed, and that if you want a job you can start cleaning the rubble from the streets. What is your reaction likely to be? You will be frustrated. Your characteristic skill is being denied expression. You have no opportunity to describe yourself as an artist printer. Your reaction will probably be to oppose the occupation people and resist all their consolidation propaganda. Suppose, on the other hand, they recognize your skill, use it, praise you. Then how might you react to the occupation?

We are not saying, of course, that all consolidation operations should as a matter of course employ native labor. The point is, rather, that propaganda whenever possible should provide for "selfish" behavior, that is, behavior through which the major characteristics of the self can be expressed. Let us take one more example. A basic characteristic of the Chinese personality seems to be respect for the past and, especially, for the great men of the past. One device of anti-Communist paywar in China has

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therefore been to try to convince the Chinese that the present Communist regime is traitorous to the ideals and heroes of the past, particularly to such leaders as Sun Yat-sen, who has for many years been a symbol of particular importance in China. It thus gets on its side, or tries to, the attitudes the Chinese have developed in defense of the self, and action against the Communists is made to appear selfishly rewarding behavior.

### Ego-involved Attitudes

"Ego" is a term used to refer to the most highly valued and protected aspects of the self, those behaviors most intimately associated with one's first personal pronouns. If "I" am a career psychological warrior, I will more highly value my skills in planning psywar operations or writing leaflets than my golf playing or automobile driving. For "I" am a psywar operator, not a golfer or cab driver.

An ego-involved motive<sup>5</sup> is one whose process of satisfaction evokes responses from other people that are evaluative of one's self. As a career psywar operator I should be very ego-involved about turning out a good piece of propaganda, for, in so doing, others are going to react evaluatively toward me, evaluating my competence. I will be very defensive of this competence, and it will be difficult to convince me that I have done poorly. "I" will not care so much if my golf score is surpassed or my car driving criticized.

An attitude is ego-involved, then, to the extent that it supports actions that will ensure "good standing" for one's ego. The social scientist is likely to be strongly for support of social science research, just as a parent is for his son. Why does a political candidate kiss or praise babies? Because that will help to evoke favorable attitudes from the ego-involved parents. The German printer we talked about in the previous section held ego-involved attitudes toward his printing.

Ego-involved attitudes are therefore only an intense variety of the "self"-centered attitudes we have been talking about. The psywar man should recognize that such ego-involved attitudes are very hard to change. A psychotherapist could testify that such a change requires major revision of the stablest aspects of personality. Wherever possible, then, psywar should try to direct and make use of such attitudes (as the candidate praises the babies) rather than try to change them.

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Attitudes Supporting Group Belongingness

Most of the motives under the influence of which we operate are not biological drives but are acquired (or learned) through our contacts with other people. We are scarcely aware of the great importance our group involvements have for us, or of the loyalties we develop toward our several groups and institutions. But if our group is threatened we become acutely aware of its importance to us, and our attitude toward it is manifested in the form of a strong "pro-" feeling. We develop also a parallel attitude of opposition to the source of threat. You see an example of this whenever our families or our towns are criticized and especially when our country finds itself in a tense situation with another powerful country. Consider how American attitudes, since the Communist situation has grown worse, have arisen in defense of America and against the Soviet Union. If you were a Communist propagandist, what would you do about those strong attitudes? You would probably try to divert and diffuse them, wouldn't you? You would probably try to get Americans fighting among themselves, defending their own groups within America, rather than taking out their aggressions on the Soviet Union. This is what the Communists in fact do.

Thus, the function of attitudes in relation to feelings of group belongingness is, again, to favor action in support of these needs and of the groups concerned. In making use of this kind of attitude, paywar should wherever possible try to elicit positive reactions rather than buck negative ones. For example, to tell an enemy soldier or sailor that there is something wrong with his company or his ship's crew would merely be to invite a defensive reaction in support of his group. But if paywar can get across the idea that the enemy regime is not treating the people at home right, then there is some hope of getting the strong group attitudes working on one's own side. For example, America's Far East paywar has tried to convince the Chinese troops in Korea that all is not well at home and that the Communist officials in China are taking undue liberties in the villages. America has, in other words, tried to get the home group loyalties of the Chinese troops to work against their loyalties to the Communist armies and their Communist commanders.

Attitudes Related to Need for Structure and Understanding

The best sowing ground for rumors is a situation that is vague

and indeterminate. This you will recognize from your own experience. People get accustomed to living in fairly predictable circumstances. They like to live that way and feel uneasy when they don't know what the score is, when they can't tell with some certainty what the next hours or days are going to bring or even whether they are going to bring anything at all. Everyone needs to have some understanding of his world, even if the understanding is fleeting or is in the form of a label. (Note, for example, how some physicians give a name to an unknown condition, such as a "constitutional psychopathy" or a "systematic invasion," so that the patient may feel that he understands and thus is in control of his situation.)

People, we are saying, need to structure and understand their world, and attitudes are not-too-hard-to-erect signposts to guide their behavior and thought in that direction. If something can be shown to have "caused" an ambiguous state of affairs—a confusion of orders, or a lack of instructions—this somehow gives the state of affairs meaning for people and lets them put the blame for it on someone. The blame, furthermore, can be verbalized in the form of adverse attitudes, and these, as indicated above, then serve as guides to other action such as grumbling, complaining, writing letters, deserting, etc.

An ambiguous situation, that is, one where there is a minimum of information to help people understand their immediate experiences, thus gives the psywar operator a real opportunity to be, for the moment at least, the master of destiny. It gives him a chance to plant his own information, start his own rumors, provide his own explanations and answers, and so organize the experience of the target as he wants it to be organized.

#### Attitudes Related to Emotional States

Emotion has been defined by one psychologist as "an acute disturbance of the individual as a whole, psychological in origin, involving behavior, conscious experience and visceral function." Strong emotional reactions have the power to disrupt most on-going activities, just as too much power suddenly added to a machine may strip the gears. If, for example, a person perceives a stimulus situation as threatening or very pleasing, the emotion may release in him hormones that have the general effect of preparing him for strenuous activity if such is necessary, and what he is doing at the moment may as a result be done badly or even abandoned. Psywar often deliberately evokes strong emotion in



the attempt to undermine attitudes. For example, it evokes fear in order to break down attitudes of group loyalty and respect for authority and to cause otherwise dependable soldiers or civilians to do things they would not conceivably have done otherwise.

Fear and anger are the two emotions that are of greatest importance to paywar. These emotions, like the biological drives, can energize and sustain action. Fear certainly does so in panic situations.\* There is one great difference, however, that paywar operators must bear in mind. The stimuli that arouse biological drives (for example, hunger) are inside the organism, whereas the stimuli that arouse emotions (for example, fear or anger) are outside the organism. So also are the conditions that can lead to the reduction of each. That means that the paywar operator can hope to control the stimuli that turn emotion on and off in a way that is out of the question with the stimuli that turn biological drives on or off. Playing on emotional attitudes is therefore a simpler and more promising paywar mission than playing on attitudes related to biological drives.

In some situations, of course, the paywar operator will seek not to arouse and activate emotional attitudes but rather to lull and neutralize them. He may direct emotion-terminating stimuli at the target—as the Germans did very skillfully sometimes during World War II—in order to allay truly justified fears and pave the way for inadequate action. And friendly paywar frequently attempts to combat fear in its target audience.

An emotional attitude is a strongly held position. Emotion strengthens the attitude; attitudes guide behavior in the discharge of emotional energy. Therefore an emotional attitude is likely to portend vigorous behavior. For paywar, one moral of this is to try to elicit emotional attitudes in support of the operator's themes, and to avoid themes likely to conflict with emotional attitudes. One of the most useful pieces of paywar intelligence we can have, therefore, is a reply to the question: Around what attitudes does the target tend to build emotion? In general it is safe to say that emotional attitudes are most likely to be related to and aroused in connection with ego values. Perhaps the strongest

\*The typical pattern of panic, as social scientists understand it, is (a) traumatic experience (such as the dropping of an atom bomb, or the discovery that one is surrounded and under attack), which results in (b) fear hindering in which, for which (c) there seems no outlet. That is, there is no apparent way to surmount the thing feared. While the victim (d) looks around helplessly for something to do about his situation, he observes some other individuals (e) running or taking other action which seems relevant to the situation. He follows these leaders. He and the rest of the crowd stampede. The usual pattern of action in this kind of panic situation is aimless running, often into greater danger.

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personality structure with which paywar has to deal is the complex in which self-interest, ego motives, and emotion center. The paywar operator is likely to get maximum response when he can successfully touch this complex.

### Attitudes Related to Personality Types

Are there personality types—groups of persons whose attitudes we may know beforehand, that is, persons whose attitudes we may predict, from knowledge of the type they belong to? It is no longer fashionable or technically accurate in psychology to speak of persons as types or to describe people in terms of distinctive typologies. There is, however, a cluster of characteristics different enough from the "normal" to be thought of as constituting types for some paywar purposes, though measuring instruments that enable us to say definitely what individuals belong to them are not available.

One such cluster of characteristics is that which Adorno<sup>8</sup> and others have written about under the name of the "authoritarian personality." What is meant here is an individual who basically, often very subtly, has a strong reverence for and dependence on some kind of authority outside himself. This person tends to be ethnocentric, that is, to identify strongly with groups in which he holds membership, and to emphasize the in-group vs out-group distinction between his own groups and others. He shows "authoritarian submission" in the form of an inability seriously to criticize or rebel against his own in-group figures and symbols. He has a highly moralized and idealized conception of authority representatives and a submissive relation to them. He is unable to look objectively at himself or others; indeed, he regards the attempt to look into deeper motives or conflicts as "prying." He likewise tends toward "projectivity," as shown in a tendency to imagine strange and sinister forces at work in the outer world. These imaginings, of course, are really projections of his own deep-lying aggressive and sexual strivings.

All this adds up to a picture of an insecure person with a closed mind, suspicious of the outer world, maintaining and often at the same time resenting a close dependence on authority figures and in-groups. To such persons the Jew, for example, may seem a symbol of strange, unknown, possibly sinister things, a force to be combated by rallying behind established symbols and sources of authority and strong in-group allegiances. Anti-Semitism, as a matter of fact, is one of the most common mani-

festations of the authoritarian personality.

We have talked about the authoritarian personality because it is one of the few such clusterings that have been carefully studied, and because we have experienced a good deal of it in recent years. For example, Nazism was undoubtedly made possible by the high incidence of authoritarian personalities in Germany. We see such personalities at work in anti-Semitic groups in this country. And wherever they appear in large numbers we have a group that we know to be susceptible to paywar of the kind that plays on insecurity and releases the terribly disruptive forces of race or class prejudice.

#### Attitudes Related to Sentiments and National Culture

Looked at from one point of view, a group is a complex of leadership and followership roles. Those who perform the leadership roles direct the group activities that are valuable to the members, and because they do this come to have value for the members, who accordingly develop favorable attitudes toward them. In organizations that have been established for a long time, such as local and national government systems, companies, and religious institutions, roles themselves become valued: The Presidency, the Chairmanship of the Board, the Papacy, the Governorship. The continued existence and effective functioning of leadership roles are, in any case, matters of real concern for the group members, who rightly see them as indispensable to continuance of the group as a social structure. This explains why Hitler's position in Germany was virtually invulnerable to paywar until the very last, and why this country deliberately refrained from attacking the Japanese Emperor. Paywar against either of these leaders would have aroused strong defensive attitudes.

Along with leaders and leadership roles, the group's symbols come to have great importance to members. The American Eagle, the Stars and Stripes, fraternity pins, crucifixes, etc., become objects of great value, with which people identify strongly and which they will defend with strong attitudes and, on occasion, with strong actions. Both the politician and the propagandist therefore need to understand symbols—how they "work" and how they may be exploited for purposes of influencing behavior.

Finally, we must mention traditions, which without necessarily being directly associated with the formal aspects of the group's activity, often acquire symbolic value. Freshman hazing as a part of fraternity rituals, rugged individualism, Yankee in-

genuity, southern courtesy, western friendliness, and home cooking are all regarded by some people as important values associated with institutions or group structures that they are determined to preserve. These also must therefore be defended attitudinally, and many a propagandist, inadequately informed about his target, has earned hostility for his whole program by unwittingly disparaging a tradition. Many another propagandist has made friends and gained acceptance by recognizing his target's traditions and conducting his propaganda with due regard for them.

### Role Attitudes

We have already talked about role attitudes and noted that when a person has functioned in a particular role for some time, and derived satisfactions from doing so, he takes on attitudes and behaviors appropriate to that role. Storekeepers acquire attitudes that fit in with their storekeeping roles. Professors are widely supposed to act like professors outside as well as inside the academic role structure. Admirals are often identifiable in mufti because they continue to act and talk as if they were on the bridge of a ship.

We have also pointed out how attitudes grow up in defense and support of roles. Children develop attitudes of respect for their larger and stronger elders. Undertakers oppose burial at sea. The well-to-do oppose sliding income-tax scales. Role attitudes also serve as a device for communication with other members of one's group; expressing them often brings members of a group closer together and makes them feel at home with one another. When three NAM (National Association of Manufacturers) members meet in a club car, the fact that each hears the others expressing his own attitudes toward John L. Lewis assures them they are among friends and sharers of common norms. When a fourth traveler joins the conversation and questions the virtue of the NAM, expressing a critical or sceptical attitude, he is suspect, and efforts will be exerted to cause him to conform or remove himself, and his contaminating influence, from the group. There are numerous rituals that are wordless expressions of attitude, and participating in them gives people mutual assurance that they are members of the group, and among friends. This function of attitudes illustrates that attitudes are both self-preservative (helping one to maintain his role in the group) and group-preservative (contributing to the solidarity of the group and thus strengthening it against external forces).

Self-other Attitudes

It is but a short step from the notion of role attitude to that of self-other attitudes. Although the notion of role attitude refers mainly to the role a man takes in a definite and recurring group situation such as his job, his play group, his family, or his lodge, self-other attitudes refer to the characteristic way in which people relate themselves to others in nonorganized, noninstitutionalized, non-bound-by-rules interactions. The storekeeper is not bound by rules to do any particular thing at, for example, a bullfight, except pay his admission and remain seated most of the time. He can read, study the technique of the picadores, count the number of trombones in the band, or go home, as the spirit moves him. But his personality characteristics, acquired (as we know) through his roles and his role attitudes, will nevertheless influence his way of responding to the shout of "down in front," the bid of the beer vendor, and the sound and smell of the person next to him. He has characteristic ways of relating himself to others, that is, particular attitudes toward what they are doing that influence his reactions to them. These are self-other attitudes. Since they tend to be superseded in formal group structures by specific role attitudes, they are most apparent in informal situations.

The paywar operator needs to understand the function of self-other attitudes because in unorganized situations it is these attitudes, not the role attitudes, that organize and direct behavior. Thus, when enemy troops are in confusion, self-other attitudes will deeply influence their reaction to the estimate of the situation put forward by America's paywar group. In a militarily healthy situation the soldier's role attitudes will probably maintain his discipline. But if the situation deteriorates, if, for example, the soldier is isolated or in headlong retreat, then the self-other attitudes are likely to take over.

Summary

The material in this section will help the paywar operator to map out his battleground and points to some of the target intelligence he needs for his battle map. Where is he likely to find the "strong structures" of attitude in his target? What kinds of attitude in the target are likely to be emotionally involved? What is the nature of the role attitudes the target holds? What are the symbols, the leaders, the traditions around which strong

positive attitudes have grown? Are there any areas in which the target's biological drives have been notably unsatisfied so that strong attitudes and disruptive action might be evoked by playing on the resulting tensions? In what fields of information is the situation vague and unstructured for the target so that paywar can take advantage of the strong attitudes related to the need for understanding? The paywar man needs to know things like this if he is to operate with eyes open.

Given this basic intelligence, he will be in position to make some predictions as to what kind of acceptance (or what degree of resistance) he will meet if he sends a given message or combination of messages. He knows, for example, that, when the chips are really down, biogenic drives are usually going to take precedence over sociogenic motives and attitudes, so that a hungry target is probably a poor target for conversion propaganda. He knows there is a strong cluster of attitudes around the deepest aspects of personality, that many of these are likely to be ego-involved, and many emotionally involved, and that, day in and day out, this is probably the strongest attitude cluster he will find in any target. He will try to enlist these strong attitudes on his side, or at least he will try not to arouse them in opposition to what he has to say. This does not mean, of course, that paywar should never attack strong positions. On some occasions it may be more important to do so than to undertake something easier but less promising for the long pull. But when a paywar operation does attack a strong position, it should do so in full awareness of the resistance it is likely to meet. The paywar man keeps himself reminded, for instance, that attitudes arising from the need for group belongingness are often aroused to great strength when the group is threatened or attacked. He knows that favorable attitudes grow up around national and group symbols, traditions, and leaders and that attack on these symbols will evoke defensive attitudes, as invoking their sanction will evoke positive attitudes. He knows that role attitudes are widespread, influential, and hard to change from outside the target culture. He knows that members of his target audience have a strong need for understanding and organizing experience. If he can step into an unstructured situation with a message that provides them informational structuring, they are likely to respond favorably.

This is the nature of the battleground. The next section deals with the nature of the battle itself, that is, with some of the ways attitudes may be changed.

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**PROCESS OF CHANGING ATTITUDES**

The goal is to change attitudes of members of the target audience. More precisely the goal is to be able to control, speed up or arrest, direct, and redirect changes in their attitudes, including the intensification of present attitudes or maintaining them unchanged in circumstances in which, if left to themselves, they would change. Paywar often defends an attitude (such as loyalty or international friendship) from change, or tries to keep a target feeling about something (such as disliking a common enemy) just as it has hitherto. The goal of the entire process as we have described it so far, that is, attracting attention, getting the meaning across, and understanding the nature of target attitudes and their clustering, is to be able to control attitude change and, through it, behavior.

Before the processes and mechanisms that enter directly into changes in attitudes are discussed, it is necessary to repeat a warning, implicit throughout the preceding pages, that must not be forgotten by any reader who intends to apply this material to the practice of paywar. We said early in this book that research in this entire field is not very far advanced. About paywar itself there has been up to now relatively little research, so that most of the principles stated in these pages have not been developed in or for paywar situations. The purpose of this book, given the present state of research, has to be to gather together the most relevant evidence and theory from social psychology and the other social science disciplines and to attempt to say how this evidence and theory—themselves not very far advanced—apply to paywar.

You should not, then, think of yourself as studying the science of paywar. Paywar is a long way from being a science. Rather, this book offers a social science background for the practice of paywar. The applications to paywar suggested in these pages are for the most part projections and extrapolations from existing evidence intended for purposes other than those of paywar. This evidence will be useful to you. It will let you proceed with more confidence and a better sense of direction. But the application of this evidence to the practice of paywar is not like applying a scientific formula to physical quantities. The application is partly science and partly (in very large part) art.

There has been considerable study of attitude change in various fields and from various points of view. You will find that much of it has a direct and evident application to paywar.

Prognosis of Difficulty of Attitude Change

The physician is accustomed to give or use a prognosis: he predicts, on the basis of existing evidence, the likely course of an illness. We have been indicating that some attitudes are more strongly defended, and therefore probably harder to change, than others. Now let us gather some of the available material together and restate it in terms of predicting the difficulty of changing different kinds of attitudes.

The more firmly an attitude is anchored in group membership, the more difficult it is to change.

In saying "anchored in group membership," we refer back to our earlier statement that attitudes and group roles tend to support one another. For example, it might be expected that the regular Army man's attitude toward authority and discipline might be more firmly anchored than that of the young draftee. The regular's attitude has grown up out of long experience. He has learned his role thoroughly. The saluting, the obedience, the alertness have become second nature to him, because he has found that they simplify his problems. The group rewards such behavior. His role experience supports the attitude and the attitude supports the role. The new draftee is in the same situation but does not yet fully realize it; he hasn't learned the role so thoroughly, nor have the appropriate attitudes grown so strong.

Studies of religious attitudes have indicated that Roman Catholics, more than members of other churches, tend to hold strongly anchored attitudes toward religion (Katz<sup>2</sup>). It is believed that this is because Catholics are strongly indoctrinated in their church's beliefs and practices, and because the church normally constitutes a relatively large proportion of their routine of living. They spend a considerable amount of time with other members of their faith, who in general hold the same attitudes and have a common concept of role. The attitude therefore supports the group, and the group supports the attitude, by rewarding the individual for playing the role related to the attitude.

Attitudes toward leaders tend to be strongly held in proportion to the degree such attitudes enter into the group activities of the individual. In Nazi Germany, for example, according to Shils and Janowitz<sup>3</sup>, attitudes toward Hitler would have been extremely hard to change: Hitler was a value-laden symbol integrated into the daily routines of a large part of the population. Lesser figures in the national structure were much more vulnerable. They may, from some points of view, have been no less important than



Hitler to the national effort, but they were much more remote than he from the daily lives of the people. The people belonged to the Hitler Youth, listened for the voice of Hitler on the radio, kept the picture of Hitler on their walls, and were rewarded for doing as Hitler said they should and for following the example of Hitler and for cheering Hitler. Hitler personified and unified all their attitudes toward authority and leadership, which, it is sometimes said, have always been strong and idealized among the Germans. Hitler, therefore, could "do no wrong." If something went wrong, it was the fault of lesser functionaries, of bad staff work, or of disloyalty to Hitler. Any direct attack on Hitler could thus be counted on to rouse strong defensive attitudes.

It seems probable that similar strong attitudes gathered in the Soviet Union around Stalin. No matter how he looked from the outside, to many Russians he must have been a symbol of the rewards they got for playing the role of good Communists, loyal Russians. Stalin was equated with the rewards they got out of their role-playing. If there were unequal distribution of food and supplies, bad orders, unmet quotas, mistakes, then lesser officials, not Stalin, were responsible. It would be far easier for paywar to induce an unfavorable attitude toward lesser Communists than toward such a leader as Stalin.

This does not, as has been said earlier, mean that paywar should necessarily follow the easiest path. Sometimes more can be accomplished by frontal assault than by attacking on a flank or bypassing. There are, of course, situations where it would become the task of paywar to attack strongly held attitudes frontally for reasons other than the intention to change them. Paywar might, for example, have the mission of unifying the target, or of stirring up controversy within it. We cannot remind ourselves too often that there is an unlimited variety of potential paywar missions. Sometimes it is worth the effort to attack the strongest attitude in the hope of changing it. But any decision to do this must be made in the light of a clear prognosis of what it may cost in time and effort.

As a further example, note that a member of the armed forces, in a foreign country, is *per se* a psychological as well as a shooting warrior. For example, the behavior of American troops in Japan was closely observed and in general favorably received; it apparently helped in minimizing the general problems of the occupation. Now how should such a soldier or sailor proceed in his part-time paywar job? One principle of conduct is suggested by what we have been saying, that is, he should not openly

or strongly oppose the important group-based attitudes of the people about him unless he knows it to be the policy of his country to do that. For example, he should be wary of attacking or belittling their religious practices or their attitudes toward the family or the customs and practices they follow in everyday contacts with one another, unless his government has indeed bargained for the unavoidable consequences. All these are likely to be strongly defended, because the attitudes are constantly reinforced by successful role experience, and vice versa.

The more isolated an attitude is from a person's other systems of belief and values, the easier it is to change.

This is seen most clearly in the case of newly acquired attitudes, which the person has not had time or occasion to integrate with the rest of his psychological make-up. Everyone has some traffic in temporary attitudes—toward facts, art objects, news items, or minor political figures of temporary prominence. These attitudes are usually subject to change through discussion or through the manipulation of prestige symbols. People are willing to "talk them over" or are willing, with respect to them, to follow the lead of an authority, for example, that of a drama or music critic. Since these attitudes are of minor importance in the individual's "psychic economy," he can afford to change them according to shifting conditions.

But let us suppose that a man who holds strong religious attitudes comes upon a new book, written by a member of his church, which advances and illustrates the doctrines of that church. That book is likely to be integrated rapidly with his other belief systems, and his favorite attitude toward it is likely to resist attack by some such prestige figure as a literary critic. This will be especially true if the church group rewards a favorable attitude toward the book, for here the force of group anchoring will come into play.

Attitudes may be more transient at some times than at others. For example, transient attitudes are likely to be encountered when a population is undergoing radical change, as during a revolution or an economic crisis, or a military debacle. In times like those, old value systems, beliefs, and allegiances are being questioned. People look around for new attitudes, new ways of anchoring and securing themselves. Things are moving so swiftly that people haven't time to integrate new ideas with old, and in such periods the old ones are less dominant than usual anyway. In the French revolution, for example, attitudes shifted rapidly from support of one leader to another. In the period of Communist occupation

of Seoul, people were bewildered by events, lacked confidence in their old attitudes, and were more receptive than they would have been in normal times to the new attitudes which the Communists suggested to them. In such situations of flux the paywar operator has his best opportunity to propose and support new leaders, new programs, new values, and new patterns of action.

The more clearly an attitude is differentiated and organized, the less likely it is to be affected by prestige suggestions or other such devices. It will yield, if at all, only to rational argument or to placement attack on the beliefs that support it.

An example is furnished by an experiment by Lewis<sup>9</sup> which attempted to modify attitudes toward political slogans by attributing them to prestigious public figures. Although the less-informed subjects, holding less well-differentiated and organized attitudes, were somewhat influenced, the better-informed subjects were not. In fact, they would often question the validity of attributing the quotation to the man who was credited with it. Faced, for example, with a statement attributing "America for Americans" to FDR, some answered "But Roosevelt just wouldn't say that!"

The practical problem of influencing such well-organized attitudes is great and may not be solvable at all except when paywar is being undertaken in a period of major social change. So well rationalized are they that, even if some of the supporting beliefs and attitudes are discredited to some extent, the remaining supports are likely to be strengthened. For example, a German intellectual may be made to agree that the notion of the biological superiority of "Aryans" is nonsense, but if he has a strong need to identify with and submit to authority he will probably cling to the idea that German culture is, regardless of the cause, superior to others and that therefore the Reich must be revered and served.

Observations recorded by Bettelheim<sup>10</sup> in German concentration camps show that only under severe conditions did the prisoners reject their previous value systems and more or less completely adapt themselves to the new life in the camp. Men who had been prisoners for several years took over the Gestapo's attitudes toward new and unfit prisoners, carried out and enforced arbitrary rules of the Gestapo long after the Gestapo had abandoned them, and often came to believe that beneath their rough exteriors the Gestapo guards were decent fellows. Such a transfiguration of personality, attitudes, and values usually required years of "reeducation." Nothing remotely approaching it can be

expected via propaganda alone. So long as the role structures, or substitutes for them, in which personality is formed and expressed remain intact, basic attitudes will remain unchanged. In their study of group stability in the Wehrmacht, Shils and Janowitz<sup>8</sup> showed that the troops' loyalty to Hitler, the Reich, and their immediate superiors held up under severe military conditions even when it was felt that the war was as good as lost. Role attitudes of subservience to authorities were so enmeshed in basic personality structure that surrender leaflets and other paywar messages were largely ineffective unless primary group structures were breaking up under force of Allied arms, and threats to life were constant and immediate. There were, to be sure, many surrenders, but they were often rationalized in terms of practical ends that allowed basic attitudes to remain untouched.

The more clearly a person understands what his attitudes are and what they can do for him, the less likely these attitudes are to be changed by suggestion and argument.

The nonsmoker who opposes cigarettes because he knows that they are bad for his health is not going to be moved by the fact that 99 percent of the men who know tobacco best smoke Peaches. Nor does the scholar who holds well-documented attitudes toward cultural determinism care whether the authorities cited in opposition to his view are "eminent." It is probable that businessmen felt that Old-Businessman Bernard Baruch's recommendation for complete price controls represented a lapse of normally good judgment, and they did not support his proposal, preferring policies in accord with their well-thought-out best interests. It is difficult to make a dent in attitudes that are understood by their holders by simply criticizing those attitudes or bringing authorities and other prestige symbols to bear against them.

However, understood attitudes are likely to be open to discussion; and we must note here a practical difference between these and the integrated attitudes discussed above. For example, Hovland and others,<sup>11</sup> in their experiments with the effects of orientation films during World War II, found that in the case of better educated subjects a more favorable situation for attitude change was set up when both sides of an argument were presented. In general the person who understands why he holds an attitude tends to be willing to concede that there is something to be said for the other side and that his attitude may not be correct under all possible conditions. It is likely that such understood attitudes are limited to some extent to persons who are relatively well educated and have been exposed to some of the values of self-

criticisms. Such people are open to persuasion, to the extent that their attitudes are of this rational kind.

### Basic Pattern of Change

In this book a picture of what people are like, what makes them tick, and especially what leads them to hold the attitudes they do has been gradually built up. The human being is an organism, born with biological needs and placed in a social situation. He learns, little by little, to discriminate between the parts of experience that are himself and those that are not himself. As he gradually builds this awareness his basic need comes to be to preserve, enhance, and express himself, the self; that is, the enduring aspects of the personality. Experiences that protect or enhance the self are rewarding, to be sought after. Experiences that threaten the self are classified as threatening, to be avoided. Experiences that give meaning to experience, and thus enable the individual to behave more efficiently in satisfying needs, come increasingly to be sought as the individual matures. As he finds out what experiences are rewarding, he learns to repeat them, learns to discriminate among responses, learns habits. Attitudes of favorableness and unfavorableness become firmer as the habits harden. He develops favorable attitudes toward experience that reduces biological drives and unfavorable attitudes toward experience that hinders drive satisfaction. He develops attitudes to support action leading to reduction of his emotional tensions, to relieve the external conditions that bring about fear or anger, for example. He develops attitudes to guide action through which he can preserve values; for example, if fair play is one of his values, he develops unfavorable attitudes toward cheaters; if free enterprise is one of his values, he develops unfavorable attitudes toward anything socialistic. He builds up attitudes which support behavior allowing him to use resources; if he dances well, he is receptive to attitudes that support dancing in public. He builds up strong attitudes toward parts of his experience that threaten or enhance his ego involvements. And he develops attitudes that support the roles he is trying to play and the group norms he has learned. As he matures, these roles become more important to him, and the group norms become clearer. Under the influence of group sanctions, he represses some of his motives, and these subsequently enter into his behavior only without his being aware of what is happening.

Thus the personality, that is, habits, system of values, char-

characteristic strivings or needs, and characteristic ways of perceiving relations to others, grows by constant interaction of individual and group. It is impossible to make a sharp separation between the individual factors and the group factors involved in the process. Nevertheless the paywar operator has much to gain from keeping them separate in his mind. Any paywar message clearly has to contend at any given time with psychological factors operative within individual members of the target audience and social factors operative in the target environment. If the target individual is to be persuaded to hold a given attitude, the action to which that attitude predisposes him must square more or less with his personality factors (habits, values, needs, etc.), his role patterns, and the group norms as he has interiorized them. It is likewise clear that the intended change in his attitudes may be facilitated either by something new in his environment (for example, threat of group disorganization) or by some new physical or psychological factor (for example, hunger or confusion). With all this in mind, we can suggest a kind of master pattern for attitude change, which takes account of the foregoing considerations.

1. If a person's attitudes are to be changed, if he is to be predisposed toward action of such and such a kind, then the action the proposed new attitude implies should fit the psychological pattern operating within him at the time.

For example, a very hungry man is in poor shape to entertain logical argument. A direct attack on an ego-involved attitude will be strongly resisted. On the other hand a suggestion that merely expands or diverts an existing attitude will have easier going. A suggestion that evokes emotional attitudes in its favor will have strong support. A suggestion that meets a need (for example, for clarification in a vague situation) will probably be received with gratitude.

2. If a person's attitudes are to be changed, then the action the proposed new attitude implies should be in support of present group relations or lead to other group relations that are important and meaningful to him.

For example, people normally do not adopt attitudes implying action that would result in their being read out of group. Important to them. They do adopt attitudes that support the roles they play in groups or that maintain the groups in which they

play roles. This is particularly true in the case of primary groups, such as the family. It is also true in the case of the national group, which represents the supreme effective power, includes all the groups that can be important to most people, and provides practically all the circumstances through which personal values can be expressed, attained, and maintained. Appeals based on nationalistic motives and identifications, especially when a nation is under threat from outside, are likely to be most effective. When the group situation is somewhat vague, an invitation to join a stronger group is often effective; this is a favorite Communist technique, in fact a favorite technique of all revolutionists.

3. If a person's attitudes are to be changed, the most favorable situation exists when the action the proposed new attitude implies is congenial both to the psychological pattern operative within him at the time and to his group relations and aspirations.

When an individual's personality values and the roles he has to take are not harmonious, then we say that he is "maladjusted." (Bringing this about is sometimes a goal of paywar.) On the other hand nothing is more acceptable to a person than an activity that gives expression to his interests, needs, and values and at the same time contributes to the support of his important groups or of his membership and status in them. For example, many Communists who have been studied psychologically appear to have been highly insecure, often rather lonely, individuals. By joining an organization with strong discipline, clear-cut roles, and clear-cut principles and antagonisms, such people win greater personal security and, along with it, the satisfactions of status and action in a group. What happens when propaganda does not fit the pattern of both psychological and group factors is illustrated by the previously mentioned Shils and Janowitz<sup>1</sup> studies of morale in the German Wehrmacht during World War II. America apparently made some telling hits with propaganda addressed simultaneously to the personal values of German soldiers and their concern for their families. Their anxiety was aroused. But so strong were the role attitudes in the Wehrmacht and the relations in the primary group structure (company size and under) that there were very few surrenders until actual military defeat had broken up the primary groups. Our propaganda, in other words, was unable to break down the immediate social structure for survival and psychological support, and as long as that remained intact our efforts were unsuccessful.

Mechanisms of Change

The basic pattern of change is therefore the one we discussed previously under the general topic of learning, that is, responses that are rewarded tend to be learned and retained. This is the most direct way to accomplish a change in attitude, and the simplest way to put it into effect is against the background of a monopoly of communications such as the Communist states try so hard to achieve within their own borders. Indeed, so important is communications monopoly to the Soviet propagandists that during their 1950 occupation of South Korea they confiscated as many radios as possible from South Korean homes to keep them from being tuned to UN stations in Japan, despite the fact that by so doing they gave up the chance to speak to Koreans on Radio Seoul, which they had captured intact and which was the most powerful broadcasting station in East Asia except for Peiping. In other words they gave up the use of radio in return for a communications monopoly, which they exploited with print, film, and face-to-face methods. The advantages of monopoly are obvious. The monopolists can completely control what cues are presented, and, so far as communications themselves control rewards, they can determine completely what responses are to be reinforced. Propagandists from our country are seldom given so favorable a situation in which to operate.

For the most part they have to operate under conditions of intense competition. When they direct paywar to Communist states they have to operate against intense and effective opposition. Therefore, although it is easy enough to say that practicing a response (such as expressing an attitude, passing a rumor, opposing an authority) and being rewarded for it is the best way to ensure that the response will become a dependable part of the person's behavior, it is quite another thing for the paywar operator to bring about this situation by means of long-range communication.

So far as the use of communications as a direct instrument for changing attitudes is concerned, then, the paywar operator must try to set up situations in which the responses he wants will be rewarded and thus reinforced. He will therefore try to build his messages around appeals and themes that are related to tensions or needs in the target and suggest responses that (a) are desirable from the point of view of the paywar mission, (b) have some chance of being expressed in the target culture, and (c) will reduce drives or other tensions and therefore be rewarding. We have already talked about areas of tension, but let us summarize briefly here:

Biological Drives In normal times, these drives are satisfied



by existing social patterns and do not present a fruitful field for paywar, but in case of threat, emergency, and deprivation they may become important sources of reward and reinforcement.

Normal Personality Needs. That is, needs for security, status, understanding, (freedom from constraint, clear definition of role, etc., are numerous and common to all men. But they are, of all needs, the ones most likely to be satisfied within the target culture.

Deviant Personality Needs. That is, needs regarded as abnormal or deviant by a society are widely unacceptable, encounter taboos, and are more frustrated. Hence persons with deviant needs are more strongly motivated in nontypical directions than other members of society. Homosexuals are a familiar example, and we are often reminded that because they are good targets for blackmail they are poor security risks. This is not the place to discuss deviant personalities in detail, but let us note that the same needs that make them poor security risks also make them good targets for paywar. Their resentment against the society that refuses to accept them can often be channeled into behavior that fits in with the paywar operator's mission.

Transient Personal Needs. These needs also are common to all men, but usually people are able to reduce them in a socially approved way. However, there are situations in which people are subject to need-producing factors beyond their (and their society's) control. The soldier in the field, the population under bombing or siege will often have unsatisfied needs for food and for relief from pain, discomfort, stress, anxiety, and threat to life and health, which are not the less urgent for being transient. In such situations there is a ready market for paywar or rations that direct attention to these needs and point a way to their satisfaction.

Group Needs. This class includes needs such as that for acceptance by others, especially in the primary group. Acceptance by others is perhaps the most important form of reward for changing human behavior. If, then, the paywar operator can find a way to manipulate group pressures, he has a ready-made device for reinforcement of his message. This, of course, is one of the reasons why the Communists gear their mass media into a well-organized system of groups within any country they are trying to propagandize.

But the process of stimulus and response in society does not always follow the relatively simple and unhindered path we have been describing. Sometimes the target culture does not sanction the response that would satisfy the need or reduce the drive on which paywar seeks to play. The role attitude of the individual member of the audience, or his general value system, may inhibit

the desired response. In such a case the path to drive reduction is often indirect. Indirect paths are of great importance to the paywar operator as he seeks, at long distance, to set up the learning system (we call it a "paradigm") in which a desired response to a given cue will be rewarded and hence reinforced and learned. He can, if he understands them, make good use of them.

We are talking now about what Sigmund Freud called "mechanisms." Freud used this term to refer to the techniques the individual employs to protect himself from the recognition that he has motives and desires that he should not have. In recent years the concept has been expanded to include not only the function of protecting the self from itself, so to speak, but of protecting the self from the outer world. Thus rationalizing the purchase of a new car in terms of "long-run economy" may protect a man from recognizing that he wants to look more important than the person next door, and regression serves to remove the person from the responsibilities thrust on him by society, by taking him back to the comfortable and safe dependency of childhood. Both are common and effective means of winning and maintaining comparative freedom from anxiety. In this section we shall describe and illustrate several of these modes of reacting to problem situations, all of them familiar to contemporary psychological research. By means of communications and carefully planned events, the skilled psychological warrior can put all of them, at one time or another, to work on his behalf.

First, however, let us clear up one possible question: Do these "mechanisms" refer only to abnormal behavior? They do not. Though they are commonly thought of as clinical symptoms, they are also very common features of normal life in society. It might be noted, too, that social living is what makes these mechanisms possible, and also what makes them necessary. The rules of social living impose numerous limitations on what people may do and what they may express as reasons for doing them. Since one is not supposed to express dislikes for rivals publicly, it is only natural to rationalize a bit of unfair business dealing in terms of the "process of competition" or "if I hadn't done it to him he would have done it to me." The frustrated housewife can get vicarious status by identifying with certain kinds of heroines of soap operas. Mechanisms like these are ways of avoiding frustrating realities. They really are needed for the smooth functioning of society; if they did not exist, if people had always to seek direct satisfaction of needs and immediate removal of frustration sources, then certainly violence would be much more

common than it is now, and our social structures would be very shaky indeed.

Let us now look at some of these mechanisms and at the ways they may be used in psywar.

Displacement. Underlying these mechanisms is a general assumption that the individual whose needs are frustrated commonly strikes out at, that is, aggresses against, whatever he perceives as the cause of his frustration (Dollard, Doob, et al<sup>2</sup>). This is a common pattern and may be made use of by psywar operators to direct aggression against governments that control and tax, officers who lead troops into necessary danger or hardship, etc. But the individual's society does not let him express aggression against the real source of his frustration as he sees it. Children are prevented from directly attacking their parents. Soldiers are prevented from showing aggression directly against their superior officers. In many countries of the world, men are not even permitted to criticize the government. The punishments are too great to make that kind of aggression worth while; the individual therefore learns to control and repress it. But very often he turns his aggression toward some other person, or object, or group, and when he does he is said to have displaced his aggression.

The individual is usually not aware that he is displacing his aggression. Either (a) he is aware of the frustration and attendant feelings of hostility but not aware of the fact of displacement, or (b) he is aware of the fact of interference but is not aware either of the feelings of hostility or of the fact of displacement. The first form is the garden variety of displacement, as when a man home from a tough day with the boss blows his top when one of the children irks him. The second form occurs in people with more severe training in the inhibition of aggression; it is not only overt acts that are inhibited but the verbalizations usually attendant on them as well. The process of repression works to prevent us from recognizing within us the tabooed aggressive thoughts. It is this second kind of displacement that, we are told, operates in habitual fire setters, consistent sadists, and the sterner advocates of "spare the rod and spoil the child." It is also likely to be operating in such strictly reared people as the Germans and Japanese, who are taught to suppress aggressive feelings against fathers and other authorities and to substitute for them verbalizations of respect. The pent-up floods of aggression in peoples like these can easily be directed against out-groups, especially when aggressive action against them is given official sanction. If all this is correct, Nazi anti-Semitism and some Japanese excesses of

cruelty during World War II are not too difficult to understand.

Aggression is often displaced toward a substitute, that is, a "scapegoat." This term originated with the ancient Hebrews, who used to send a goat into the wilderness to carry away sins that were causing them a sense of guilt. Ironically the modern Hebrews have perhaps been used as scapegoats more often than any other racial group. Leonard Doob<sup>13</sup> points out that, during World War II, Goebbels seemed to launch an attack upon the Jews whenever the Germans had suffered, or were about to suffer, a military reverse or a cut in food rations. He used these unfortunate people as scapegoats on whom the bitterness and disappointment of Goebbels's mass audience could be displaced. He chose for the purpose, be it noted, a single defenseless minority; this is the usual pattern of scapegoat tactics.

Under just what conditions a given person will be seen as a fit substitute is a question that needs further experimental researching. However, we have one essay in theoretical analysis of the problem (Miller<sup>14</sup>) and some empirical evidence (Brown,<sup>15</sup> Miller<sup>16</sup>) that the scapegoat must bear some resemblance to the real source of the frustration and be of such character as not to elicit anxiety and inhibitions strong enough to protect it from the would-be aggressor. Also the scapegoat must, as already noted, not be able to fight back. By way of hypothetical illustration, suppose a sergeant is dressed down by his company commander. The known consequences of aggression toward an officer inhibit any aggressive response by the sergeant. However, he can be cruel or rude to enlisted men without much risk, and enlisted men and their behaviors are markedly similar to the officer and his behavior, which meets the requirement of defenselessness and similarity noted previously. Hence the next time an unlucky private gets in the way of the sergeant he receives not only any rough treatment he may deserve but also the aggression stored up against the officer.

What can the paywar operator make of this aspect of human behavior? In general his aim should be to emphasize the frustrations and to suggest outlets for aggressive attitudes and actions that will reduce them. Care must be taken, however, to make sure that the objects to be used as scapegoats actually are likely scapegoats and not objects loaded with symbols and cues evoking deference or other attitudes that would interfere with the displacement process. For example, the best analysis of what happened in Germany during the last war indicates that it would have been ineffective to try to turn much German aggression

against Hitler. Aggression was plentiful in that highly controlled country, especially when the war was going badly, as Goebbels recognized when he relied so heavily on aggression against the Jews. The best tactics would probably have been to try to turn the aggression against minor party functionaries, or other Nazis not so well known or so well protected as Hitler. In the Communist countries, similarly, it seems impracticable to direct aggression toward Malenkov or any of the top Communist leaders of the satellites. Rather it would be necessary to try to direct it toward some person or group less well known, farther away (in "psychological distance") from the target audience and its realm of experience. Perhaps the Communists of another country, the cultural officers from the central Party, the bureaucracy in the capital, or the unknown Party members who are thought to be growing rich on graft would be better scapegoats.

It should be obvious that in trying to capitalize on frustration and the displacement of resultant aggression the psywar staff needs the best available information on the attitudes and social structure of the enemy society. Without it the attempt to use and exploit these mechanisms will not only fail but will make American psywar look foolish.

Rationalization. Rationalization serves all other mechanisms by providing the individual with an acceptable reason for an attitude or action. In most western cultures a premium has been placed on "being rational" or having a reason for doing something; it is important to be able to say why you don't like fried grasshoppers or Democrats and not good enough to say that you just don't. The real reasons for a good many of our actions are not acceptable to others or to ourselves; it is not acceptable to vote Republican just because father did; better far to be able to explain that the GOP stands for something you believe in. We say we drink hard liquor not because it relieves tension within us but because of "sociability" or the flavor.

Rationalization is fed by two springs: ignorance and repression. Ignorance-based rationalization is necessitated by the cultural demand that behavior be explainable. Repression-based rationalization is tied up with the individual's need to keep himself from recognizing the (real) reasons for his behavior and attitudes that are socially unacceptable. Why does the anti-Semite not tolerate Jews? Because Jews are greedy and unprincipled, says the anti-Semite, and one must protect himself against them. The true reasons: repressed hostility against authority, strong (inhibited) aggressions, sexual repressions, urgent needs for

status and power. If, given the individual's family background and present groupings and associations, these reasons appear socially unacceptable, the individual denies having them not only to others but himself, projects them on some out-group, and uses them as a rationalization for his antagonism against that out-group.

The rationalizing habits of human beings are important to the propagandist, for one reason, because they provide him with great opportunities for influencing attitudes and behavior. If he can manufacture and communicate the rationalization people are looking for, so that they will have good and acceptable reason for behaving as they wish to, the chances are pretty good they will seize on it. He can, moreover, by repeating and giving currency to it, make a rationalization about whose acceptability people are doubtful sound safer than it otherwise would. In general, moreover, the propagandist who understands the role of rationalization in people's behavior will get a better understanding of his target than one who does not; indeed, there is no more valuable paywar intelligence than that which tells us what rationalizations are current in what groups within the target. For rationalization fits in with so many other mechanisms to provide reasons for actions, to justify displacement, for example.

Projection. Another common mechanism is attributing to others motives the individual recognizes as undesirable in himself. The individual does this unconsciously but with spectacular results. One of the classical examples is that of the old maid who tells the police that a man is following her or has made immodest proposals to her. What apparently happens here is that she projects her own repressed sexual impulses onto the unlucky man, who in many such cases is entirely innocent. The hostility she displays toward him merely reflects the shock her own unconscious effort at repression has caused within her. This same pattern repeats itself on the group and even the national level, as may be seen in the Soviet Union, which charges its neighbors with aggressive intentions at a time when the real aggressor is the Soviet Union itself.

Projection ordinarily occurs only where two conditions are present: first having a motive or need that the individual deems socially unacceptable and second being unaware of having it because of having repressed all knowledge of it. This has been demonstrated experimentally by Sears.<sup>16</sup> A prime example in American history is the case of Anthony Comstock, who with the help of other persons of the same ilk pushed through Congress the "Comstock laws" against the mailing of matter referring to

sex. Comstock's biographers have shown that as a young man he was very interested in sex and felt great guilt for his pre-occupation with such a topic. Gradually, it would seem, he repressed his thoughts about sex and came to attribute them to others, against whom he then waged a vigorous campaign. The individual who has tabooed sexual impulses, in other words, can effectively combat them by seeing them in others and denouncing or punishing those others. The denunciations and punishments contribute to his self-respect and free him from the anxieties associated with recognizing the drives.

What can the paywar operator do with or about projection? At times it is well worth his while to recognize, encourage, and exploit the tendency to project on the part of members of his target audience. We have already pointed out how Russian propagandists are using this mechanism to make peoples suspect non-Communists of aggressive tendencies. Hitler and Goebbels used the same technique whenever the Nazis invaded a new country. The North Koreans continued to tell their people that the invasion of South Korea in June of 1950 was a defensive move against a South Korean attack. All these instances appear to have involved cold and calculated planning to make use of the mechanism of projection, along with other mechanisms that have been discussed. The victim of such propaganda, be it noted, actually believes the person or group on whom he projects to be guilty of the alleged crime or crimes, even in the teeth of evidence to the contrary. Countless North Koreans are today certain that South Korea invaded North Korea. Many intelligent Germans, in 1938 and 1939, believed that Germany was being encircled with aggressive intent and that enemy armies would soon move to impose their will on the Reich. Out of the total evidence available to them they selected that which fed the powerful mechanism of projection. It may be assumed, similarly, that a very large number of Communists honestly believe that the non-Communist countries are aggressive, that the Communist countries are in danger, and that every extension of Soviet power is a defensive measure. In fact it would be surprising if this point of view were not held even in the Politburo, which set the campaign of projection in motion. Projection brings satisfying relief from anxiety and guilt, and high-level Soviet bureaucrats are not less vulnerable to anxiety and guilt than other human beings.

The paywar operator, then, will be well advised to look for evidences of guilt and anxiety in the target culture and to ask how they can be mobilized on behalf of his mission. What are the

taboos, and what motives do they refer to? What does his intelligence tell him about evidence of past or present disloyalties, graft or malfeasance, inefficiencies or failures, homosexual deviations, etc.? What strong drives have apparently been repressed because their expression is not, or is thought not to be, for the good of the State? If the psywar operator can find evidences of guilt, he can be pretty sure that people in the target can be brought to attribute them and the actions responsible for them to others. Nazi propaganda projected numerous socially undesirable motives onto the Jews. The Communists project all manner of criminal impulses onto the capitalists, "Wall Street," "feudal" landowners, etc. In the light of recent disclosures about the Russian biological warfare experiment station in North Korea as long ago as 1950, current Communist charges that the United Nations is using biological warfare are a further clear example both of projection and of playing upon projective impulses in propaganda.

There is yet another psywar use of projection, which can be used apart from repression or aggressive intent. Every propagandist at some time or other plays upon projective impulses to bring individuals into a group or a movement. The problem is to make the individual ascribe his own feelings to the group, and say to himself: "Why, these people are like me!" or "After all, we all dislike the same things!" or "We're all human beings!" or "We're all rational men," for these are the familiar responses when projection is skillfully used in this way. This is what the propagandist is doing when, for example, he uses the "plain-folks" technique. He tries, in part by echoing the projections of the target individual, to persuade him that the operator's side are plain folks, just like the target individual himself. The target individual then feels safe in joining the group, climbing on the bandwagon.

Identification. Identification is projection in reverse; instead of convincing himself that "This person is like me," the propagandized individual ends up saying "I am like him." This is a very common and powerful mechanism. It is one of the things that makes group life possible, and it helps countless lonely people to overcome some of their loneliness.

The parent identifies with the child (and suffers when the child does). The child identifies with the parent (and shares some of the parent's small triumphs and problems). The lonely woman identifies with the movie star she reads about or with the soap opera heroine; she reads her own problems into those of the star and is thus able to share vicariously in the star's sorrows and joys and travels into strange environments. The boy iden-



ties with the great athletic hero. A whole nation identified with Lindbergh in the twenties, and certainly a great many young women must have identified in the thirties with the woman for whom the King of England gave up his throne. Lovers identify with each other. Soldiers in a small group identify with each other and are more willing to share privations because the others are in every society, people identify with the leader, read their worries and problems into him, and are therefore the more ready to follow his decisions.

Leadership is, of course, the connection in which psywar can best exploit people's tendency to identify with others. There is some evidence that a group leader often comes to serve as a kind of substitute for parent identification. As several investigators have pointed out, it is more than a coincidence that modern totalitarian leaders use terms like "my children" and "my son," or that the father idea recurs throughout the vocabulary of religion. Certainly a great deal was done in the case of Hitler, and was also done in the case of Stalin, to build a father atmosphere around the leader.

The psywar operator can try to undermine this kind of identification with a leader. This is an extremely difficult operation when undertaken from a distance. It is easier from close at hand. You will probably remember the rumors circulated about Franklin D. Roosevelt, which, whether they were that or not, looked like deliberate efforts to break down identification with the leader of the Allies in World War II. Rumors are one of the most effective tools for this purpose. Against Hitler the rumor was circulated that he was crazy. Against Eisenhower the rumor has been circulated in this country, on the basis of a joking entry in the West Point annual, that he is a Jew.

But it is easier to build identification than to break it down. In the armed services, in civilian organizations, and in neutral countries, leaders can be built up by psywar techniques. Their strength, their humaneness, their warmth, their glamor can be brought home to the target audience, which will then identify with them and be more willing as a result to put their destiny in the leaders' hands. Identification can also be used to distract individuals from real problems toward fantasy and thus to undermine their capacity to cope with real problems. And the intensity of emotions can often be increased by identification; for example, by making the sufferings of the home folks very real to Chinese soldiers in Korea, we should theoretically be able to make them feel more anger toward the persons responsible for those sufferings.

**Regression.** The moving backward implied in the term "regression" is, psychologically, a reversion to a mode of meeting problems that has been useful in similar circumstances in the past. When the individual's present attitudes and habits fail to achieve satisfaction for a drive, then his attitudes and habits of an earlier period in his life, usually less efficient ones, may be brought into play. This has been experimentally demonstrated in laboratory experiments with various animal forms and with children (Barker, Dembo, and Lewin<sup>17</sup>). Although the most striking examples of regression are to be found in the schizophrenia wards of mental hospitals, this mechanism, like the others, is a normal part of everyday life. In interpersonal relations, outbursts of profanity and violence are regressions toward earlier, more childish, less effective ways of reacting to frustration. In broader social contexts, regressions are evident in the juvenile antics of American conventioners in solemn conclave gathered, in sects that emphasize God as a stern and punitive father figure, and in fantasies about the "good old days."

For paywar, the most important thing to remember in this connection is that regression is most likely to occur, and easiest to bring about, in a context of anxiety, frustration, or shock. For example, men under fire, when highly skilled reactions they have learned in training begin to lose their effectiveness, begin to react less efficiently and in a more childlike manner. Under great stress many a man will turn to mechanical activities and try not to think of his troubles. Paywar can use this mechanism by enhancing the apparent difficulty of the obstacles confronting the enemy, thus making it easier for him to escape from anxiety back into regressive behavior and so to resist less effectively. And by playing down obstacles it can help to prevent regressive behavior on the part of allies and neutrals.

**Withdrawal.** Psychologically, the term "withdrawal" is used most often to refer to people's tendency to avoid problems and frustrations by retreating from reality into a fantasy state. Daydreaming is a common reaction to problems, and it can occupy such a large proportion of an individual's time that he becomes unable to maintain himself in a society which demands certain overt behaviors as methods of getting along. Daydreams are wish fulfillments, and they consume time; they are also habit forming, since they do give release from tension. The combat paywar operator can assist in the fostering of daydreams by providing news of home couched in nostalgic terms (the Japanese used the song "White Christmas" to this end in 1942); distributing attractive recipes and menus to hungry troops; pictures of farm

fires to cold troops, or of cool drinks to hot troops; and in general by suggesting unattainable goals relevant to the needs of frustrated, deprived people. It is not to be expected, of course, that all the recipients of messages of this sort will spend their days in schizophrenic stupors. What can be expected is the stimulation in some of them of increased "goofing off" and fantasy play, together with heightened dissatisfaction over the present state of affairs.

Conversion and Confluence. The layman expects paywar to convert the enemy. Indeed, the most commonly expressed concept of the Voice of America has been that it should be a device to "sell free enterprise" or "convert the Communists to our way of life." Therefore we had better set down some notes on the mechanisms of conversion and confluence.

A very frequent life situation is one in which strong motives are in conflict. We say we are "torn between desires" or "between love and duty" or "between what we want to do and what we ought to do." Such conflicts may be very strong. Anxiety and frustration then develop. We look for a way out.

The case of Anthony Comstock may again be used as an example. Comstock lived a good many years in a state of strong conflict between his sexual needs and interests on one hand and the teachings of his parents on the other. The result of the conflict was a drifting from one unsatisfactory vocation to another. After some years of concern over his past and current temptations, he came to see the literature of the world as conspiring to make an immoral man of him and other young people. It occurred to him that if this source of stimulation could be removed he would be freed from his conflicts. He found such strong virtuous feeling in his initial attitudes and reactions against suggestive literature that he quickly became wildly enthusiastic over the prosecution of this new cause.

What happened to Comstock represents confluence perhaps better than conversion. That is, he found a path whereby conflicting motivations could be expressed and thereby relieved his anxiety. The Nazis deliberately provided such outlets by allowing sadistic exhibitionistic drives to be expressed under conditions of social approval. In any working society there has to be a certain amount of rationalization and displacement so that escapes can be found from conflicts of motive, or means discovered for reconciling them.

By "conversion" we mean something more than providing an outlet to relieve conflicting tensions. Comstock's story illustrates some of the features of conversion: (a) a strong per-

sonal conflict, (b) realization of a pattern of action that will relieve the conflict, (c) intense activity in that direction, and (d) great enthusiasm over the new pattern. This is much like what happened to St. Paul on the Damascus road, and Paul's story, perhaps better than Comstock's, illustrates the essence of conversion. Every true convert "sees a vision." He experiences the blinding light. The idea he has been looking for suddenly comes to him; all at once his world falls into order, and he feels an overpowering motivation ("a call") to the new way of life. Many converts have testified to the feeling of peace (relief from anxiety and conflict) that came to them with the call, and to the new drive (a confluence of previously conflicting motives) that impelled them to convert others, to work for the new order, repudiate their old allegiances, and stand against the new order's enemies.

Conversion, then, is not simply an outlet, temporary or otherwise. It is not a gradual shift of attitude from opposition to favor. It is not a slow strengthening of belief brought about by advertisements or propaganda. It is a sudden and complete shift of position, a rejection of past belief. It occurs as an all-or-none phenomenon and involves a reorientation of all or a large part of one's personality and behavior.

Stories of conversion in a modern political context are not uncommon. Kravchenko<sup>14</sup> describes how he was torn by a conflict between comparative material comfort and high status, on the one hand, and opposition to Soviet inefficiency, cruelty, and cynicism, on the other. He resolved this conflict not merely by fleeing from the Soviet Union but by becoming a violent opponent of the Soviet regime. Louis Budenz is another example, now violently opposing what he formerly espoused. On the other side we have the record of General von Paulus and others of the Free Germany Committee.

Frankly we don't know much about how to achieve conversion by mass communications at long distance. Because of our experience with religious conversions, we know a great deal more about conversion face to face. Here the situation for success falls into a fairly common pattern: (a) the intense personal conflict, (b) a clear and simple pattern for resolving the conflict, (c) symbols highly clothed with emotion, (d) (usually) a leader with whom one can identify, and (e) a promise of group reinforcement. This seems to be the pattern of religious conversion and apparently also of political conversion. For example, some accounts of conversion to Communism have stressed (a) the severe malad-

justment and insecurity, (b) the apparent clarity of the Marxist doctrine, (c) the emotional quality of the symbols of "equality" and "the working classes" and "workers of the world," (d) the influence of a highly trained agitator, and (e) the reward of belonging to a group of similarly motivated individuals. The last is very important. The Communists seldom rely on mass communications alone to accomplish any major result. In a country where they have major goals they have a major organization. In a country where they seek converts they have a well-organized group into which the convert is invited. This does not mean that we understand fully even the mechanisms of face-to-face conversion; certainly the paywar operator should study carefully the results of psychological research on political conversions as this research becomes available during the next few years. But it does mean that we can at least make some tentative suggestions to paywar planners who may some day have a mission that calls for attempts at converting Communists and Communist sympathizers.

In the first place it is evident that a great deal of conflict and tension exists among highly placed Communists. Attention has been called to the insecurity of Soviet officials over being discredited if and when the Party Line shifts and leaves them in the position of having advocated something "wrong." Certainly one thing paywar can do is to try to heighten some of these conflicts, with the hope of setting up the conditions for conversion. A second thing we can do is to present a clear alternative; this should obviously be appropriate to the target culture rather than to our culture. For example, as Charles Malik of Lebanon, a good friend of the West, warns us, we must not expect the American system (based on the needs of an industrial middle-class democracy founded on centuries of tradition) to be adopted "in countries where there is no middle class and no industry, where such tradition is wholly lacking." In the third place we can at the proper time introduce symbols with a strong emotional appeal, though these too must be appropriate to the target culture. "Free enterprise" may mean less than "land reform" to the people we are trying to convert. Finally we can do everything we can to give our prospective and actual converts the advantage of group reinforcement. Converts need this. They need, in their strange new pattern, to feel that they belong. They need to see other people doing what they are doing. They need people to identify with and project onto. They need work assignments, which usually require group organization. It is obvious, therefore, that

the conditions for conversion are going to be much more favorable if we have an underground organization.

### Summary

Early in this section, we stated what we called a basic pattern for attitude change, which was briefly this:

1. If a person's attitudes are to be changed, if he is to be pre-disposed toward action of a desired kind, then the action should fit the psychological pattern operating within him at the time.

2. If a person's attitudes are to be changed, then the action to which the attitude leads should be in support of present group relations or lead to other group relations important and meaningful to the person.

3. If a person's attitudes are to be changed, the most favorable situation exists when the action the attitude implies is congenial both to the psychological pattern operating within him at the time and to the person's group relations and aspirations.

Most of the rest of the chapter has been in the nature of applications of these principles. For example, we have discussed predictions as to how difficult or how easy a given attitude might be to change. We said that the more firmly an attitude is anchored in group membership and the closer it is to a person's other belief systems and values, the more difficult it will be to change. We said also that the more clearly an attitude is differentiated and organized, the less likely it is to be affected by prestige suggestions or other such devices, and also that the more clearly a person understands what his attitudes are and what they can do for him, the less likely such attitudes are to be changed by suggestion and argument.

Turning then to the practical problem of the paywar operator, we tried to illustrate some of the processes by which attitude change may be brought about. The basic pattern, of course, is the learning paradigm, in which responses to given cues are rewarded and reinforced by the reduction of biological drives, normal personality needs, deviant personality needs, transient personality needs, or group needs. However, it may not always be possible to elicit the desired response and reward it. Social sanctions, group norms, or personal values may inhibit such a response. In such cases certain mechanisms, or ways of reacting to frustration and allaying anxieties, can be brought into play. Among these mechanisms are:

Displacement—When aggression cannot be expressed against

the person or persons responsible for the frustration that caused it, then the aggression may be directed against a substitute.

**Rationalizing**—Offering acceptable reasons for actions saves one from recognizing the true (usually not acceptable) causes.

**Projection**—One's own motives (sometimes those which one does not realize he has) may be attributed to others.

**Identification**—Another person's motives, qualities, and experiences may be shared vicariously or attributed to oneself. Whereas the projector says "he is like me," the identifier says "I am like him."

**Regression**—When one cannot meet a problem situation, he is likely to revert to an earlier, probably more childish, way of meeting such a problem.

**Withdrawal**—Another way of avoiding frustrating problems is to retreat into daydreams and fantasies.

**Conversion**—Conversion is a sweeping and usually permanent change of attitudes and values, which comes about as a means of resolving long-standing conflicts between strong sets of motives.

These mechanisms are of potential use to paywar. Some of their paywar applications have been discussed in the preceding pages. In general, they provide ways of making use of anxieties and frustrations in the target society and of bringing about attitude changes and resultant actions even when these are directly opposed by the target culture.

## ATTITUDE CHANGE AND ACTION IN GROUPS

We have consistently emphasized that personality factors and group factors interact in changing attitudes and motivating action. However, so far we have rather neglected the group problems. This is a good time to try to fill the gap and put together some of the information a paywar operator needs to know about groups, how they work, and what they mean to paywar.

Now it is obvious that most paywar is planned in terms of groups rather than individuals. Only rarely can paywar permit itself the luxury of tailoring a message or a campaign to an individual. The "propaganda man" (who stands for the target in the mind of the paywar planner) usually represents a composite or average or mode of the personalities in a group—or so the planner hopes. The paywar operator looks for needs, motives, or values that seem to characterize a given target group and distinguish it from other groups. Then he designs his message with a careful eye to these distinguishing characteristics.

Once a group has been selected as a target for the psywar planner, two questions are always paramount: (a) what is the degree and kind of like-mindedness in the group? and (b) what machinery has the group for responding to the message?

Concerning like-mindedness, he has two further kinds of questions: the obvious one, What needs, motives, repressions, value systems, common interests, or characteristic ways of responding make the group members like-minded? And a less obvious one, What is the range or variation around the typical or representative or model personality pattern? In other words, how nearly like-minded are they? This is an exceedingly important question to put to Psywar Intelligence. Averages in this sort of planning are no more meaningful than the average of one horse and one rabbit, which figures out, let us say, about the size of a pig or an antelope.

If a large percentage of the members of a target group have approximately the same anxieties or needs or problems, then the psywar operator can easily devise messages for the group. But if there is a wide variation, then he either is up against a group on which psywar cannot be used profitably, or he has not yet broken it down far enough and thus is not yet ready to exploit it as a target.

As far as machinery of response is concerned, the planner wants to know how the group operates. How much interaction takes place inside it? How much discussion or implementation is a message likely to get? A message addressed to a mass audience will probably get far less discussion than one addressed to a surrounded battalion or a labor union. And what action is the group in position to take? A message addressed to the common people of North Korea, even if it had convinced many of them that the Communist regime was bad, would still have been up against the fact that they had few channels for action other than those desired by the Communist regime. Their actions were tightly controlled. On the other hand, Captain Zacharias<sup>18</sup> was broadcasting in 1945 to the power elite of Japan, that is, the very people who could do what he wished done, that is, surrender the islands.

Let us look at some different types of groups and how they work.

### Types of Group

We know that society consists of and operates through a system of interrelated social groups. These are of many kinds



and size, from two lovers on a park bench to a rioting mob on May Day in Tokyo, from the small primary group (such as the family) to the nation, from a crowd of spectators at a football game to the members of a religious denomination. Perhaps the most important of all groups is the primary group, because this is where most human communication takes place and where the individual learns language and his first roles and his basic concepts of group norms. Another important group is the crowd, a collection of people drawn together by an event. The crowd, properly motivated and directed, has despite its accidental character the capacity for collective action, and we shall have more to say about the crowd in this respect. Another group is the public, which for our purposes we may define as a group confronted by an issue and under some tension to reach an opinion on it. Still another group is the mass, which Blumer<sup>20</sup> calls "an anonymous group of anonymous individuals," that is, a large grouping of people distinguished not by contact but by some common place of residence or common interest. There are many other types of groups, but for the purpose of paywar the most useful division is into two general kinds of groups: classificatory and functional.

A classificatory group is any number of people having an important feature or characteristic in common but lacking in interpersonal contacts. White-collar workers, day laborers, the audience for the Jack Benny program, Naval officers, engineers, Negroes, deaf mutes are all groups of that kind. This does not mean that no contacts take place between members of such a group but only that interpersonal contacts do not ordinarily take place between them because of their membership in the group. For example, if engineers join a national society, or work on the same job, or band together to organize a new firm, they will have interpersonal contacts, but those contacts come about not because they are engineers, but because they have formed the other kind of group—a functional group.

A functional group is a number of people whose behaviors have some predictable effect on one another. Examples are the New York Yankees, the Jones family, the fellows in the machine shop, the third platoon of Company E, the Senate of the United States, the crew of a B-47, and the Operations Research Office. In the very nature of the case the members of such a group interact with each other. The larger the group, to be sure, the less interaction. For example, the members of the Jones family or a B-47 crew will be in more frequent contact with one another

than, let us say, the members of the 1st Marine Division.

Like-mindedness in both kinds of group may be either transitory or relatively permanent. A ship's passengers, marooned on an island, share a common problem but will throw off their commonality as soon as they are rescued. The audience listening to a radio address by a high government official has a high degree of common interest during the speech but will break up into other groups as soon as the speech is over. Likewise a cut in food rations will for the time being fuse a large number of otherwise unlike people into a group with a common source of frustration, but this will pass and other groupings will then replace it. Paywar can use such transitory groups as targets and does use them, but the majority of target groups are more stable than that. They tend to be groups organized around continuing interests and motives.

Here are some examples:

**Power-interest groups**

**(a) Political**

**Classificatory:** government employees in China, tax collectors in Korea, chiefs of state of Latin American countries, the "intellectuals" in a target society  
**Functional:** the government of Iran, the Russian Politburo, the Chinese Ministry of Propaganda, the British Foreign Service

**(b) Military**

**Classificatory:** Russian submariners, soldiers in the CCF, Communist cultural officers all over the world, prisoners of war, military leaders in the Arab states  
**Functional:** the 43d Chinese Regiment, the staff of Kim Il Sung, the Egyptian General Staff, a battalion isolated on Heartbreak Ridge, the 29th MIG-15 Squadron

**(c) Industrial and technological elites**

**Classificatory:** the managerial class in the Soviet Union, big businessmen in the Near East, owners of industry in India, scientific society presidents throughout the world  
**Functional:** the management of I. G. Farben, the Bankers' Association of Shanghai, the Board of Governors of the Royal Scientific Society

**Economic-interest groups**

**Classificatory:** Chinese farmers, skilled workers in Russia, Korean railroad workers, remaining private landowners in Communist countries, small businessmen in Malaya

**Functional:** The Communications Union in North Korea, the Chamber of Commerce in Singapore, employees of the Skoda plant, the Association of Swedish Newspaper Publishers

**Common value and ideology groups**

**Classificatory:** regional groupings (Bavarians, Muscovites, Cantonese), religious groups (Christians in China, Buddhists, Mohammedans), ethnic groupings (Jews, Negroes, Irish, yellow race), recreational and avocational groupings (golfers, stamp collectors, people who read Pravda, people who see movies)

**Functional:** religious groups (the Roman Catholic Church, Congregational Church members in Pyongyang, the Korean Christian University), ethnic subgroups (the Georgian Association of Moscow, the Chinese-American Club of Honolulu), recreational and avocational groups (the Philatelic Society of Germany, members of the Moscow Athletic Club, audience at a public address by Stalin)

Any group, whether classificatory or functional, tends to be organized around its own symbols and to have a consciousness of its identity. Therefore it can be appealed to either via these symbols or in terms of its members' common interest and needs. As already indicated, the members of functional groups will interact a great deal more than members of the classificatory groups. On the other hand the functional groups will be harder to reach with mass communications. For the same reason, a mass-media message directed at such a group will ordinarily spread beyond the bounds of the group.

This raises another question. Most if not all individuals belong to more than one group. That is, the individual may be at one and the same time a North Korean, a Christian, a Roman Catholic of the Pyongyang congregation, a member of the railroad worker's union, and a trombone player (The first two of the group memberships listed are classificatory, the next two functional, the last classificatory) Conceivably, propaganda

messages might be addressed to him in each capacity, and perhaps by both sides in the current controversy over Korea. What will then be the effect of his multiple group membership?

From the standpoint of the paywar operator, multiple group membership puts him on his mettle as regards the consistency of his messages; if they are consistent, multiple membership may provide a channel for reinforcing them (the ones the individual receives in his capacity as Roman Catholic backing up the ones he receives as trade unionist); if they are inconsistent, the fact of multiple membership may prove very costly, since the target individual then experiences a conflict between the needs relating to his various memberships. To go back to our example, the North Korean's union is affiliated with the Communist Party, while his church is anti-Communist. The ruling regime's propaganda is pro-Communist, pro-trade union, anti-Catholic. By playing up anti-Catholic themes, it may alienate him; by playing down anti-Catholic themes, it may keep him in the boat. It defends the confiscation of his church property, praises workers who meet their work quota on the railroads; it appeals to the emotional symbols to which he responds as a North Korean patriot, but weaves into its radio programs music that he dislikes in his capacity as trombone player. Paywar operators have to give careful attention to this sort of thing, about which we have now said enough to be able to add that we are using "consistent" in a special sense. Consistent propaganda, on the above showing, is primarily propaganda that makes its bets as to how best to exploit the "lay" of multiple membership within the target, and sticks to them, at least until there are urgent reasons for making new ones. The results, of course, will be no better than the original bets, about which we will say more in a minute. The immediate point is that by switching its bets in this matter a paywar operation may well end up by alienating everyone.

What we are saying here is that a paywar operation cannot hope to produce propaganda that will please everyone, that it has some choices to make as to whom to please and whom to risk offending and alienating, and that these choices have to be made with an eye to the fact of there being numerous groups within the target (Catholics and Protestants, Christians and atheists, Communists and anti-Communists), and the further fact of multiple membership, which means that even those whom your propaganda pleases may be alienated because of what you say to them in some capacity you have overlooked. About all we can say about the latter problem is that each individual decides for himself how.

in reacting to propaganda, he "weights" his various group memberships, that is, what group needs he is going to treat as representing his dominant needs. We can say too that if your propaganda sets up a conflict within him between his group loyalties, he will look around for a way to resolve it. Some North Koreans have resolved the conflict aroused in them by Soviet propaganda by conversion to Communism, others by becoming refugees, still others by trying to form a counterelite. Recently the Communists in eastern Europe have provided a means of confluence for such conflicting motives by—in effect—taking over the churches and making them speak with the voice of Communism, so that for many Greek Orthodox Christians the conflict between denominational membership and Party affiliation is removed. In any such case, however, the conflict of motives and needs provides the battleground for the propagandist, and the winner is the one who can best make use of the mechanisms we have outlined and suggest a way out of the conflict that is satisfactory to the maximum possible number of target individuals.

#### How Groups Work: The Group and The Individual

Persons find themselves members of some groups by birth or because of some other event over which they have no control (for example, Bavarians, the white race, blue-eyed people, people who are inconvenienced by a cut in food rations). Other groups they join because those groups meet some personality need. That is, an individual joins the classificatory group listening to a broadcast by his chief of state because the broadcast promises to meet his need for structure and understanding. He joins a labor union or a chamber of commerce because that functional group helps protect his job and thus relieves some of his anxiety. He joins with an individual of the opposite sex to form a functional group of two on a park bench because it is spring and because they have biological drives that need to be reduced.

There are, in other words, specific and identifiable needs that groups come into being to meet. There are also some general needs that are common to all functional groups. These groups help to meet the need all normal persons feel to "belong"—to be accepted, to be understood, to be a part of something bigger than themselves. The primary group is therefore not the only device for satisfying the need for belongingness. The labor union and the chamber of commerce do not merely protect the individual's economic interest; they also let him belong to a

friendly, functioning group. Even the group of two on a park bench does more than meet biological drives; it also gives the members a sense of being understood and loved and secure.

Another general need that functional groups meet is the need for power or dominance. Some persons have this need in greater degree than others. Some may be satisfied merely to identify with the group in its successes; others may get their greatest satisfactions out of acting as leaders. Groups provide different experiences for different persons. There is good reason to think that groups satisfy the current needs of their dominant members better than those of other members, but in any case there is a variety of choices of role experience, and at different times the roles within a group change in character and may even change hands. The leader dealing with one problem may not be the leader when the group faces a different problem. The expert may be the leader in one situation and a submissive follower in another.

Functional groups tend to develop, among other things, a core of common beliefs. These grow out of the needs of the individual members, and it is easy to see how a common core develops. For one thing the prospect of satisfying certain needs is the chief reason why persons join one group rather than another. Once in the group, the process of interaction operates to select the members who will stay in; those who tend to disagree with the common core of belief tend to leave the group. Furthermore most groups have a certain amount of doctrine, either handed down (as in a church) or expressed by dominant members, which serves to shape the members and their attitudes to the common pattern. And in a very real sense the members of a functional group tend to have about the same experience; they face the same problems, receive the same information, identify with the same leaders, learn the same rationalizations. This does not mean that the belief pattern of a group is necessarily static, for, although the core of beliefs arises out of the needs of the members, it in turn gives rise to new needs. An example is that of the broadcasters of this country, who came together in a group to protect their practices and found themselves in need of a new code of practices, which they devised. In any case, this may be said with confidence: beliefs held by an individual in common with a group are likely to resist change very strongly.

Why this should be the case, you can see from the description just given. The group tends to select its members, integrate them, give them the same experiences, reward the same responses,

and build up a loyalty out of the experience of belonging. It teaches roles and role patterns, and these in particular are products of group processes and hard to change without group interaction changing them. It tends to give its members the same frame of reference on common problems, and, in this one area of their lives, at least, the same general pattern of behavior. There is a natural tendency to continue any such comfortable and rewarding arrangement. Members want their groups to go on, even in the midst of change. Members do not want to be the first to renounce the old loyalties. Thus a hard core of belief and behavior grows up around a group. For paywar this is not necessarily a discouraging fact even where paywar is called on to buck it rather than maintain it. It does point to an area where frontal attack on attitudes may prove very difficult, but it also reminds us that if the group itself can be tied into paywar's mission, if the discipline it imposes on its members can be enlisted on paywar's side, then the operator's task is greatly simplified. The great feats of paywar always consist in getting groups inside the target to take on paywar's job, or at least the later phases of it, themselves.

Thus it is important at this point to ask how groups act.

### The Group in Action

The pertinent question here for paywar is, What can be said in general about the group vs. the individual, that is, about the quality of group decisions as compared to those at which the individual members would arrive if left to their own devices? And what changes can be brought about via group interaction that cannot be brought about via individual action?

For one thing there is a presumption that group decisions will prevail over those of isolated individuals on questions of perceptual fact and the evaluation of perceptual materials. An individual may perceive some lights in the sky, but when he talks it over with the group they put their perceptions together; decide on the number, size, and shape; and perhaps evaluate the lights as flying saucers. Individuals in a group may have different tentative evaluations of an enemy propaganda broadcast offering peace. When they bring this subject to the group and talk it over, a consensus emerges, and the group decision helps to dispel the area of vagueness. "What do you think of this new candidate?" one member of a group asks others, and gradually a group decision comes into being to modify and integrate individual decisions. In any such decisions as these, of course, the leader is a very

important factor, and control of leadership is in many cases tantamount to control of the group.

In the second place it is apparent that only by group interaction can group norms be modified and social change accomplished. Let us not get caught up in language here. By group norms we mean the group standards of what it is right to do and believe. By interaction we mean discussion, one-way communication (bulletins, orders, etc.), coercion if any (for example, reward and punishment), and all the other ways that members of a group have an impact on each other. Now obviously one of the great reasons for addressing paywar to groups is that groups have the power to change their norms, for instance, to change the way their members think about Communism, or their accepted attitude toward the United States of America. And one of the chief reasons for directing paywar to functional groups is that by so doing there is some hope of accomplishing interaction; for example, getting the paywar message discussed and evaluated. The question then arises, what kind of interaction is likely to change attitudes in groups?

Festinger,<sup>21</sup> on the basis of an experiment with changing attitudes in a housing project, developed three generalizations in answer to this question. He says in the first place that contacts help produce attitude change only if they entail transmission of evaluative statements by other persons about the object of the attitude. These may be either verbal and explicit or behavioral, but they must represent an evaluation (it is good, it is bad; it is better than this, worse than this; it is dangerous; it is what we need, etc.) In the second place, and conversely, contacts will not be effective in changing attitudes if they merely contain information about the objects of the attitudes. This kind of interaction may change the cognitive structures (knowledge) but does not appear to change evaluations of the object or emotional feelings about it. Third, as might be expected, the effectiveness of communicated attitudes varies with the many relations between communicator and recipient. For example, the leader of the group may carry more weight with his opinion. A person to whom one is strongly attracted, or whom one confidently trusts, will carry more weight.

The paywar implications of these conclusions are that if we are going to try to change attitudes in a functional group we must (a) relate the message to a strong need or an emotionally involved attitude, so as to be sure of getting it discussed, (b) relate our message closely enough to obvious rewards or to enduring



personality structures in the group, so as to be sure of getting some favorable evaluations, and (c) if possible, try to suggest responses and rewards that will get group leaders to evaluate the message favorably.

There are other ways in which groups may be used to control social change. One we have already suggested in talking about the way a group tends to integrate its members' beliefs. A group, we said, has the power to make its members conform and therefore to prevent social changes. A group can coerce its members by reducing their status in the group, by penalizing them in terms of property (for example, fining them), or by holding over them the threat of being expelled. A group, we said further, can to a great extent control what its members learn about a given problem, what examples they see, what evaluations they are offered to choose among. And a group builds up loyalty and a desire for the group to continue, which tends to keep members in the fold even after they have ceased to believe in the old norms. There is a fairly familiar situation that Katz and Schanck<sup>22</sup> have called "pluralistic ignorance," a situation in which no one believes, but everyone believes everyone else still believes, and no individual wants to be the only one to question the belief.

Thus group action may be used to keep things as they are, maintain standards, keep down defiance, and hold the ground against change. Or it can be used to accomplish change, peacefully or violently. Two special cases of the way groups accomplish change—one without, one with violence—are especially interesting to paywar.

Public Opinion. We have defined a public as a group confronted by an issue and under some pressure to reach a decision on it. In any society, therefore, there are many publics and many issues. The more communication, the larger the publics can be, and the more numerous the issues. In fact the size of a public is governed by the number of people to whom a given issue is important, and by the length of the channels for intercommunications. Whether to build a new waterworks in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, is not an important issue to many persons outside Cedar Rapids; but even a nationwide issue can be confined to a very small public if, for example, a totalitarian government closes the communication lines (for instance, if the Politburo chooses to have no public discussion about who succeeds Stalin).

An issue is simply a problem that calls forth a sense of need or threat in the group. Most paywar messages therefore pose issues. The first response to these issues is almost al-

ways on an individual basis, that is, that of persons who read or heard the message and have not yet discussed it or heard it discussed by anyone else. At this stage we may say that opinion is latent or unformed. Then, however, the group processes begin, unless they are inhibited by censorship or distraction. Intercommunication takes place. People talk the issue over with one another. Newspapers write about it. Political leaders make public speeches about it. This is the period of sharpening the issue, making clear the rewards of possible responses, simplifying the facts so that people hold practically identical information, trying argument against argument. Paywar can affect matters in this stage as well as the initial one, of course, and not necessarily or exclusively by verbal communication. It is precisely at this stage of public opinion that the totalitarian countries have always staged military maneuvers near the border of whatever country they are trying to influence.

If public opinion follows its full pattern, interaction will finally lead to a sharp question on which people can express their views and on which a decision can be taken (shall we go to war? shall we elect X or Y as President? shall we ratify the treaty?). The individual has to decide for himself what kind of action is most likely to meet the need or remove the threat the issue poses, but he also feels a need to merge into a group consensus. The larger the group, to be sure, the easier it is for minority stands to be made and minority views to circulate. But by one means or other the group has to arrive at a working understanding.

We are talking about propaganda and public opinion as though the propagandist had free access and as though the public had free expression. This is not true in the totalitarian countries to which America directs paywar. In those countries the engineering of consent is often a fine art, but it is not the art of discussion and compromise as we practice it in the United States. It is a matter of the deliberate control of information and the expression of opinion, of the use of emotional symbols and, where necessary, of coercion. In the Communist states the engineering of consent often looks to an outsider like a matter of teaching conditioned responses desired by the leaders. Even against this situation, of course, paywar is not helpless. It can interfere with the communications monopoly. It can introduce information of its own, make use of counter prestige figures, flaunt its own symbols, and suggest other responses and their attendant rewards. It can try to arouse dissatisfaction with the engineered decision. But always it must ask the realistic ques-

tion: how much is this accomplishing? For in a tightly controlled totalitarian state, the sources of change and policy are seldom publics acting in the way we have described.

In a freer situation, of course, paywar can use all the mechanisms and processes we have been describing in this book, for public opinion is the traditional battleground of propaganda.

Let us review some of the weapons the propagandist has at hand for influencing public opinion:

(1) He knows, and will make constant use of, devices for gaining attention (novelty, contrast, color, figure-ground relations, etc.).

(2) He makes it his business to get at least enough communication time for his messages to be widely heard or seen so that he can repeat them with variations (Goebbels said, "Don't argue; just assert and assert"). The Russians, too, apparently believe in the practice of saying something over so often that the reader's or listener's original objections to it may be forgotten.

(3) He will see to it that his messages appeal to strong needs and anxieties in his target audiences, and especially to emotionally involved needs.

(4) Wherever possible he will try to make use of the target's firmly held attitudes, diverting them slightly in the direction required by his mission.

(5) Where he wants a real attitude change, he will work if possible in the area where attitudes are weakly held or where information is vague and where there is a felt need for structuring.

(6) He will try to get functional groups (religious, political, labor, business, women's, education) at work on his side.

(7) He will try to get the target to think of the propagandist's views as expressions of an in-group, and of the opposition's views as those of an out-group.

(8) He will try to get the target to identify with the leaders of the operator's side ("I can understand them, I feel like that too.").

(9) He will use prestige figures for testimonials and try to persuade the target to join the band wagon.

(10) He will introduce emotionally loaded symbols and slogans to dramatize the responses he wants the target to make.

(11) He will be on hand at the right moment with a pattern of confluence to resolve any conflict in a manner favorable to his mission.

(12) He will be ready with rationalizations for any unpopular position his side has to take.

(13) If aggression exists, he will try to displace it onto a substitute among his opponents.

(14) He will try to appeal to ego-involved motives in his target audience (this is your battle we are waging; this counter-elite is looking out for you; you are the greatest people on earth and deserve better from your neighbors; we need you).

The Crowd. A crowd is a spontaneous grouping of people drawn together by an event. Ordinarily crowds have very little to do directly with social change. For example, the casual crowd that gathers to look in a toy store window is not going to establish any new norms or overthrow a government. Nor is the crowd at a football or baseball game likely to change anything; indeed this is one of the most conventionalized of all groups, as the cheers, the peanuts, and the traditional patterns of behavior indicate. But there are occasions when a casual crowd is transformed into an acting crowd, and then it becomes a vicious and irrational instrument. This is what we know as a "lynching mob" or a "riot." The behavior of one such acting crowd is described in the following: 23

#### LION TAMER

Koje Island's new prison commandant, a first-class combat man, emerged last week as a soldier who could also use his wit in the most disagreeable of rear-area jobs. Boldly and shrewdly, Brigadier General Hayden L. Huestner had chosen Compound 75, scene of the Doud-Colson coup, as the first to be tackled in bringing order to the prison. After the bloody battle in which Compound 75's 3000 hard-core Communists were subdued (Time, June 18), the other tough enclaves on Kojima toppled like dominoes, with no further fighting between guards and prisoners. By week's end, some 30,000 prisoners had been moved into smaller enclaves, where they were searched and fingerprinted. During the cleanup nearly 800 anti-Communists had escaped from Communist control and were safely segregated, and more than 100 ring leaders in kangaroo-court murders had been identified, dragged out and mutilated. It seemed physically impossible that any further mass rebellion could occur. Reported "Hull" Huestner: "The worst is over."

Meanwhile, the prisoner death list following the battle of Compound 75 rose to 41 (plus one UN paratrooper). At least twelve of these were killed by last-ditch fanaticism for refusing to fight or for trying to obey Huestner's orders, some were bayoneted in the trenches by UN paratroopers, and others died in buildings captured only after conventional grenades were tossed in. The Americans did not fire a shot, although the prisoners fought with spears, homemade swords, clubs and barbed-wire flails. Also found were maps which indicated that a Communist capture of the whole island had been planned.

Anger on Kojima. When the order to move went to the next post - Compound 74 - the inmates, who had watched the battle of 75, lined up meekly and were taken away. Compound 77 was next, and it was here that Hull Huestner made his one tactical mistake of the week. He gave

77 a day's advance notice of the move, and the Communists inside used their last night to execute anti-Communists. After the evacuation, 16 bodies were found, hacked, beaten or strangled, tossed into water-filled ditches, jammed into metal drums, and even hidden under hut floors. Compound 77's kangaroo courts had not found all of the anti-Communists, however; 88 more broke away next day.

Buntner's paratroops moved on to Compound 88. While the prisoners were being moved, interpreters passed orders for the column to turn left, but added that anti-Communists could fall out to the right. No fewer than 100 anti-Communists turned to the right. Some of these dashed their red-stained caps to the ground.

Buntner expected some trouble from the swaggering, defiant North Korean officers of Compound 88, but after he had taken representatives from the enclosure on a tour of the blood-spattered ruins of Compound 76, the officers marched out in orderly ranks, five abreast. As a reward for obedience and a mark of respect for their rank, Buntner ordered the machineguns on the watchtowers turned skyward during the transfer. Only one North Korean officer stepped out of ranks; he identified himself as an anti-Communist.

**Pens and Runways.** The new prison pens, intended to house no more than 500 men each, measure some 200 by 155 ft. and are surrounded by a double fence of barbed wire. They are arranged in groups of eight in larger enclosures, which are also fenced with double barriers of barbed wire. The large enclosures are traversed by a central barbed-wire runway, which makes it easy for guards to reach any of the smaller pens with tear gas. Constant and thorough searches, and floodlighting at night are expected to prevent the prisoners from cutting the wire and thus assembling in larger groups.

After being herded into the small pens, the battered survivors of Compound 76 had still not had enough. Three times in one day they disobeyed orders; each time they were brought to heel by tear-gas barrages. One anti-Communist, hardly more than four feet tall, seized his chance to scramble under the wire of his pen, lacerating his back but getting away just ahead of clutching Communist fingers. He said he had been sentenced to death, and he then put the finger on 102 members of kangaroo courts. These misdeeds were dragged out by US guards for isolation.

At week's end, like a lion tamer who dindains whip, chair and pistol, Bill Buntner entered one of the new pens and walked alone, unarmed and unmolested, among the prisoners. He had cowed the unruly Communists and had done much to restore US prestige lost by previous pampering and bungling.\*

How does an acting crowd come into existence? It starts with some exciting and dramatic event. Perhaps it is a report of a rape, or a threat, or some harm done to a person who should have been protected. Whatever the exact cause, the event catches the attention of individuals and builds up a high state of tension in them. They begin to mill around. This is typical acting-crowd behavior. They talk to each other, communicate their excitement, build tension in one another, and often generate a surprisingly close rapport among themselves. Then a common object of attention emerges as a focus of the crowd tension. Sometimes this is the

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
event that started the whole process. More often it is a related or substitute symbol that develops during the period of milling around. For example, if they can't get at a man, they may burn his home, or a friend's home, or the jail. But someone yells, "Look, they've got him over at the jail!" Or, "Jeff just saw him down behind the coal shed; those lily-livered police aren't even going after him!" And the crowd tension spills over into mob action.

Now the question is, how by means of communication can we control the acting crowd? The crowd is nearly hysterical by the end of the milling process. It is highly suggestible, but its general direction of response is very well determined. In other words, anything we say to such a crowd will be ignored or rejected unless it falls within the general direction of the aroused impulse. It does little good to reason with a crowd or plead with them.

If a paywar operator wants to use and direct such an acting crowd, it would appear that the key time is near the end of the milling process, when they are beginning to look for an object on which to focus their aggression. That is the time when a leader or even a "plant" in the crowd can suggest a victim, or an objective, and if it is closely enough related to the original objective get it accepted.


If you want to stop an acting crowd, the earlier the better. The problem is to make a suggestion that breaks up the crowd's almost hypnotic focusing on a single object. There are three things to do: You can frighten them, so that each individual begins to worry more about his safety than about the group objectives. You can sow discord within the crowd, so that its members end up fighting among themselves, in which case also attention is diverted from group to individual problems. Or you can diffuse their attention to more than one objective, in which case the crowd loses the unity that has sustained it.

The secret of a crowd's strength, of course, is the anonymity of the members. It makes a difference when a man knows that others know what he is doing. If they know, he realizes that he has certain role patterns he is expected to follow and that anything he does will be subject to social sanctions and individual approval or disapproval. This has been demonstrated experimentally again and again. And the principle always emerges that under conditions of anonymity it is possible to do things one wants to do but dares not when his identity is known. The hysteria of a crowd and the cloak of anonymity release pent-up aggressions and repressed sadism that would never come out otherwise.



McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 10, 11

Fig. 2—Sociogram of Squadron A



McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 11, 12

Fig. 3—Sociogram of Squadron B

Morale

The signs of group morale are perhaps easier to see and sense than to describe. Essentially they are cohesiveness and a sense of purpose and accomplishment. In a group that has really high morale the cohesiveness comes from inside; it is not imposed by outside authority but rather comes from mutual liking and respect, a minimum of friction between personalities, and flexibility enough to take care of little interpersonal problems without letting them interfere with the job. Some of this cohesive spirit, it is true, may be evoked by outside threat—as happened in the United States at the time of Pearl Harbor—but even so it will last for a shorter time, and the group will work less well, than if there is a true basis for liking and cooperation within the group. This group feeling shows up as loyalty, involvement, solidarity, pride in the group—indeed, members of a group with high morale will almost always prefer their own group to all others.

A group with high morale is always one with a clearness of purpose to which the individual ambitions and goals of the members are subordinated. The group must be conscious of a job to do and of doing that job. Each member must have a role in the job and a sense of accomplishment in it. And the rate of aspiration must be realistic; as Lewin and coworkers<sup>21</sup> say, the "next goal somewhat, but not too much, above (the) last achievement."

You will find it interesting to study some sociograms of groups,<sup>22,23</sup> such as those in Figs. 2 and 3. Sociograms indicate what the members of a group think of each other. These particular ones were developed by asking members of two Naval air squadrons which group members they would like to fly with and which ones they would not. A solid line indicates a positive answer, a dotted line a rejection. Notice that in Fig. 2 a large number of the men would like to fly with the commander or his executive; choices were widely distributed, and there were no signs of cliques within the structure. In the other squadron (Fig. 3), no members even mentioned the commanding officer in stating choices. A number of members mentioned the exec., but only to say they didn't want to fly with him. The incidence of dotted lines inside the group is higher than that of solid ones. And there are two cliques—two groups of four—who choose each other and no one else. In the first squadron (Fig. 2), no one said he wanted to fly with someone outside the squadron; in the second squadron (Fig. 3), four members preferred to fly with outsiders. You hardly have to be told which squadron had higher morale.



These signs of morale are important to the paywar operator because he needs to know what kind of groups he is facing. He would like to have groups with high morale on his side, and if he finds high morale on the other side, he would like to break it down.

How would one go about attacking morale? The most effective way is to attack the interpersonal relations within the group. The Communist tactic of "boring from within" is more than a newspaperman's phrase. One agitator inserted into a group can contaminate the whole structure, as surely as a worm can contaminate an apple. The most vulnerable point is leadership, and if the agitator can undermine the members' faith in their leader he will be a long way toward destroying the group morale. Another useful trick is to turn the attention of group members from the group objective toward their own problems and objectives, that is, toward their own ambitions, toward their frictions with fellow members, toward their own worries. Still another device is to have the group goal set impossibly high, so that the whole group is frustrated. One Communist device is to insert a Party member into a group with instructions simply to do in an extreme way what the group is supposed to do. If the group is championing labor, he is the most vigorous champion; he wants the most strikes, he has the most complaints against management. Thus he builds up tension and frustration, and to the extent that he becomes a leader he can later turn the group toward his own goals.

Group disintegration is easier to accomplish from inside than from without. Nevertheless something can be done about it by communication from outside, and one of the chief weapons for this purpose is the device we call "privatization." This is simply a matter of trying to get the individual members of a group to be concerned with their own needs and problems, and to think about those rather than their group objectives and responsibilities. If, for example, we can get enemy troops to brood over their loneliness, hardships, and deprivations, they will not be very efficient group members. Similarly, if we can make them believe that they are not accomplishing their goal—for example, that they are losing the war—and especially if we can make them believe that their leaders are misleading them, then we have the situation for group disintegration.

But even in a situation like this the group may keep on functioning. The Strategic Bombing Survey<sup>21</sup> of 1946 showed that the German factories kept right on producing when morale was at a low ebb and when the workers thought the war was lost and bitterly

blamed the Nazi leaders. Role had is worn ingrained, and there was fairly habitual repression in Nazi society, just as in most other totalitarian societies we have to deal with.

Suppose you want to build morale in a target group. You will try to rearrange personnel so that frictions will be minimized. You will see that the group has a clear assignment and a goal far enough but not too far above its last achievement. You will see that each member has a job that contributes to the group job. You will try to get the members to identify with the group. Perhaps the key will be the selection of a good leader, whom the members will recognize as a leader, and follow. That brings us to talk about leadership.

### Leadership

Some leaders work into the job through group interaction, for example by election or recognition. Others, such as army officers, are put into positions of leadership by outside authority. In either case, the leader has fairly definite functions in the group. Kreck and Crutchfield<sup>26</sup> name a number of these:

He is the executive. In other words he has the final responsibility for seeing that the group assignment is carried out.

He is planner and policy maker—either himself or as custodian of plans and policies formulated by others.

He is expert. Often he gets to be a leader because of his expert knowledge. Or he knows how to use experts.

He represents the group. He is their spokesman and the man through whom outsiders speak to the group. Thus, as Lewin and coworkers<sup>27</sup> say, he is a kind of "gatekeeper" for communication into and out of the group.

He controls relations within the group—both role assignments and interpersonal relations. He therefore is in a position to arbitrate between members and to reward and to punish.

He serves as an example or a symbol for the group. The officer must exemplify bravery; the minister must exemplify godliness. A leader such as a general or a king comes to symbolize more than relations between persons; he stands for the tradition and continuity of the group. He may become a kind of father figure, as many leaders have become in times of crisis. Roosevelt, Hitler, Stalin, and Churchill all took on aspects of the father figure. He may become a philosopher or spiritual leader of the group as, for example, Gandhi did. And, whatever happens, he is likely to get the praise or blame for what the group does. If the group fails, if

It loses the war, for example, the members are likely to turn savagely on the leader and project onto him all their own guilt and disappointment.

This is what a group expects of its leader, even though the importance of the duties varies from group to group, and the members may in no case analyze the job description exactly as we have done. When paywar attacks a leader it tries to undermine confidence in him by showing that he has not been carrying out these duties. For example:

As executive he can't delegate responsibility and is therefore a bottleneck for the whole group.

As planner or policy maker he consults no one except himself. The group does only what he wants it to do. Or he doesn't know what he is doing or where the group is going.

He pretends to be an expert but is really ignorant.

He is a poor representative. He doesn't speak the truth when he talks for the group or when he reports what other people say to the group. Or perhaps other groups laugh at him—is he the best you have for a leader?

He isn't fair with his group members. He plays favorites. He doesn't care about the problems of his group members.

He is a bad example. The officer really is a coward; the minister leads a licentious life in private; the political leader is really in it for the graft he can pick up. Furthermore he is responsible for the group's failures, if any. And he is leading, inevitably, toward failure.

If these lines of attack sound familiar, remember that not all the propagandists are in paywar directed at foreign targets.

Lewin, Lippitt, and White<sup>24</sup> and others of the group dynamics school have studied in experimental situations the difference between democratic and authoritarian leadership. They organized groups of children and young people and assigned definite roles for the leaders to play, either authoritarian or democratic. The groups were then given tasks to do, and the results were recorded. They noticed these differences between the behaviors of the two kinds of group:

(1) There is more pent-up aggression in the authoritarian group. This seems to be the result of frustration resulting from the leader's tight control and is usually diverted to scapegoats or repressed until the leader is absent.

(2) In the authoritarian groups there is more fawning over the leader, more meekness in approaches to him, and more demands for his attention and praise.

(3) In the authoritarian groups there is more "I feeling"; in the democratic groups, more "we feeling." Members of the authoritarian groups seem to be more aggressive and dominating toward each other.

(4) When the authoritarian leader is absent, the work level declines sharply. When the democratic leader is absent, the work level goes down only a little.

(5) When frustration is experimentally introduced into the situation, the authoritarian group members tend to take out their aggressions on each other. They blame each other for awkwardness, poor planning, etc. Democratic groups are more likely to think things out or to draw together for organized attacks on the obstacle.

These results must not necessarily be interpreted as favorable to democratic group organization in all circumstances. When faced by threat from outside the group, people often seek authoritarian leadership: "Tell n.c. what to do," they plead. It is noteworthy that authoritarian states try to keep their people feeling a constant sense of threat from outside, as the Soviet Union has been doing for a number of years. People who are emotionally insecure gravitate toward authoritarian leaders, as all "men on horseback" have known. Finally it should be added that in many parts of the world the role patterns have grown up in an authoritarian mold, and there is little motivation to change them.

But suppose that psywar has to deal with authoritarian groups. The findings of Lewin, Lippett, and White,<sup>24</sup> and their associates suggest ways of going about it. For one thing the leader is such a key figure in the authoritarian structure that he is an obvious target for attack. By the same token, however, an authoritarian leader is less vulnerable to successful attack. The chiefs of state of totalitarian nations are ordinarily so protected by emotional symbolism and so accepted by the people as father figures that attacks on them may be futile. But the lesser leaders are vulnerable. And if one of these can be removed or made less effective, then we have reason to hope that the effectiveness of his whole group will markedly decline, at least until another leader is substituted.

Likewise it is safe to assume that a good deal of aggressiveness will be pent up in authoritarian groups. If this can be diverted against fellow group members or subleaders, then the efficiency of the group will decline.

Summary

Without trying to repeat the details of the preceding pages, let us sum up the paywar operator's concept of groups in his target population.

1. They are (for him) clusters of roles and characteristics in the target population. This helps him to define his target, since such clusters in large part determine the amount and direction of possible change. For example, the relative roles of young people and their elders in China minimized social change for centuries. The competitive role patterns between men and women in the United States contribute to the high divorce rate.
2. They are custodians of morale in the target population and are consequently the chief points of attack if one wishes to raise or lower morale.
3. They are the chief determiners of how the target will react to paywar messages, because of group interaction on perceptual facts and because of role patterns and other pressures to conform within the group.
4. They are dynamic forces that may sometimes—dramatically in the case of an acting crowd, less dramatically in the case of public opinion formation—be mobilized to speed social change.

**ATTITUDES INTO ACTION**

The ultimate goal of paywar is action. Sometimes this goal is directly expressed, as for example when a paywar operator tries to persuade a beleaguered garrison to surrender. More often the action goal is held back, taken for granted, implied, or deliberately left unspecified (for the target to figure out for itself). If we try by means of paywar to lower the morale of troops, we are taking it for granted that as a result of lowered morale they will fight less efficiently; we don't have to say it. As we try to plant suspicion of leaders in the minds of a target population, we are taking it for granted that suspicious people may cooperate less effectively and obey less readily. (We may be holding back an action appeal for the overthrow of these leaders and contenting ourselves, for the moment, with getting the target into an appropriate frame of mind.) If we try to build friendship for ourselves in a target population, we may find it wise to do no more than simply that; given a choice involving

policy, our friends will then make the choice in favor of us. If we are trying to influence elections in a target country, we may, to avoid a boomerang effect, not specify voting for the out-elites as the action we want; we merely attack the present elite.

Changing an attitude in the direction we desire does not necessarily mean that action in the desired direction will automatically follow. Attitudes do not cause action; they direct action. We have called attitudes "signposts," because they point the direction action will take if action takes place at all. Newcomb<sup>28</sup> defines attitudes as "readiness to be motivated." Other things being equal, if a person is motivated to act, he will find a built-in compass by which to steer his action. That is the significance of an attitude to the paywar operator.

Let us take an example. A person has a strong attitude in favor of beef over pork. But no action is likely to take place that brings that preference into play unless his hunger drive is aroused. Even then it may be impossible for him to find beef. He may become so hungry that his need generalizes and he may even be willing to eat pork. When he has eaten, his drive is reduced and he no longer has a strong motivation to find a beef-steak, although he may feel a certain sense of frustration over having been unable to surmount the barrier in the way of his preference for beef.

Consider another example. Paywar succeeds in developing within a citizen of a Communist country a strong attitude of disapproval for the Communist regime. Let us suppose that he is also motivated to action along the line of that attitude. Let us say, for example, that his local Communist government has confiscated his rice and kept him working long overtime hours to earn food, spied on him, and restricted his movements, and that he wants to do something about it. Will action result? This depends on a number of factors, quite independent of the attitude itself. The man may simply not have the kind of personality it takes to resist a government or endanger himself by subversive action. Others of his attitudes (for example, in favor of protecting his family from harm) may conflict with the attitude that favors doing something. The response of resistance and revolution may not be in the culture pattern; its "little man" may have gotten used, through centuries of domination, to the idea that he is to be seen and not heard, that he is to be pushed around by a dominant class, that he is often to be hungry and weary, and that probably all this is for the best. More likely the police power

and surveillance may be so strict that he cannot find an opening. What will he do? He may displace his aggression on his family or his fellow workers; he may rationalize the situation, as we suggested a moment ago: "this is bad but it could be worse, and probably things are all for the best"; he may repress his aggression—he may do any or all of these things until a way opens up by which he can act on his anti-Communist do-something-about-it attitude.

We said previously that action would take place along the compass line of the attitude, other things being equal. But "other things" are seldom equal. Therefore it is important for us to consider some of these other things that enter into the complicated practical relation of attitudes to action.

#### Relation of Attitudes to Action

We can suggest a few principles that seem to apply to the relation of attitudes to action:

1. For a change in attitude to be a valid indicator of action, there must be either (a) a present or impending radical change in social structuring, or (b) important changes in the personality structure of the person, or (c) both. There is always a tendency to think that the process that brings these changes about is simple. The psychotherapist, the criminologist, the evangelist all know it is not. The evangelist is accustomed to see some of his supposed "converts" doing things wholly incompatible with the new attitudes they have claimed to hold. The criminologist knows how important it is to be able to hold the threat of imprisonment over a potential criminal's head, and how often it helps to take a bad boy out of his environment and put him in a wholly new one. The psychotherapist knows that very often the medicine for an ailing personality has to be complete reeducation.

Everything we have been able to observe about the action processes of paywar indicates that ordinarily at least one of the two factors mentioned above must be influenced in a powerful manner if we are going to accomplish action. For example, if we hope to secure a real change of heart through paywar in political or consolidation situations, we need an educational process of considerable scope, which may range from textbooks and youth organizations to the indoctrination of tourists and careful treatment of visiting dignitaries—in addition to the usual devices of the long-distance mass media. To secure surrenders in a tactical situation, as we have found out by bitter experience, it

is ordinarily not enough to deliver attractive leaflets and persuasive broadcasts. We must also display military power and restructure the environment sufficiently to threaten the target individuals.

The fact that both these factors may be influenced in most paywar situations gives us a welcome leverage. For example, in political and consolidation operations we can employ not only the devices of propaganda but also the reinforcement of economic, diplomatic, and potential military operations. In tactical paywar we can combine coercive with noncoercive measures and supplement one with another. In strategic paywar we can to some extent make up for the weakness of having to communicate at long distance by using the threat of military action; for example, bombers in the sky. Therefore we can bring about action in many instances without the long-time program necessary to secure really basic changes in personality structure.

2. The drive strength of an attitude is related to the likelihood of action resulting in the direction of the attitude. We have not defined an attitude very sharply, and indeed there isn't a very close consensus among psychologists as to the exact way an attitude works among the other components of personality. But there is general agreement that attitudes have the dimension of intensity, that is, they are held strongly or weakly. Furthermore they have a dynamic quality, a "dynamic, insistent, stirred up property," one psychologist calls it. In contrast to knowledge and beliefs, which are relatively neutral, attitudes are actively pro or anti. They "lean toward action," or, more accurately, they mediate between the fundamental psychological processes and action. They are closely related to drives and often are clothed with emotion. Therefore we sometimes say that attitudes which are closely related to basic and powerful drives, especially if they tend to call up emotion and ego motivations, have drive strength. And action is probably somewhat more likely to result from this kind of attitude than from another.

In a sense this is simply saying what we have previously said about the need in paywar to restructure personality. The object in trying to change personality is to place strong motivation behind the desired attitude. This is what happens in cases of conversion, where the attitudes usually acquire great drive strength. If the drive strength of the attitude of preference for beef over pork, which we mentioned previously, had been great enough, the individual would doubtless have resisted eating pork, even if he was very hungry. Among Mohammedan people, for example, such



an attitude would presumably have had sufficient drive strength to accomplish this result.

3. If action in the direction indicated by an attitude is likely to get strong group reinforcement, then such action is more likely to result. This, like the preceding principle, is really a special case of the first principle. Group reinforcement is one of the means that can be used in restructuring the individual's environment. We have seen how people seek to "belong" and how they learn roles and come to know group rules and norms. If an attitude points to an action in accord with those roles and norms, then the group will reward this action. And the action will be easier to take.

The importance of this for paywar is that it gives us another variable to manipulate. We are in position not only to suggest actions that will get group reinforcement but also often in position to provide the group itself. The Communists are careful to provide well-organized groups into which to bring their converts and through which to reinforce the kinds of action expected of Party members. Practically every attempt at subversion in an enemy country includes group organization, an underground or a counterelite, not only to make action more effective but to make it more palatable for the individual. Nor is this device limited to subversive activities. Just as a well-run boys club in a tough district can help combat tendencies toward delinquency by furnishing group reinforcement for other kinds of action, so can parallel organizations be established in neutral or occupied countries. The English-speaking Union, the Committee to Help Ourselves by Helping the Allies, the Friends of the Soviet Union, and in fact many of the ethnic clubs and societies are domestic examples with which we are all familiar.

4. Action in the direction indicated by an attitude will be more likely if channels exist for its expression, less likely if barriers exist. Channels and barriers are the chief variables we can manipulate beyond the attitudinal stage itself. They may exist in the personality or in the environment. We have just given some examples. A strong motive to eat beef may be a barrier to eating pork, whereas a rationalization may clear the channel for expressing the hunger drive on a pork chop. Group censure of deviant political action may be a barrier in the way of subversion, whereas a new and subversively inclined group to which a person will be welcomed will provide a channel for subversive activity. Even after an attitude favorable to surrender has been built up among troops, the danger and unpleasantness of surrendering

may be a barrier to the action, whereas the provision of safe and simple surrender procedures may be a channel to bring in many prisoners.

Because these devices are so important in the process of converting attitudes into action, we are going to talk about some of the chief kinds of barriers and channels, and how they may be used.

### Barriers and Channels to Action

It is obvious that a channel, as we are using the term, is the opposite, in effect, of a barrier. It may be to the interest of paywar to raise a barrier and thus close the channel to a given action, or to lift a barrier and provide a channel by which to facilitate the action.

Personality Barriers and Channels. We are not going to talk here about attitudes and drives, which are obviously necessary to action, but rather about some organizations of personality which are changeable or suggestible and which operate to inhibit or encourage actions. For example, conflict or confusion will inhibit action, and it may be desirable to produce such barriers in enemy targets. An enemy power figure who is confused (for example, by conflicting information as to our strength and intentions) will not be likely to make good policy. Segments of the enemy population that are experiencing strong conflict (for example, between their religion and their politics) may be less efficient, less loyal workers. On the other hand it may be desirable to provide a pattern of confluence for such persons, by which they can bring the conflicting drives into agreement and thus find a channel of action. For example, it might be possible to resolve such a conflict by working for a new government which would be more in accord with the religious attitudes and beliefs of the people in question.

Frustration, as we have seen, will sometimes produce withdrawal or regression. The paywar man may find it desirable, by calling attention to frustrations and deprivations, to lead enemy troops to withdraw from reality into daydreams, or to regress into a more childlike state, in which case they would certainly provide less capable opposition. Or, on the other hand, if we suspect friendly troops of daydreaming or other childlike behavior, we can look for the frustration that is causing it. If that frustration can't be removed, perhaps it can be combated with another positive motivation. For example, a unit of friendly

troops has been stationed far from home, in a theater which we control, and the need they were sent to meet has never developed. They are frustrated and lonely, they have very little to do, and their morale is low. Probably nothing can be done about their basic frustration, which stems from isolation and loneliness. But it might be possible to figure out a job for them to do, a danger for them to prepare for, a new kind of skill for them to learn, that would momentarily at least give them a channel for action and remove some of the frustration. This would be sound paywar on our part.

The displacement mechanism is really a barrier-channel process. Frustration results from the individual's finding himself up against a barrier to motivated action. As we have indicated, the paywar operator's mission often requires him to produce frustration in a target, because frustrated enemy soldiers and frustrated enemy workers are likely to be ineffectual opponents. But we know too that frustration tends to build up aggression and gives us a potential motivating force of great power to play on. The latter, however, we may be able to exploit, and keep from being turned against us, only as we provide a channel that leads it where we want it to go and that helps it to strike down the barriers that might prevent it from using that channel. If we can displace it against the enemy individual's immediate superiors, or his government, or his fellows, that is all to the good.\*

Institutional Sanctions as Barriers and Channels. By "institutions" we mean the established forms or patterns by which continued group activity is carried on in society (for example, government, church, family, etc.). In each institution there are rules (express or implied), codes, and provisions for enforcement (rewards, punishment, expulsion, etc.), which make sure that the behaviors that basically distinguish the institution are forthcoming. The government has laws and police power to enforce them; the church has rules or, as the Methodists call them, "discipline," and uses excommunication and other less formal ways to keep its members in line; the family has the power to withdraw affection, company, or support, or even to exclude a member by separation or divorce. Let us call these "sanctions" or, more precisely, "institutional sanctions."

The paywar operator runs head on into institutional sanctions when he tries to direct messages to targets within a totalitarian country. States like those in the Soviet orbit severely penalize

\*Where the target is an ally or a neutral, we may want to prevent frustration and keep aggression from being built up.

resistant behavior and provide almost no channels through which deviant activity can express itself. So widespread and strong are the surveillance and police power of these states that it is almost impossible for a counterelite to raise its head. This constitutes a very powerful barrier to the types of action we are likely to want to encourage within those states.

If this represents a barrier that paywar will have to meet as best it can, there are other barriers that paywar, if it were able to erect or reerect them within the same group of states, would be able to use for its own purpose.<sup>5</sup> For example, the Communist regimes have done much to break down the father dominance that characterized both Korean and Chinese families and tended to slow down social change. They have tried to give equal political and social rights to women, and to encourage the younger generation to be much more independent of their parents than they used to be. One of the sad types of story that keeps coming out of the Communist countries is that of children who have denounced their parents to the Party. Breaking down the old family structure, and especially the autocratic power of the father, of course helps the Communists to take over. But it is a safe assumption that the Communist onslaught has not been universally successful, and if by paywar we could appeal to the sense of tradition and fitness in the Oriental countries, and thereby put barriers in the way of the Communist changeover, it would be to our advantage.

It is hardly necessary to say that if any country seeks to encourage subversion in an enemy country it must try to provide channels for subversive activity that circumvent the sanctions of the enemy government. This means, usually, an underground organization, careful planning, logistic support, and communication with the underground in the form that will involve least risk for the members.

A favorite way of combating the sanctions of an opposing state is to try to emphasize the channels that are not officially disapproved but are irrelevant to the main purpose of the opposing government. For example, a peace campaign is a common paywar move to keep a country from getting ready for war. Witness the Soviet peace campaign of 1950 and the years following. We lost the initiative in that case, but one possible move might have been to turn the Soviet campaign back on them and do everything possible to get Russians within the Soviet Union actually working for peace and against armament. In general, any sanctioned activity that does not increase the power or preparedness of an enemy state can profitably be encouraged. If, for example, the

Soviet Union could have persuaded England to channel its energies into a program of social security at the cost of military preparedness, it would have been well worth the Soviet's while. If it could have persuaded this country to divert its attention from the Soviet to any one of a hundred activities not contributing to preparedness, it would have tried to do so. More accurately, that is what it did.

Another way of combating opposing sanctions is to try to arouse conflicting sanctions. We have mentioned the conflict of church and Communism, and also of the Oriental family and Communism. Such conflict makes for frustration and anxiety and may provide a basis for deviant behavior.

Role Status and Social Norms. People trained to play submissive roles in a society will not ordinarily take on active political roles. This is a situation that paywar meets in all Oriental countries and, in general, throughout the totalitarian states. The role of the follower is closely circumscribed and presents a real barrier to any deviant political action originating with the masses. It is next to impossible to change a role pattern from outside. The idea that revolution can be incited by paywar in the masses of a totalitarian state, against the police power, the role structure, and the dominating ideology of the state, is what Speier<sup>20</sup> calls the "democratic fallacy" of paywar. In many states the status structure is quite rigid also. People in low status have relatively little chance to rise. Against that situation paywar has a choice of action. It can try to stimulate frustration in the low-status people over their inability to rise in status; this, of course, is the basis of the Russian campaigns to the "lower classes" and racial minorities. It is possible also to stimulate gripes about low pay, slow promotions, and privilege differentials in military groups.

Another way to face the status problem is to concentrate on the leaders. Obviously it is to our benefit to have good leaders in friendly groups, poor leaders in enemy groups. If an enemy group has a poor leader, it is therefore to our advantage to keep him there. We should not try to provide a channel for attacks on him; indeed, anything we can do to keep a barrier in the way of changing status within that group will be worth while. On the other hand, if he is a good leader, then the obvious paywar attack would be in the direction of undermining confidence in him, and encouraging cliques and antagonisms within his group. This calls in many situations for covert rather than overt attack. For example, rumors about the leader can be very effective. Also, if anything can be done to disrupt the communication lines between

leader and followers, the situation is being set for misunderstandings and tensions.

Surrender and subversion are almost always contrary to social norms. To provide motivation and channels for those activities is therefore important. It may be necessary also to rationalize the act, so as to get around the guilt feeling that arises from breaking, or thinking about breaking, the norms. One aspect of providing a channel in this kind of case is the giving of explicit directions and as much help as possible. People need to be told not only how to surrender but how to express their dissatisfaction in much less dramatic ways—how to withhold some of their crop or malingering in their work or pass around the news they smuggle in via radio or messenger.

Informal Group Censure. We have so far been talking about the more formal methods of social control. Groups, however, have their own informal ways of keeping their members in line and bringing them back into line when, from the group's point of view, they are misbehaving. These sanctions operate partly through the threat of exclusion but also through the threat of losing status and communication. Festinger<sup>21</sup> has advanced the hypothesis, based on experiments with small groups, that pressures toward uniformity arise from what he calls "social reality" and "group locomotion." By social reality he means the degree to which justification for beliefs, attitudes, and actions rests on common acceptance within the group. The greater the social reality, the greater the pressures for uniformity. By group locomotion he refers to the pressures toward uniformity that arise among members of a group "because such uniformity is desirable or necessary in order for the group to move toward some goal which it has."

The more cohesive the group, the more likely it is that issues are to be talked about when differences of opinion arise, and the more likely it is that members who can't adjust their opinions to the group standard are to be excluded from the group. Therefore cohesive groups have more success than others in changing the viewpoints of their deviant members. The tendency to change the membership of the group increases also with the relevance of the issue to the group's goal. These are parts of a considerable body of hypotheses advanced by Festinger and his associates<sup>20</sup> on the basis of their experiments.

Now what does this mean to paywar?

The power of a group to censure its members is obviously a barrier to deviant action. Whether this is a barrier to be pre-

served or attacked depends on whether the group is friendly or unfriendly to the operator's goals.

If the paywar task is to attack the barrier, then the problem is to break down the cohesiveness of the group. This can be done much more easily in a large group where communication is relatively poor than in a small one where communication is good and differences of opinion can readily be talked out. But the principle is the same in either case, that is, to magnify differences and break down communication, emphasizing individual needs at the cost of group needs, and irrelevant issues at the cost of relevant ones. If deviance can be brought about, then more can be done with it if an alternative group is provided for the deviants.

Similarly it is possible to encourage general group frustration by raising doubts about the purpose and goal of the group. The Communists, for a long time, have been asking us why we are fighting in Korea. And whether we should be fighting there.

Another attack is to encourage potential deviants within the group to contrast social reality, as decided upon by the group, with "physical reality" which, in Festinger's terms,<sup>30</sup> means the reality that can be tested objectively outside the group. This is what Vishinsky does when he invites American Negroes to compare the American group idea of equality among black and white Americans with the "physical reality" of the situation.

Pluralistic ignorance. We have already mentioned pluralistic ignorance. It is a condition in which communication has broken down in a group. The members do not know exactly what other members believe or are doing, and each is therefore highly suggestible concerning group uniformity. A situation like this exists in some families where there are a number of young children, all of whom have been taught early in life to believe in Santa Claus. Each one is reluctant to say that he has ceased to believe because he doesn't know how many of the others still believe. Thus some of the children (and both parents) act as though they still believed in the Gentleman from the North Pole for some time after they have realized that he is only a myth. A similar condition existed in this country in the late twenties and thirties, when the great majority of people apparently had ceased to favor prohibition and yet were kept from turning their attitudes into action because they believed that there was almost universal opposition to repealing the Eighteenth Amendment. Once the wets realized how many people were deviant, the illusion of universal support of prohibition disappeared, and the Eighteenth Amendment disappeared soon afterward.

Pluralistic ignorance can operate for a time, therefore, as a barrier to action, or it can be used as a means of channeling action. As you can see, it operates with a kind of band-wagon effect. On one side it can be used to convince potential waverers that they are going against the current, failing to recognize their group obligations. On the other it can be used to create an artificial band wagon. For example, a loyal and conscientious nonboarder can be scared into action by uncheckable reports that everyone is hoarding and supplies are running low. A potential surrenderer who is told that his friends are surrendering may come over if he can't check the validity of the assertion and prove it untrue. It is important, of course, that these assertions should not be easily contradictable.

One of the best opportunities for playing upon pluralistic ignorance lies in dealing with isolated military units or culture groups. Then the propagandist can step into the broken communication lines and utilize the ignorance for his own ends. He can persuade one group that another has turned against the government. He can persuade one military unit that it can afford to relax and feel secure "like the others."

### Summary

This section will serve to remind us that attitude change is not necessarily predictive of action. In fact, action may not confidently be predicted to follow attitude change unless there are also (a) important changes in the personality, (b) actual impending radical changes in the social structuring, or (c) both. The drive strength of the attitude and the possibility of the action receiving group reinforcement are also related to the likelihood of the attitude being translated into action. And it is clear that barriers to action will lessen the likelihood of action following attitude change, just as the existence of channels will facilitate action.

Barriers and channels are therefore two of the important variables the paywar operator will manipulate if he can. Obviously there are some situations in which he will want to erect a barrier to action, and other cases in which he will want to clear a channel for action. Barriers and channels may exist in the form of personality patterns, institutional sanctions, role-status patterns and social norms, informal group censure, and pluralistic ignorance. In each of these areas there are possi-



bilities by which the paywar operator can increase or decrease the likelihood of action by manipulating or making use of barriers or channels, and thus come nearer to being able to control change.

And now let us try to summarize very briefly how paywar works, as we have described it in Part II of this book.

Given a policy, given intelligence support, given a specified target, and given a directive stating general thematic content and desired results, then the paywar operator proceeds to manipulate such variables as he can command. The chief variable at his command is the message.

He must construct, time, and transmit his message so that, if nothing else, it gets a hearing. He must attract attention for his message in competition with all the other cues being presented to his target.

In the second place he must get his meaning across. This means he must design and present his message in terms of his target's frame of reference.

In the third place he must accomplish a change in the target—an attitude change, preferably also an overt action. To accomplish this he must organize his message or messages so as to (a) arouse personality needs of the target individual and communicate ways of meeting those needs which will be favorable to the operator's side, and do this when the person is in a group situation where the appropriate actions have some possibility of occurring; and (b) make the actions urged or implied in the messages seem important for the target's important current and background groupings, and do this while making the action seem appropriate to personality needs. The process, as you will recognize, is more complicated, but this is the essence of it.

Finally he must do what he can to manipulate barriers and channels so that the action he desires will have the best possible opportunity, and the action he does not desire will have the least possible opportunity, for expression in the target society.

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SECURITY **RESTRICTED** INFORMATION

Part III

HOW PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IS USED

SECURITY **RESTRICTED** INFORMATION

## Chapter 5

**USES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE**

Paywar may be used, as was indicated in Part II, to call forth any response which it is in the power of the available target audience to make and within the power of the available symbols and media to stimulate. The range of possible uses is therefore, if not endless, very large.

In practice the range of the uses of paywar is determined by the using nation's goals: political, economic, social, military, ideological, or even religious. Paywar is one of the means by which nations seek to maintain or redistribute power throughout the world. Whatever form or nature paywar assumes, it has always basically the same purpose: one state or society is seeking by means of message warfare to impose its will on a target state or society, to influence the target's policy and actions in a desired direction, to make it weaker and less efficient as an opponent or to make it a stronger or more loyal ally, or a more prosperous and contented friend. In our time, to be sure, paywar, both hostile and friendly, tends to be closely related to the quest for victory over an enemy. But this is best regarded as a reflection of the cold war. In other times we might well use paywar techniques, for example, to strengthen democracy in Uruguay, merely because of our devotion to democracy.

The targets of paywar are consequently groups, and groups that can get things done, call or influence the calling of the tricks, and carry measures out or keep them from being carried out once the tricks have been called. In simplest terms, paywar is directed at one or another of four groups within the target society: those who have the power to make political policy (the political elite), those who have the power, within limits imposed by policy, to plan and execute military missions (the military elite), those who do the fighting (the military population), and those who produce goods and services (the working population). The responses that paywar seeks are usually responses on the part of one or

more of these groups. And because they have to do with whether or how what things get done, they are best thought of as power-relevant, or power-related, responses.

## **POWER GOALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE**

Speier<sup>1</sup> has developed a useful breakdown of paywar objectives. The "will to fight" or the "will to resist" in a modern state, he points out, is really a complex of functions, abilities, and wills, and there are six of these that paywar typically seeks to affect: (1) deciding foreign policy, (2) determination of military missions, (3) ability to govern, (4) ability to command, (5) will to obey, and (6) will to fight.

The power to decide foreign policy rests primarily with the political elite in office, that is, with presidents, prime ministers, congressional and parliamentary majorities, department heads, etc. As it goes about making the decisions, however, the elite is influenced by the staff advice at its disposal (for example, from foreign offices, other government departments, bureaucrats) and, especially as regards the nation's capabilities and the capabilities of its potential enemies and allies, by military advice (chiefs of staff, high-level military committees, etc.). It is also influenced, in varying degrees, by public opinion and pressure groups, including those of the opposition. The influence of opinion and pressure groups varies, more or less in proportion to the degree of democracy the nation has achieved. In a country such as the United States, for example, expressions of support or lack of support from the general public, which must be depended on to fight, work, and pay taxes, and which can turn the elite out of office at the next election, are highly influential in determining policy, and opposition opinion and pressures are carefully heeded. In a country such as the Soviet Union, by contrast, the elite is free to act with much less regard to public opinion (although the extent of its freedom in this regard is often exaggerated in contemporary discussions). Thus paywar, even against a country such as the Soviet Union, has both primary and secondary targets it can aim at in its attempt to influence the deciding of foreign policy. It can appeal directly to the political elite. It can try to influence the elite by rousing public opinion on one side or the other of a current or proposed policy decision. Given the importance of expert staff work in today's complicated world situation, it can try to get at the elite through the elite's key advisers and staff men.



Military missions, though normally imposed by the political elite, are planned and executed by the military elite, that is, the general staffs and other high-ranking officers—plus their advisers. Here also, however, opinion and pressures, including rank and file or even opposition opinion and pressures, play a role; no general staff, even in the Soviet Union, can plan a military operation or, for that matter, military preparations, without giving some thought to mass reactions both within and without its armed forces. In a country such as the United States, for example, prevailing attitudes toward conservation of human life often affect important tactical decisions, which in some other countries might be made on strictly military grounds.

The ability to govern, like the deciding of foreign policy, is a function of the political elite. Unlike foreign policy, however, governing involves a large body of administrative and operational personnel, a considerable number of whom are spread out over the country. Unlike foreign policy, also, it conducts its daily operations in close proximity to and under more or less careful scrutiny by the public. Whereas a change in foreign policy might not have any effect on the general public for months or years, even a slight change in taxes or in the traffic laws will be felt at once. Therefore paywar can affect the public very quickly by affecting the ability of the elite to govern, and, conversely, it can affect the ability to govern through influencing the public. For example, it can undermine the ability to govern by stimulating the growth of a counterelite. In such a republican form of government as ours that would normally mean an opposition party. In a totalitarian state it would mean a secret resistance movement; in a subjugated country, an underground. As another example, it can move to undermine public confidence in the political elite, as by interfering with the efficiency of government or with the communication lines between elite and public. Friendly paywar may seek to do the opposite of these things, such as keep the present elite in power, discourage the counterelite, promote the efficiency of government, or reinforce communications between elite and public. And even hostile paywar might try to keep the target elite in power. As Napoleon said, a blundering leader is a priceless thing—on the side of the enemy.

The ability to command is related to the determining of military missions much as the ability to govern is related to the deciding of foreign policy. Like the ability to govern, it involves a large number of command personnel who come into frequent and close contact with the armed forces. And like the ability to

govern, any change in the ability to command will affect large numbers of fighting men, just as any change in the will of those men to obey will instantly affect the ability to command. Therefore the lines of attack are the same. Anything that can be done to destroy the confidence of men in their leaders, anything that can be done to disrupt communication between commander and troops, anything that can be done to affect the intelligence on which command decisions are made will directly affect, for good or ill, the efficiency of command and the resultant efficiency of the target nation's fighting forces.

In a nation at war, the military elite must be willing to obey the policy of the political elite (in totalitarian countries, of course, these two elites are frequently hard to distinguish, as in the case of Marshal Stalin), the fighting population to obey the commands of the military elite, the working population to obey the orders of the political elite. (For some purposes it is useful to distinguish between the political elite and what we may call the "managerial elite," which stands in the same relation to production as the governing elite to government.) The will of the working population to obey appears chiefly as willingness to work, but also as willingness to reorganize daily lives and endure hardships, dangers, and deprivations. The will of the fighting population to obey represents much more than the will to fight, which we must discuss separately, for in any modern army a large proportion of the troops do not fight. Hence, obedience, that is, willingness to disrupt civilian patterns, to give up civilian rewards, and to endure hardship, danger, and deprivation are all involved. The will to obey, therefore, can be influenced through the elites, through the working population, or through the fighting population. It can be influenced by lessening rank-and-file confidence in leadership, by persuading followers to pursue their own interests rather than those of the state, or by stirring up conflicts of interest in the population and depending on them to take minds off the state's interests.

The will to fight is expected of the entire fighting population, including the military elite. Affecting it is the most direct and immediate way to affect the military potential of a nation at war. This can be accomplished either at the level of command or at the level of the rank and file. It can be accomplished in some cases even through the civilian population, who have power to influence the morale of their men in uniform. Chiefly, however, the opportunities of paywar in this field are those of persuading an enemy to lay down (or not lay down) his arms, building

(or counteracting dissatisfaction, increasing (or cushioning) the psychological impact of weapons, and contributing to the subversion (or stimulating the loyalty) of key personnel. For every army has key personnel; for example, the fortune of modern mechanized armies rides increasingly with their technicians and specialists.

This is the modern view of the field of paywar. As the concept of international conflict has broadened, so has the older, more limited concept of paywar (as a weapon against the will to fight) come to be replaced by a broader one. In these categories of Speter<sup>1</sup> we have a varied spectrum indeed. Here are two decision functions (foreign policy and military missions) by means of which a state chiefly comes into contact with other states; two operational functions (command and governing) by which a state keeps its own house in order, organizes its power, puts into effect its policies; and two basic motivations (the will to obey and the will to fight) which must pervade large segments of the population if any state is to be productive and strong. We have said that the use of paywar is to affect and influence these functions and qualities.

Here are some examples—suggestive, rather than inclusive—of ways in which paywar has been used under each of these six headings.

### Deciding Foreign Policy

#### Supporting Diplomatic Negotiations or Political Objectives.

Nations use paywar measures to affect other nations' diplomatic goals and to influence diplomatic negotiations. The Italian elections of 1950, for example, were a major battleground of Communist vs. Free World propaganda. On the Communist side there were parades, posters, meetings, broadcasts, and threats and promises from Moscow; on the Free World side there were pretty much the same things, except of course the threats, plus the communication of implied messages via Marshall Plan funds. In an even more spectacular way the San Francisco conference on the Japanese treaty was a paywar battleground. For months before the conference the Communist bloc and the Western bloc maneuvered for support and for headlines. The Communist radio did its best to rouse all the old fears of Japan in the Pacific. Even as late as November 1951 a large segment of Chinese and Korean radio time was devoted to denunciations of the treaty and dire predictions as to its consequences. At the conference itself,

most of the speeches, pictures, and planned events, whatever the immediate occasion for them, were in fact intended not for the delegates but for the psywar target audience, which in this case was world wide. The fact that the conference was televised throughout this country was, whether so planned or not, a psywar measure of great importance from the standpoint of US foreign policy, not because of its influence on opinion within the United States, but because of the dramatic way in which it called the attention of world opinion to the meaning of popular participation in government. Gromyko's dramatic departure from the conference and his news conference after leaving were psywar measures. The dignified and contrite appearance of the Japanese spokesman at the conference was, again, a psywar weapon. The Italian elections and the Japanese peace treaty provide examples of relatively short-term psywar operations intended to affect other nations' impact upon international events. What the United States does by way of strengthening the United Nations as an instrument for peace and the solidarity and friendship of the Western Hemisphere nations illustrates long-term psywar operations of this character. It is hardly necessary to mention that the Soviet Union is engaged in long-term psywar operations on behalf of world revolution and world Communism and against capitalism and genuinely popular government.

Getting Help from Neutral Countries. In any tense world situation the support and cooperation of neutral countries become especially important. In World War II special attention was given Ireland and Sweden because they were neutrals in key geographic positions. Today the Arab states and India are hotly contested targets for the psywar of both the great powers in the cold war. The attitudes at stake in such frays are not necessarily political ones; for example, it might be to the advantage of the United States, and in the interest of world peace, to change the attitudes of certain populations toward farming and fertilizing procedures, so that fewer people will be driven toward aggression or Communism by hunger. And the members of the target audiences are not necessarily dealt with at a distance, even if the target country is far away. America's huge program of student exchanges brings large numbers of students to these shores from important target countries, and the Government has, and tries to exploit, a unique opportunity to influence their attitudes while they are here. It is worth noting, as already intimated, that part of psywar's task in this connection is to counter enemy propaganda to neutral countries.

Strengthening or Weakening Alliances. The pattern of modern warfare is that of alliances. Thus a nation uses paywar on the one hand to urge its allies on to greater efforts, and on the other to weaken unity among enemy alliances. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) program is an example of the first, and the Soviet Union's efforts to weaken NATO, by breeding distrust in Europe for America's alleged "aggressive" reasons for starting NATO, are an example of the second. The English-Speaking Union, the campaigns of friendship for France, and the exchange-of-persons program, are examples of the first; the World War II efforts to sow discord between Hitler and Mussolini and the German use of the Katyn massacres to foster distrust between the Soviet Union and Poland are examples of the second.

Preventing or Fostering Aggression. Paywar is also used as a weapon short of war to deter potential aggression or—the other side of the coin—to clear the way for aggression. The Nazi build-ups for the Munich agreement and the invasion of the Sudetenland and the way the Soviet Union prepared the stage for the attack on Finland are clear examples of paywar for aggression. What this country has done in recent years in its attempt to deter the Communist nations from further power grabs illustrates, in the same way, paywar against aggression. America has consistently unmasked Communist intentions in Indo-China, Burma, India, Iran, Egypt, Italy, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere, and warned the Communists themselves of the probable costs of carrying them out. Our actions prior to the Communist invasion of South Korea—our withdrawal from the peninsula, our publication of a map that excluded Korea from the area we would defend, etc.—are examples of failures on the part of this country to use paywar against aggression.

Inducing a Nation to Surrender. Captain Zacharias's broadcasts to Japan had this purpose. So did America's end-of-the-war messages to Badoglio in Italy.

#### ZACHARIAS'S DECISIVE MOMENT

By then just a few men were coming in to Washington in amazingly large numbers. . . . Admiral Nimitz . . . was more than willing to heed the Emperor's desire to bring about peace—but his loyalty to the Emperor made him refrain from doing anything about it until he could ascertain what the Allies had in mind regarding the future fate of the imperial house. In his plight he decided upon what in retrospect appears to have been a desperate move. In June he instructed Mr. Togo, the Japanese ambassador to the Kremlin, to make representations to the Soviet Union and ask them to intervene with the Western Allies on Japan's behalf in order to obtain a further clarification of the unconditional surrender formula, and, if possible, peace terms. What he really

wanted was an assurance that Japan's sovereignty would be respected even if she had to pay for the privilege with her empire.

The fact that such a peace plan had been forwarded to Stalin and Japan's plight faced to the Soviet leaders did not receive here the attention it seemed to warrant. The Soviet Union by Suzuki's move was given a clear indication of Japan's inner plight and her willingness to surrender. Thus when on August 8, 1945, the Russians joined in the war against Japan, they acted upon intelligence provided by the Japanese themselves that they were at the end of their rope. Russia joined in the war in the knowledge that Japan had admitted defeat. . . . By the end of June the plight of the Japanese had become desperate, and an Admiral Suzuki received no answer to his plea from Russia, he called an extraordinary session of the Diet in which he discussed in remarkably frank terms the entire war situation.

We recognized the significance of this move and gathered around the ticker bringing to our office the momentous speech. It was evident from the very outset that while Suzuki was talking of war, he was thinking of peace. Now, it was no longer a material consideration such as the retention of Manchuria or Korea which prevented him from saying in so many words that he would accept our terms. The only doubt which still forestalled a decision was the future status of the Emperor. "I have served His Imperial Majesty over a period of many years," Suzuki said, "and I am deeply impressed with this home. As bold as it may seem, I firmly believe there is no one in the entire world who is more deeply concerned with world peace and the welfare of mankind than His Imperial Majesty the Emperor. The brutal and inhuman acts of both America and England are aimed to make it impossible for us to follow our national policy as proclaimed by the Emperor Meiji. I hear that the enemy is boasting of his demand of unconditional surrender by Japan. Unconditional surrender will only mean that our national structure and our people will be destroyed. Against such boastful talk there is only one measure we must take—that is to fight to the last."

With our knowledge of the background of this extraordinary session and of Suzuki's speech, I made an important broadcast to the Japanese on July 7 inviting them to ask openly for peace. "Japan must make the next move," I said in clearly accentuated words. "Japan must make her choice without delay, for reasons which Admiral Suzuki knows. I have told you before that the time is running out for Japan. You must move and move quickly. Tomorrow it may be too late."

We analyzed the speech again for future action, and as subsequently proven by events and confirmed by Suzuki himself, our analysis was accurate. The problem now was the method by which we could reassure Suzuki on this score, and indicate that there was no intention to destroy what he ambiguously described as the national structure of Japan.

This time our answer was not confined to another broadcast. Instead, there was selected a method as devious as those chosen by the Japanese themselves. We decided to answer Premier Suzuki in an anonymous letter written to a reputable American newspaper and to bring this letter to his attention in the quickest manner possible. The Washington Post was selected as the vehicle with full cooperation of its editors. The letter contained all the answers to Suzuki's query. . . . The letter attracted considerable attention in the United States, and the Washington Post was bombarded by callers who wanted to learn the identity of its anonymous author. My telephone also rang. Washington correspondents, anxiously guessing the technique, tried to make me confess authorship. . . . The letter was reprinted in many American dailies from coast to coast. We felt certain that it would be picked up in Washington by the listening posts of the Japanese government.

Simultaneously another broadcast was prepared along more conventional lines. I was now called upon to prepare a radio script on the highest

diplomatic level. I fully recognized my tremendous responsibility and devoted special attention to this one talk. We worked on the script day and night for almost a week, drafting and redrafting it, listening to suggestions, submitting it for approval, weighing every single word with the greatest of care. When at last I went to the broadcasting studio, I had the fourteenth draft in my pocket.

For this broadcast we selected a little room specially built for highly classified recording to guarantee security. As unobtainable as possible, guards were posted around the studio to see that no unauthorized person could obtain advance information of what I was to say. But this secrecy was maintained for only a short period. When my recordings were put on the air a few days later, the text of the broadcast was released to the American press by the OWI, using this publicity as another means of reinforcing and emphasizing the message.

I was introduced as "an official spokesman of the United States government," in line with the stipulation of the operation plan. But the Japanese had indicated doubt as to my true authority. Was I "official spokesman" in fact, as well as in name? Did my statements carry higher endorsement? Or was I merely a cog in the wheel of the American propaganda mill? With the release to the press we hoped to dispel their doubts, and the reception which the American newspapers accorded to this talk surpassed our most optimistic expectations. The news of this broadcast broke on July 21, and the evening papers were the first to feature it. "U. S. Warns Japan to Quit Now, Face Virtual Destruction," headlined the *Washington Post*, and next morning the *New York Times* gave it front-page display and repeated the whole broadcast. Other prominent papers similarly featured it.

The broadcast reiterated the themes of my letter to the *Post*. The message it carried was incorporated in four sentences: "The leaders of Japan have been entrusted with the salvation and not the destruction of Japan. As I have said before, the Japanese leaders face two alternatives. One is the virtual destruction of Japan followed by a dictated peace. The other is unconditional surrender with its attendant benefits as laid down by the Atlantic Charter." The urgency of the situation was formulated in words which were adapted to Japanese psychology when I said: "Your opportunity to think over these facts is rapidly passing. . . . If the Japanese leaders still prefer to delay and hope for miracles, they should remember that the cemetery of history is crowded with the graves of nations - nations which were doomed to extinction because they made their decision too late."

In the midst of the domestic clamor which was manifested in editorially printed in virtually every American daily, the Japanese kept a significant silence. As I waited for their answer, I visualized the conclaves going on in Tokyo, in which possible strategy and tactics were being discussed in an endeavor to find the most propitious answer. As it was, we did not have to wait long. The Japanese answer was delivered at 12:15 A.M. (PWT) on July 24, by another Inouye, Dr. Kiyoshi Inouye this time, who was introduced as Japan's outstanding authority on international relations. I remembered him quite well as a former professor at the University of Southern California, at Tokyo University, and as delegate to various international conferences.

The message entrusted to Dr. Kiyoshi Inouye was of momentous importance. In effect, he was to indicate Japan's willingness to surrender unconditionally, if and when Japan was assured that the Atlantic Charter would apply to her. He stated: "Should America show any sincerity of putting into practice what she promises, as for instance in the Atlantic Charter accepting its positive clause, the Japanese nation, in fact the Japanese military, would automatically, if not willingly, follow in the step of the conflict. Then and then only will others cease to battle both in the East and the West."

Best Available Copy

This was not the final word of the campaign. But it was the next to last. In retrospect, the Japoye broadcast of July 24 must be accepted as evidence of the Japanese decision to terminate the war then and there; to terminate it on the basis of the terms outlined in my series of previous broadcasts culminating in my tenth talk. The Japanese answer was delivered on the eve of the Potsdam Declaration in which the meaning of unconditional surrender was clearly outlined and spelled out. It was delivered thirteen days before the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, and more than two weeks before the Soviet's entry into the war. Japan was ready for surrender. To keep our harvest we had only to shake her like a tree full of ripe apples.

Subsequent investigations on the spot after Japan's surrender revealed that the Emperor was fully aware of our paywar activities and had access to the monitoring service. He felt that we understood closely the situation inside Japan and that at the end of June 1945 the time had come to seek peace.

Several Japanese in high positions who were in constant touch with the Emperor were thoroughly investigated. One official of the Foreign Office said: "The Zacharias broadcasts were influential especially in government circles," and added, "The outstanding feature of the Zacharias broadcasts was the difference between unconditional surrender and dictated peace. The Japanese knew how Germany was being administered under such a peace. Zacharias promised that if Japan accepted unconditional surrender they would have the benefit of the Atlantic Charter. The people began to look with favor on such terms, claiming that it was not what the negotiators had said. It seemed to the people that Zacharias's explanation of unconditional surrender offered a way out."

Mr. Toshiro Shiizumi read the copies of my broadcasts at the Foreign office. At first he was somewhat skeptical, then became a thorough believer. A copy of each broadcast was taken to the Emperor by Mr. Matsuda. He stated that the information in these talks influenced those in the Emperor's circle as well as the Emperor himself.\*

### Determination of Military Missions

**Design of Enemy Strategy and Tactics.** The typical instance of paywar against an enemy military elite is the message intended to influence its strategic or tactical decisions. A common objective here is to influence his timetable—to induce him to do such and such (make an attack, commit a reserve regiment) earlier or later than he would have in the absence of the message. An example of this kind of thing is the campaign in World War II that centered around the taunting question, "Where is the Luftwaffe?" This was undoubtedly of some influence in leading Goering to send up the fighters he was saving for later and critical battles, and to send them up at a time when the odds were against them. Or, leaving time to one side, paywar might try to induce the target to do X in preference to Y, X being something it would presumably have avoided but for the message.

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The United States, at the present time, for example, would of course like to slow down the pace of Soviet rearmament and is presumably saying things over VOA that, if effective, would move the Soviet Union in that direction and thus influence its strategy.

Speter<sup>1</sup> expresses doubt that paywar by itself can do much by way of surprising or deceiving the enemy in a combat situation. The point, presumably, is that tactical decisions are made and tactical expectations formulated by taking into account only what the enemy commander learns from his intelligence and his (and his patrols') observations but not messages from the other side. That, of course, is perfectly true. Goebbels went to great length in June of 1941, for example, to create through paywar the impression that Germany was going to invade England. An article in the Volksische Beobachter described what had happened in Crete as a rehearsal for a great airborne invasion. A "leak" occurred. The censors ostentatiously clamped down on outgoing dispatches dealing with the matter. From first to last, however, it was known to the military in Britain, and to the newspapers, as well, that more than 100 German divisions were massed on the Soviet border. These divisions naturally spoke louder by far than Goebbels's words.

Enhancing Military Deception. This is not to say, however, that paywar cannot be used successfully for purposes of surprise. Certainly it is not to say that surprise and deception measures cannot be strengthened with paywar support. It might indeed be argued that all deception is paywar. We could not, on that showing, speak of paywar "support" for a deception measure; the correct distinction would be between deception paywar and propaganda support for it. When paywar is combined with other evidence—for example, when materiel is deployed as a hoax, as in the preparations for McNair's "army" at the time of the Normandy invasion—it can surely increase the likelihood of successful military deception. Often, moreover, the enemy commander has no intelligence he can rely on: If our Air Force drops leaflets on civilians in area A, advising them that they are about to be bombed and should flee, the enemy G-3 would be foolish to take it absolutely for granted that the real bombing raid would be elsewhere; that is, he must take precautions. If the leaflets do turn out to have been a deception measure, he will have wasted his energies and will be taken by surprise when the raid actually does occur.

Affecting Will of Command. Paywar has been used many times in an attempt to reduce or increase the will of military command to begin or continue fighting. Goering's display of German air power to Lindbergh and other visitors was obviously an attempt to reach military commanders through these representatives. He wanted to discourage the military elite of other countries from giving warlike advice to their political elite.

In a different sense, paywar has been used to persuade enemy commanders to surrender their units. Sometimes such measures have succeeded (some of the variables that affect success or failure have been discussed by Herz and others). One or two principles seem to emerge from America's experience with them, in France, Germany, and the Pacific Islands. For one thing, paywar is not likely to bring an enemy unit over unless the latter's military situation is pretty bad. Again, an ultimatum is less often effective than an approach that saves the commander's face by appealing to his reasonableness and consideration for his charges in the face of a hopeless tactical situation.

Arousing Public Opinion or Political Pressures. The Soviet peace balloon of 1951 illustrates a further use of paywar to influence military planning. At that time it was unquestionably to the advantage of the Communists to get our "killer offensive" called off in favor of truce talks. Therefore the campaign was planned to take full advantage of our wish for peace. As another example, before the Soviet Union got the A-bomb there was a widespread Communist campaign to rouse substantial segments of public opinion against the use of atomic weapons.

#### Ability to Govern

Interference with Control Systems or Communications. The illustrations that come most readily to mind here have to do with paywar operations against Communist states, where close control over and surveillance of the general population are the major instruments the government uses in imposing its will. If its capacity to exercise control and surveillance can be weakened, therefore, the door will be thrown open to a great many paywar measures that would otherwise be pointless. When Radio Free Europe broadcasts the names of Communist informers in East Germany, what it is really attacking is the Communist control and surveillance system. The communication systems of Communist states are targets of great importance for this very reason. Anything that can be done to interfere with communication between political

leaders and followers will obviously lessen the former's control and also encourage suspicion and frustration. It is not often possible to attack communication lines with wire cutters or any other physical means. But paywar can accomplish some of the same ends by starting rumors, inserting false information in the communication channels, or encouraging withdrawal and other troublesome types of behavior on the part of the general population.

Helping Build Counterrelies. The oldest technique of attack on government is the building up of counterrelies. This has been the Communist technique throughout all the present Soviet orbit and also throughout the countries which are marked but not taken. The Soviet Union, for example, gave propaganda and organizational support to Mao in China for a long while before he came to power. Its support of the Communist movements in France, Italy, Egypt, Iran, Burma, and Indo-China are examples of presently continuing operations aimed at the overthrow of the governments of target countries. Conversely, much of the surveillance in the Soviet states is aimed at making sure that no counterrelie shall ever raise its head. It is therefore not easy for an outside country to give support and encouragement to opposition groups, particularly those behind the Curtain. Indeed, any overt encouragement given to such a group would at once reveal its existence to the control and surveillance officials and result in hurting it.

Strengthening Friendly Leaders and Weakening Enemy Ones. One purpose of paywar in the area of governing is always to strengthen friendly leaders and weaken enemy leaders. Our paywar policy in World War II was, as a matter of course, to build up confidence in the allied leaders, especially FDR and Churchill, and wear down confidence in Hitler and other enemy leaders. The Communists have always given vigorous paywar support to their chosen leaders, such as Mao in China, Kim Il Sung in Korea, and, in other days, of course, Tito in Yugoslavia.

Supporting Resistance and Gaining Support. Another use of paywar that assumed great importance in the last war was the strengthening of resistance among subjugated peoples. The US support, logistic and propaganda, given to, for example, the French underground and the Philippine resistance between 1941 and 1944 are examples of this paywar objective. As soon as we moved back into the countries in question, paywar took on another assignment—that of winning and keeping friends and supporters among the liberated populations. Later paywar had the same task to perform in Germany and Japan.

The Ability to Command

Producing Dissension in Enemy Military Forces. One of the commonest paywar missions is that of producing cleavages in the ranks of the enemy forces. In Korea the Communists have tried to foment mutual suspicion and dislike between the ROK troops and the American troops, and between American and British Commonwealth troops. America, for its part, has tried to encourage distrust between Chinese and North Koreans, between military and cultural officers, and between cultural officers and their charges. A familiar theme for this purpose is the idea that group A is carrying the brunt of the fighting, while group B is having it easy. The real purpose of such propaganda, of course, is to make things difficult for the enemy command, by countering its effort to work its units together like a team.

Strengthening Friendly Leaders and Weakening Enemy Ones. In military as in civilian affairs a continuing objective is to strengthen friendly leaders and weaken enemy ones. That is one of the reasons why this country has given medals, recognition, and publicity to the leaders of its allies in the Korean war. Of this same general character is propaganda designed to call attention to ruthless use of troops and playing of favorites on the part of enemy commanders.

Misleading Enemy Intelligence and Disrupting Communications. Every army, of course, tries to see that its opponents get false intelligence and erroneous information on which to estimate capabilities and intentions. Paywar's easiest opportunities for doing this come when an enemy unit is isolated or disorganized, since paywar can then plant false information about unit locations or the battle situation or even give the unit spurious orders purporting to come from its own command, without normal interference by the enemy's communication network. Here, however, we must repeat our word of caution on military deception in general: a field commander will always trust his own intelligence and observation reports rather than enemy paywar.

Supporting Military Government. Military government needs and uses paywar to support its programs. American military governments in both Germany and Japan made broad and continued use of paywar of many kinds—broadcasts, posters, printed materials, films, meetings, demonstrations, libraries, schools, exchange of persons—and found them very helpful.

Eliciting Information of Military Value. Paywar is used by military commands for "fishing." By broadcasting assertions or

asking well-chosen questions it is sometimes possible to force the enemy to reveal (or trick or inveigle him into revealing) the true location of a unit or the economic statistic sorely needed for planning purposes—or, more important still, the premises and expectations on which he is acting. The development of what is called "content analysis," by which it is possible to learn things from the enemy's propaganda that he does not intend to reveal, has enormously increased the potentialities of fishing expeditions and made them easier to bring off.

### Will to Obey

#### Creating Difficulties between Military and Political Elites.

Cleavage between military and political elites is perhaps more prevalent and easier to encourage than is generally realized. Gorilla says that out of a total of 36 lieutenant generals in the German army, 21 were dismissed by Hitler, 2 were expelled from the army, and 3 were executed. Out of 800 officers of the German general staff, 150 are believed to have lost their lives as opponents of the regime. Russian purges, as is well known, have frequently struck hard in army circles. In 1941, indeed, many people believed that the purges had seriously weakened Russia's Army.

#### Disrupting Communication between Leader and Followers.

Anything that can be done to keep the needs of followers from being communicated to leaders, and the orders and explanations of leaders from being communicated to followers, will result in disorganization and, at the margin, in suspicion and distrust. Paywar can seldom hope to accomplish this kind of thing by striking at the communication channels themselves, but the communications can be virtually disrupted by affecting what goes into the channels or by influencing attitudes toward what emerges from them. If, for example, paywar can convince the followers that their needs will not be heeded by the leaders even if communicated to them, it will to all intents and purposes have interrupted communication in that direction. If, similarly, it can undermine the followers' confidence in the explanations handed down by the leaders, the effect is again much the same as would be achieved by blocking off the channel. An example of striking at the channels themselves by paywar would be propaganda calling upon literates in a country with a high incidence of illiteracy not to serve as secondary communicators for official orders.

Undermining Confidence in Leadership and War Aims. This is one of the commonest aims of paywar operations. One of the chief objectives of recent Communist paywar has been to wear down confidence in leaders and war aims among the populations of the United Nations fighting in Korea. In World War II, Goebbels struck again and again at Roosevelt and Churchill in a vain attempt to persuade Englishmen and Americans that they lacked military judgment and political acumen. We have already discussed the difficulties in the way of direct attacks on such totalitarian leaders as Hitler and Stalin. The democracies are undoubtedly more open to this kind of paywar measure than their enemies.

Reducing or Increasing the Incentive to Work. Nations at war usually provide some sort of incentive program for industrial workers. In Communist Korea the workers were persuaded to give many hours of free overtime labor in honor of special causes and occasions—for example, Kim Il Sung's birthday, Stalin's birthday, the success of the People's Army, etc. Therefore UN paywar had the task of trying to persuade the North Korean workers that they were being misused and should work less hard, and the farmers that they should withhold some of their crops from the Communist collectors.

Willingness to Sacrifice and Face Danger. Work is not all that is expected of a nation's population in wartime. It must also make sacrifices, and paywar is often used to reduce (the enemies') or increase (the friends') willingness to give up things that they value in order to help the war effort. Such propaganda is the paywar equivalent of the domestic "blood, sweat, tears, and toil" program with which Churchill appealed to the iron in the British temperament. Examples are the broadcasts of "Annie" to the Germans and Tokyo Rose to the Americans in the Pacific, the purpose of which was to make the listeners nostalgic, remind them of the things they were giving up, and reduce their willingness to do without those things any longer.

A people at war must also be willing to face bombing raids and other types of physical danger. Paywar, if it can get through to them from outside, can play upon their anxiety, counteract domestic efforts to minimize the dangers, plant questions and doubts as to whether further sacrifices are worth making, and encourage people to attribute their hardships to the government's incompetence, negligence, or lack of foresight. If it succeeds in evoking the desired attitudes, the effect will be to reduce people's

willingness to carry on and, in all likelihood, to reduce the effectiveness of the government's civilian defense program.

Causing Panic. Paywar is sometimes used, usually in connection with military operations, in the attempt to create panic. The Germans did this in France in 1940, with the result that panic-stricken French people, many of them men and women without whom public utilities and other necessary services could not operate, poured out of the cities, blocked traffic on the highways, and created overnight vast refugee problems. The Chinese, when they used fireworks and bugles before their attacks in Korea, were employing a centuries-old paywar device for inducing panic in the enemy's army.

Feelings of Discrimination and Unfair Treatment. Both in armies and in civilian populations there are sure to be individuals who can be brought to feel—correctly or incorrectly—that they are getting a raw deal. This is an open door for paywar. For example, casualties and dangerous assignments are inevitably distributed unevenly among fighting forces. About 70 percent of American casualties in World War II were among the infantry, which accounted for no more than 10 percent of American armed forces. It is paywar's business to call attention to such apparent inequities, especially if the unevenness can plausibly be linked to alleged favoritism on the part of the enemy leaders, or to their class, national, or ethnic loyalties. Among the working population of the target country, similarly, it is easy to show that some groups are doing better out of the war than others, that some are being worked harder than others, etc. Rationing systems, and no country can now fight a war without one, offer paywar similar opportunities for making people aware of grievances that they might otherwise overlook. Rationing causes ill feeling even if the rationers have the best and most equitable intentions—if for no other reason than because they cannot take the individual case into account. And normal western standards of fair play give paywar the rationalization people need in order to justify their resentment of the system.

Encouraging Minority Groups. Much of the propaganda directed at the Austro-Hungarian empire in World War I was intended to bring about a majority-minority cleavage between its two components. Russian propaganda to the United States now tries to set Negro against white, Puerto Rican against continental American, Filipino against American. In Japan the Communists are today making skillful use of a Korean minority, which has already assumed an importance quite out of proportion to its numbers.

**HOW YOU WASTE  
TO THEM:**

**THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO**

**THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO**



**THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO**

**THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS**

**THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS**

**THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS**

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ORU-T-211

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Contributing to Subversion of Key Personnel. Key personnel such as engineers, top scientists, top pilots, and commanders are targets that paywar dares not neglect in modern warfare. Churchill testifies that the elimination of three expert German submarine commanders in 1941 made a substantial difference in the war at sea. The subversion of Klaus Fuchs, the British atomic scientist, which was apparently accomplished without any coercion whatsoever, may turn out to have been more important to the Russians than the winning of a great battle. And undoubtedly the Russian pilots who have defected in recent years by flying their planes outside the Iron Curtain have dealt blows to the Communist regime out of all proportion to the value of the planes or the need for their individual skills. Key men, simply because they are key men, set an example that is likely to be imitated on lower echelons; they are, again merely in virtue of being key men, in the know and have valuable information to impart to the enemy. Therefore the command setup that cannot keep them in line and count on their loyalty is heading for trouble and, what is equally important, knows it is heading for trouble and must take corrective action that is sure to prove costly. Indeed, one of the major purposes of this type of propaganda is to give command the jitters and cause it, perhaps unnecessarily, to increase security precautions.

#### Will to Fight

Encouraging Surrender and Reducing Last-ditch Resistance. The typical form of surrender-mission paywar is the surrender pass, which has been dropped by the hundreds of millions in World War II and the Korean operation (see also the next section, Sub-mission). It is the commonest form of military paywar and has been much written about. Reducing last-ditch resistance is merely a special form of surrender-mission paywar. Brick and stone cities, jungles, mountains, etc. are hard to clear of enemy troops, even after they are beaten militarily; often they can be mopped up only at great cost, so that the military places a high value on measures calculated to persuade isolated pockets of enemy troops to give up. The caves of Okinawa, the mountains of Korea, and the city of Stalingrad all testify to the success of such measures. And, as has been mentioned above, it is often possible to deal with the enemy commander and arrange the surrender of an entire unit.

Figures 4 and 5 are enemy paywar leaflets dropped by the Chinese Communist Forces among UN troops. Figure 4 is not



only a surrender-mission leaflet but also attempts to arouse feelings of privatization, unfair treatment, and distrust of war aims.

Inducing a Sense of Unfair Treatment. A sense of being unfairly treated can be created in troops as well as in civilians. Troops can be made less willing to face casualties or deprivations, and encouraged to privatize, withdraw into daydreams, or regress into more childlike behavior. This is the purpose of much psywar addressed to tactical units. Where it is successful, it results in a notable reduction of the enemy's will to fight. Figure 5 subordinates the surrender-mission theme to the unfair-treatment and distrust-of-war-aims themes.

Increasing the Impact of Weapons. Armies have experimented with ways of using paywar to increase the tension and shock of military operations. Some variety of warning has been the usual pattern. The German blitzkrieg built up fears long before any bullets came, and there is good reason to believe the fears then made the bullets more effective. A common tactic in strategic bombing is to warn a group of cities that one of them will be bombed, in the hope of disrupting activities in all of them. Another experiment has been the use of successively stepped-up bombardments, always with the warning that the real bombardment is yet to come.

A promising new development in thinking about paywar has to do with taking account of the psychological effect of weapons in deciding what weapon to use in achieving a given tactical purpose (for example, artillery vs. air-dropped napalm). This we might call using paywar to increase the impact of the weapons system.

Contributing to Subversion of Key Personnel. We have mentioned the subversion of key personnel in connection with the ability to command. What we said about it in that connection is, however, equally relevant here, since the reason that propaganda to subvert key personnel is a good way of striking at ability to command is, in large part, derivative from its being a good way to strike at the will to fight. Such personnel are, for the most part, technicians and extremely necessary to smooth operation of the military machine. In America's Asian campaign great responsibility has rested on interpreters. Intelligence personnel has become increasingly important as warfare has speeded up and extended its scope. Communications personnel can sway the tide of battle by performing their functions badly. Thus, purely aside from what the subversion of key personnel does to the ability to command, it cuts down fighting efficiency. And an army

# ONE MINUTE

Read the following for quick reading and thoroughly understand the meaning of the following before you go to bed.

1. In a battle of attrition, where more men are killed than are replaced, the side that has the most men will win.
2. The side that has the most men will win.
3. The side that has the most men will win.
4. The side that has the most men will win.
5. The side that has the most men will win.
6. The side that has the most men will win.
7. The side that has the most men will win.
8. The side that has the most men will win.
9. The side that has the most men will win.
10. The side that has the most men will win.

REPLACES OF 20 100

# ONE MINUTE

Read the following for quick reading and thoroughly understand the meaning of the following before you go to bed.

1. In a battle of attrition, where more men are killed than are replaced, the side that has the most men will win.
2. The side that has the most men will win.
3. The side that has the most men will win.
4. The side that has the most men will win.
5. The side that has the most men will win.
6. The side that has the most men will win.
7. The side that has the most men will win.
8. The side that has the most men will win.
9. The side that has the most men will win.
10. The side that has the most men will win.

Fig. 6—American World War II Survival-Mission Leaflet Linked with Tactical Situation along Eastern Front

that knows it is not fighting efficiently speedily loses its will to fight.

### **CHIEF RESPONSES SOUGHT BY PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE**

Another way to look at the uses of paywar is in terms of the chief responses it seeks from its target audiences. It is customary to say that paywar, in different forms and different situations, may be used to bring about submission, subversion, confusion, cooperation, privatization, or panic. Let us say a word about each of these, reminding ourselves, to begin with, that under our broad definition of paywar we are interested not only in these responses but in their opposites as well, and not only in how to achieve these responses but also in how to prevent someone else from achieving them.

#### Submission

As mentioned in the preceding section, Will to Fight, most tactical paywar has this response as its goal, because most tactical paywar is surrender-mission paywar. And surrender-mission tactical paywar is, or at least has been until now, the commonest form of paywar with submission as its goal. Other forms, of which we may have more experience in the future, would be propaganda looking to submission on the part of an entire country or on the part of the rural population of a country in which we had occupied only the cities and the arterials.

The tactical paywar officer must do more than convince his enemy of the futility of continued resistance; he must make the life of a prisoner of war sound as attractive as possible; he must clearly explain the procedure for surrendering and make it sound as easy and safe as possible. It is now common paywar practice to saturate the enemy lines at times with surrender leaflets (Figs. 6 and 7), which usually contain detailed instructions to "throw away your weapon, and come in with your hands clasped behind your head," and an official pass signed by the theater commander. [The World War II form of this pass read: "The German soldier who carries this safe conduct is using it as a sign of his genuine wish to give himself up. He is to be disarmed, to be well looked after, to receive food and medical attention as required, and to be removed from the danger zone as soon as possible. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary

REVELATION OF T.C. 60

# **You are now cut off!**

In order to avoid needless bloodshed, this leaflet is being delivered to you.

**You are now cut off.** Allied units are already far in your rear. You have fought bravely, but from now on it would be suicidal to continue fighting. You must give up or die - shortly before the end of this war.

You remain very valuable. Now you must act accordingly. Every one of you must decide for himself. There is no time to be lost.

The Allies want to spare your lives and guarantee you decent treatment. But you must clearly indicate that you are quitting the fight.

# **ACT IMMEDIATELY!**

# **Ihr seid jetzt abgeschnitten!**

Um unnötiges Blutvergießen zu vermeiden, wird Euch dieses Flugblatt zugestellt.

**Ihr seid jetzt abgeschnitten. Alliierte Einheiten befinden sich weit hinter Euch. Ihr habt tapfer gekämpft, aber von jetzt an ist ein Weiterkämpfen sinnlos. Ihr müsst Euch ergeben oder kurz vor dem Ende dieses Krieges sterben.**

Ihr seid sehr wertvoll. Jetzt müsst Ihr entsprechend handeln. Jeder muss für sich selbst entscheiden. Es ist keine Zeit zu verlieren.

Die Alliierten wollen Euer Leben schonen und Euch menschenwürdige Behandlung zu Teil lassen. Aber hier müsst Ihr eindeutig angeben, dass Ihr aus dem Kampf absteht.

# **MACHET ERFORT!**

Fig. 7—American World War II Surrender-Mission Leaflet Linked with Local Tactical Situation

Forces" (Fig. 8). Sometimes the passes carry reproductions of one or more flags, sometimes they bear official seals, sometimes they are printed so as to resemble a bond or certificate—anything to make them look authoritative and impressive. Such




Fig. 8—Eisenhower World War II Surrender-Mission  
Safe-Conduct Pass

passes, and most of the leaflets urging their use, are intended for dissemination to enemy soldiers all along the line, and in both forward and rear areas. Sometimes, however, leaflets stating the case for surrendering are addressed to a particular unit in the enemy line or to the troops involved in a particular

tactical situation, or else loudspeakers (on the ground or airborne) are used to speak directly to the enemy, thus adding the persuasive appeal of the human voice to the arguments of the leaflets.<sup>11</sup>

#### The Capture of Willingen

An opportunity to observe the battle conditions under which propaganda appeals for group surrender are able to succeed was presented by a loudspeaker address to the German troops defending the town of Willingen, situated six miles south of Trier on the Moselle River. This flyover mission was able to issue precise instructions, completely coordinated with artillery and infantry fire, so as to convert the defeatist predispositions of most of the garrison into a successful group surrender.

Willingen is situated in a valley of the Moselle River and is traversed by a north-south railroad. A US infantry battalion was approaching the town from the south as part of the coordinated attack northward toward Trier. Armored elements had already outflanked Willingen on the southeast and were well on their way to penetrating into Trier. Earlier in the morning of the attack, elements of a tank destroyer battalion, located across the river on the high ground of the valley's western slope, had been engaged in reducing pillboxes lining the river and the railroad in preparation for the infantry assault. The German garrison was composed of a security battalion, which had been stationed in the town for about three months, as well as elements of a German infantry division which had been retiring northward toward Trier under American pressure. These troops were in a hopeless tactical situation but still in a position to delay the American drive. It was therefore decided to issue a loudspeaker appeal to these troops before launching the infantry assault.

The loudspeaker apparatus was installed on the high ground of the west slope of the valley, near the American tank destroyer. The tank destroyer fire against the pillboxes was interrupted and instructions in English were issued over the loudspeaker to the American infantry unit. They were told to hold their fire for a period of five minutes since an appeal to surrender was about to be issued to the German forces in the village. The lull in the firing was necessary to enable enemy troops to hear the message and to ensure them an opportunity to surrender.

The broadcast to the German troops was simple and largely in the form of an order to surrender or be destroyed. They were informed that their position was hopeless owing to their encirclement by American armored units, supported by artillery and infantry units on the other edges of the town. They were given five minutes in which to throw away their weapons, leave their positions, and move southward along the railroad track toward the American infantry positions. After each minute the directions to leave the town or be destroyed were repeated. At the end of the third minute, a white flag appeared over one of the main bunkers, and a small group of men left their positions and walked southward. Soon other units within the town began to do likewise. Some soldiers, perhaps confused, began to leave the town in a northward direction, that is, toward the main German positions. The surrender instructions were again repeated by the loudspeaker, addressed particularly to those soldiers moving northward. This second message caused nearly all of them to change their direction as instructed. However, two men intent on escaping from the town continued northward. Artillery fire from a tank destroyer eliminated these two, who had not been impressed by paywar. This incident provided copy for an additional loudspeaker broadcast, which was made immediately.



pointing out the uselessness of further resistance. An immediate response was additional surrenders from positions along the hillside outside the town and in a second, smaller village further to the east, which was still completely in the enemy's hands.

Throughout the American infantry commander, using the loudspeaker, ordered his troops in the valley to move in and take over the town, which was surrendering. It also became necessary to issue directions to the remnants of the town's civilian population who, as could be seen from the hillside, were becoming alarmed and were attempting either to show their neutrality by waving white flags or to surrender with German soldiers. Since the American commander did not wish to be encumbered by civilian movements along the road, an order was issued to the population to assemble in the town's main church. The order was scrupulously obeyed and the civilian population remained there until the MG officer arrived later in the day. When he arrived, he found them still conveniently assembled and was able to issue curfew regulations and other instructions to them.

The basis for success of the mission was the perfect coordination between fire and assault. Interrogation of many POWs captured during the operation indicated that their defeatism was pronounced. An overwhelming majority had seen our leaflets pointing out the strategic hopelessness of Germany's military position. Most had been demoralized by the Allied progress during the last few days, which had forced them into the town. A further sense of hopelessness developed early that morning, according to some POWs, when most of their commissioned officers withdrew.

Despite such a level of defeatism and even loosening of command, mass surrender was physically impossible as long as treasure was being placed on the town. Interrogations revealed that the security battalion stationed in the town had frequently discussed their plans to surrender once the American troops arrived at the outskirts of the town. But when the troops actually came on the scene, no one seemed willing, or knew how to face the physical dangers of bringing about such a surrender. As soon as an opportunity to surrender, and direct instructions on how to do so, were presented, the overwhelming majority of troops complied. Others in the town seemed to be swept along with the tide.

Loudspeakers have also proved highly effective against isolated enemy units ("pockets") and against enemy troops or guerrillas who have taken refuge in forests, underbrush, caves, etc. For example, they were sometimes used with spectacular success to accomplish the surrender of Japanese troops holed up on conquered or bypassed Pacific islands.

### Subversion

As submission is the chief goal of tactical paywar, subversion is the usual goal of strategic paywar. By subversion in this sense we do not refer only to the spectacular cloak and dagger activities of paid agents. We mean any activity that is contrary to the best interests of the state, most particularly to the conduct of its war effort. The paywar operator's favorite instrument for encouraging such activity on the part of civilians behind the

battle lines is propaganda calculated to evoke mutual suspicion, dissatisfaction, and resentment. The theory underlying such propaganda is that if it is successful some civilians will obey orders less quickly and work less hard. They will write lonely, depressed letters to their sons in the army. They will stay home from the factory oftener or contribute less freely to war loans or cheat when they turn in their crops for state use. They will help spread rumors against the political leaders. A few—a very few at best—will perhaps become so bitter in opposition to the policy of their leaders that they will resort to spying, sabotage, or assassination. But these few can be very useful, especially in the later stages of the war; it is they who will work with this country's agents when they can be gotten in. The major function of subversion propaganda, in other words, is to start people down the road that leads to actual cooperation with the United States.

In a country at war, subversion takes a form anywhere along the continuum from dissatisfaction to violent revolution. In Germany during World War II it ran the gamut from jokes about the Nazis to the plot to murder Hitler. In occupied France it ran all the way from insults chalked on the walls to the guerrilla activities of the maquis. In occupied South Korea it went from the human chains that passed news to the organized sabotage that kept telephone lines out of repair. This is the complex of responses that the strategic psywar operator tries to evoke with subversion propaganda.

The general population is not likely to be drawn into subversive activities. Thus the psywar operator is on the lookout for specific groups that have reason to be disaffected or which have the organization and, above all, the opportunity for subversion. By working with and through such groups, instead of trying to subvert the whole population, he will at the same time protect his friends and avoid the risk of antagonizing large numbers of people and so increase their "will to obey."

### Confusion

Confusion is one of the oldest and most common of psywar goals, and any type of psywar, whether tactical, strategic, or political, may have the task of achieving it as part of its mission.

When a boxer famed for his lasting power feigns weariness early in a fight, part of his purpose is to leave his opponent wondering whether he is really weary or merely setting a trap.

that is, to confuse him. The same thing is true of the army commander who puts his troops through motions evidently calculated to cause his opponent to expect an attack at a point in the line at which he does not intend to attack at all, and of the strategic paywar operator who pyramids the threat of a bombing attack into a work stoppage in 12 enemy cities. As all these examples show, confusion-producing paywar often has in it an element of deception. More precisely, it often confronts the target with a choice between assuming that an attempt is being made to deceive it, assuming the contrary, or recognizing that it does not know what to expect. But not all paywar measures intended to confuse are of this character. When Litvinov was removed as Commissar of Foreign Affairs it really did mean that the Soviet Union was adopting a new, anticollective-security foreign policy. But its immediate effect, no doubt intended by Soviet political warriors, was to leave other countries guessing and thus throw them diplomatically off balance. Some observers believe that many of the most dramatic Soviet *démarchés* in foreign affairs have as their main purpose the sowing of confusion—confusion for its own sake—in foreign chancelleries. The proposal for peace negotiations in Korea many months ago may, for example, have been of this character. The democracies apparently do not play this game. But it is something they may have to learn in order to cope with the Soviet Union.

Conflict, hot or cold, requires continuous prediction and planning—calling the tricks as to the enemy's present intentions and present and future capabilities and planning one's own campaign so as to win. The wider, the more complex the conflict, the more difficult it is to make correct predictions and change one's plans accordingly, and the more important it is that the predictions be made promptly. The central purpose of the kind of paywar here in question is to do things to the enemy that make it difficult for him, at the moment anyhow, to make any prediction at all that he's sure enough of to treat as firm. (Leading him to make a wrong prediction is deception paywar, not confusion paywar, though as we have noted the two shade into one another.) The result will be to delay his planning, which gains us an advantage in time, and get him worried about the delay, thus maximizing the likelihood of his planning badly. The perfect example is the practice, attributed by some observers to the Communists, of simultaneously playing both sides of the political market, for example, both supporting and opposing the UN, or supporting a strike and urging policies sure to make it fail.

One further point is that the feasibility of confusion paywar varies with the extent to which the enemy, in making predictions, must rely on data that he can get only or mostly from his opponent's official releases. If he has independent sources of information as to the opponent's capabilities and intentions, in other words, the opponent's attempts to confuse him will merely amuse him. This, of course, is why the totalitarian states are in a better position than the democracies to achieve the goal of confusion.

### Cooperation

Cooperation is the chief goal of consolidation paywar and also the chief goal of political warfare directed at allies or neutrals. In the very nature of the case, therefore, it offers the operator a wider choice of media than the other goals we have been discussing and lends itself much better than they to, for example, the slower printed media, the poster, the meeting, and the motion picture, which usually cannot get through to an enemy target audience.

When a paywar operator plans a campaign aimed at cooperation he is trying to win friends for his country and influence people to believe as he does. For example, it has been one of the continuing tasks of America's political warfare to keep the friendship of the nations of Latin America. Both sides in the cold war have been directing cooperation paywar at neutral areas like India and the Arab world, in the hope of winning the friendship of those rich and powerful countries and, ultimately, making allies out of them. Since the end of World War II, both the Soviet Union and the United States have completed extensive consolidation operations—the Soviets in the European satellite states, East Germany, and North Korea, and this country in its zone in Germany and in Japan. The Russian techniques and political goals have, of course, been quite different from this country's. The Russians have fastened a rigid control on the sources and processes of power; they have imposed a communication monopoly and used every channel of communication and every possible hour of time to drive their teachings home. The United States, by contrast, has tended to let the Germans and Japanese work into the patterns of democracy in their own way and has opened the channels of communication to and from them by helping to restore their newspapers and educational systems. But regardless of the difference in technique and in political master plans, the object on both sides has been cooperation.

Privatization

By privatization we mean the directing of a person's thoughts to his own troubles and needs, with a resulting decrease in his attention to his country's problems and needs. The soldier who gives himself over to thoughts of his own discomfort and home-sickness is not likely to be an efficient soldier, or a good member of a working military team. The civilian workman who gives himself over to thoughts of his own discomfort and the injustices being done him in war work is not likely to be an efficient war worker or to help morale in his war plant. Privatization may therefore be the goal of either tactical or strategic psywar, but it is seen most commonly in tactical operations. Examples of this tactic are Figs. 4 and 5 and the frostbite leaflets of the Korean war, the leaflets and broadcasts about what the Communists are doing to the villages and farms back home, and the material about lack of medical care and scarcity of food. All these were designed to encourage the soldier to privatize, to turn his attention away from his military job toward himself and his nonmilitary connections, and thus to win all or part of his effectiveness away from his army.

Panic

The response Gideon desired and got from the Midianites was panic. The German blitzkrieg across France and the Lowlands was, in part at least, a psywar measure of this type and depended for its tactical success, in large part, on its success as psywar. The screaming dive bombers, the terrific destruction in Rotterdam, the careful propaganda build-up, that is to say, were all calculated to arouse panic; paralyze transportation, supply, and communication systems, and disorganize the opposition. Panic was also one object of many Nazi bombing raids and of the flying-bomb attack on Britain. Such measures are based on the notion that an enemy ridden by panic will not produce and that in a closely organized operation like modern warfare even a small center of panic may seriously weaken the whole. A factory center where production notably falls off may handicap a nation's entire war effort. A single unit that abandons its place in the line may lose a battle for a whole army.

It is hardly necessary to say that the atomic bomb provides a new and overpowering reason for understanding not only the offensive use but also the defensive control of panic in warfare.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AS PART OF A TOTAL OPERATION

The uses of paywar are therefore as broad as a nation's ability to implement its policies and programs by the communication of messages. But if the question is asked the other way—What can paywar be counted on to do?—then it becomes important to enter a word of caution.

Paywar per se is not a mighty weapon in the way that much contemporary discussion assumes it to be or in the way that the atomic bomb is a mighty weapon. A single atomic bomb may kill thousands of people, lay waste miles of countryside, and force a nation to its knees. A single act of paywar (a leaflet, a radio broadcast) is not likely to bring about the submission, subversion, cooperation, confusion, privatization, or panic of even its target audience, much less a target country; even the cumulative effect of a series of acts of paywar, a whole propaganda campaign, for example, is likely to be very small. At most it will change the attitudes of a numerically small group of people; it is likely to change even their attitudes not very much; and, for reasons we have already seen, not all of those whose attitudes are changed by it will act in the desired manner. But this is not to say that paywar cannot change the course of events. The Communist paywar that enlisted Klaus Fuchs as a Soviet spy did not necessarily work any sea change in his attitudes, but there is reason to believe that its end result was to cut down America's time advantage in atomic warfare by several years. Paywar, in short, may well supply the nail without which the kingdom would have been lost. And no stronger claim need be made for it.

Besides being less than mighty, paywar is not a sure-fire weapon. It calls, as we shall see, for great skill, great imagination and empathy, and great resourcefulness on the part of the operators; it calls for good current intelligence about the target; and like most human activities it calls, at the margin, for a bit of luck. Any of these things may be missing in any paywar operation; to the extent that any are missing, paywar will be proportionately less mighty. If many are missing, it may accomplish nothing or even hurt the cause it is intended to support. This, of course, is more or less true of all weapons. We do not know beforehand, in any given situation, what any weapon will accomplish. The nation's bets, we must remember, are on its combination or "family" of weapons, any member of which may fail it in any given situation without the family as a

whole failing it. And all we need claim for paywar is that it is a member of the family that has grown to be mighty enough and predictable enough that we dare not leave it at home when we go forth to do battle.

We must notice also that paywar is most likely to yield dividends when it is used in combination with the other weapons in the family. A paywar sound truck drawn up alone before the city of Willingen, Germany, without the threat or appearance of force, could not have achieved the surrender of the garrison. But a paywar mission supported by an American army was able in a few minutes to accomplish the surrender of the garrison, prevent hundreds, perhaps thousands, of casualties, and save days or weeks of fighting, thus freeing some resources for other military uses. Likewise Captain Zacharias,<sup>2</sup> broadcasting to Japan, would not have been able to sway the Japanese war policy to any great extent without the presence of the US Air Force over Kyushu and Honshu, the US Navy in the Pacific, and the Allied army poised on Okinawa and the Philippines. But when Zacharias's persuasive broadcasts were added to these factors, the broadcasts were able to contribute significantly. Wilson's Fourteen Points, one of the most effective pieces of paywar of all time, represent another case in point. By themselves they were merely lucid and rational. With the power and integrity of the United States and the Allies behind them, they were a powerful weapon that undoubtedly changed men's minds and helped bring the war to an end. And look at the other side of the present world conflict. How much more has Communist propaganda accomplished in Europe and Asia—outside Russia because it had Communist organizations and the threat or promise of Soviet power behind it?

This principle is important. Paywar is used with greatest effect always when combined with other measures—actions, policies, military force, threats of force, etc. So used, it can broaden and increase the impact of the action, the policy, the force, or the threat, which in turn broaden and increase its impact. And thus it becomes a matter of first importance how paywar is fitted into other measures, how it is blended with other weapons to implement policy, and how its use is coordinated and timed with military, economic, or political operations.

Used well, coordinated well, paywar can often substitute to some extent for military or political force. In a situation otherwise close, it can often sway the balance. Built into a campaign, political or military, it can contribute not only to victory today but also to an easier battle tomorrow.

**SUMMARY**

Our topic has now moved from the process of paywar to its use, and you will recognize that we are no longer talking in the vocabulary of social psychology but increasingly in the language of politics and power. For, although paywar may be used to call forth any response which is in the power of the available target audience to make and within the power of the available symbols and media to stimulate, in practice its use is restricted to the political and military goals of the nation that uses it.

Its broad targets are therefore groups that can exercise or implement or at least affect power relations, that is, the political elite, military elite, military population, and working population. You will find it useful to remember Spater's classification<sup>1</sup> of the power areas that paywar seeks to influence: the deciding of foreign policy, determination of military missions, ability to govern, ability to command, will to obey, and will to fight.

In the area of foreign policy, paywar may have, among other purposes, those of supporting diplomatic negotiations or political objectives, gaining the support and cooperation of neutral countries, strengthening or weakening alliances, deterring a nation from aggression or clearing the way for aggression, and bringing about the final capitulation of an enemy nation.

In the area of military missions, paywar may be used to influence the design of enemy strategy and tactics, to enhance military deception, to affect the will of command to begin or continue fighting, and to rouse public opinion or political pressures for or against a military operation.

In relation to the ability to govern, paywar may be employed to interfere with control systems or with communication, to help build counterelites, to make friendly leaders stronger and enemy leaders weaker, and to support resistance movements and gain support in newly liberated areas.

In the area of ability to command, paywar may be used to produce dissension among enemy forces, to strengthen friendly leaders and weaken enemy ones, to convey deceptive intelligence and to disrupt communications, to support military government, and to elicit information of military value.

As a weapon against the will to obey, paywar may be used to stimulate dissension between military and political elites, to disrupt communication between leader and followers, to undermine confidence in leadership and war aims, to reduce the incentive to work, to affect willingness to make sacrifices and



face dangers, to cause panic, to encourage a sense of inequality and unfairness, to encourage the self-interests of minority groups, and to help in the subversion of key personnel.

Against the will to fight, paywar can be used to encourage surrender and especially to reduce last-ditch resistance, to induce a sense of unfair treatment, to increase the impact of weapons, and to contribute to the subversion of key personnel.

You will recognize, of course, that these are merely examples and not inclusive lists.

You may also want to remember the list of the chief responses paywar is used to seek, as given in this chapter. These responses are submission, subversion, confusion, cooperation, privatization, and panic—and their opposites. Moreover, paywar is often called upon to counteract enemy attempts to produce these responses.

Finally you will want to remember that paywar derives its chief effectiveness from being a part of a total operation. It is not by itself so mighty a weapon as, for example, the atom bomb. But used well, coordinated well with other instruments of power, it can often sway the balance between victory and defeat.

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## CHAPTER 6

### BACKGROUND OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DECISION

The use of paywar requires a series of managerial decisions. On the highest echelons these are closely related to policy. On the lowest echelons they are concerned with technique. Across the continuum from policy to technique, however, the basic questions are the same: What shall we try to accomplish with paywar? With what target? When? How?

No paywar decision, however, can be properly made in terms of purely technical considerations, as if paywar were an isolated activity. Paywar planning must work, at all echelons, not only (1) within the framework of policy and objectives but also (2) within limits set by operational plans and capabilities, and (3) within limits set by intelligence, both basic and current. Otherwise, it would leave out of account much essential information about potentials, capabilities, and vulnerabilities; cut itself off from the reinforcing power of events; and, worst of all, commit its government—in other peoples' eyes at least—to promises that cannot be redeemed, policies that cannot be carried out, etc. Indeed, the three limiting considerations of paywar planning are so important that they may well be restated: The psychological warfare decision must be made (1) within the framework of policy and objectives; (2) in conjunction with operational plans, and with an eye to operational capabilities; and (3) in the light of the fullest possible intelligence about the target.

These three requirements for the sound paywar decision will be discussed in the following sections.

### POLICY AND OBJECTIVES

By policy we mean what Lerner<sup>1</sup> has called "the continuous effort to shape the future by decisions in the present." A confused policy, then, is simply one in which clear and unambiguous and

consistent decisions about shaping the future fail to get made. A faulty policy exists when present decisions are of such character that they will not shape the future in the way the policy makers intend. A "sound policy," on the other hand, is one that uses all available means and instruments to produce decisions that will make future events develop according to our stated goals. Hence the soundness of any policy decision is "to be judged by its effectiveness in modifying given conditions toward desired goals."

Now it is apparent that psywar is one of the instruments just mentioned. Its assignment is to modify "given conditions toward desired goals." It must also be apparent that psywar can never be better than policy. If policy is confused, can psywar be any different? If policy is faulty, can psywar hope that its efforts will forward national objectives? The answer, clearly, is no.

The layman's stereotype of the propagandist or the psychological warrior is that of a magician who moves men around with word-wizardry and reshuffles world events to suit himself. We know it is not so. We know that if our Asia policy is confused, no psywar, no matter how brilliant, can keep our affairs in that area from going badly. We know that if our policy in regard to resisting Communism turns out to be faulty, then God pity us, for no psywar operation is going to be able to save us. In fact, that stereotype is one for both the psywar student and the political leader to put out of their minds—the former because he needs to get rid of any lingering suspicion that his task is to make foreign policy, and the latter because he needs to get rid of any lingering suspicion that if he fails to clarify policy goals, or chooses wrong, then his psywar man can straighten things out for him, or cover up his mistakes.

Psywar, then, is an instrument of policy and a means toward accomplishing objectives. The responsibility of the policy maker is to present the psywar operator with a clear and a sound policy. The responsibility of the psywar man is to implement that policy with effective messages. He has, no doubt, a further responsibility to give advice, when asked for it, as to what the psychological effect of a policy will probably be, and what the psywar implementation of a policy will call for in the way of resources, modified directives, etc. But chiefly he is presented with a policy, and he translates it—at the level of his echelon—into directives, campaigns, media choices, and messages.

The various types of psywar differ in their relation to national policy. Into the planning of political psywar, for example, national policy enters directly; it enters somewhat less directly into the

planning of strategic and consolidation psywar and least directly into the planning of tactical psywar. No psywar planning, however, can leave it out of account or go against it. Take, for example, the policy stated clearly by the President during World War II, that the only terms to be offered our enemies should be unconditional surrender. This national policy reached down even to the tactical level, greatly restricting what could be said to the Nazi armies by way of persuading them to lay down their weapons--partly because of uncertainty as to what could be said and what could not. General Eisenhower tried unsuccessfully to get a clarification from higher authority of what unconditional surrender actually meant, so that enemy troops could be told clearly what to expect if they were to give up the fight. Some observers believe, indeed, that the policy seriously handicapped our psywar effort in Europe, and this is a good place to repeat the objection to which such statements are open. What is meant by this one is that more Germans would have surrendered, after seeing our leaflets, if the latter had not had to stress unconditional surrender. But since our national policy makers did not want surrender on terms other than unconditional capitulation, any surrenders psywar might have got on other terms would have forwarded no US objective and would have been pointless or even harmful.

Military objectives enter most directly into the planning of tactical psywar less into strategic and consolidation, least into political; but they must be taken into account in the planning of every kind of psywar. For example, the fact that the United States is not able or eager to undertake certain military commitments in far places sharply limits what Voice of America (VOA) can say or imply, by way of threats or promises, in political psywar.

The planner of psywar will therefore work within the blueprints of policy and objectives, and the planning priorities will be congruent with the priorities for goals and objectives. Even with that understood, however, there are some aspects of the relation of policy and objectives to planning which continue to cause confusion in psywar circles.

For one thing, every psywar situation involves some combination of short- and medium- and long-range policy goals and military objectives. Policywar, for instance, a current operation might involve an immediate political goal of this or that character, the medium-range goal of victory in an international conflict, and the long-term goal of such and such a kind of international reorganization after the conflict. In a military psywar operation the goals might be a successful strategic retreat in a

particular sector, victory in the campaign, and unconditional surrender by the enemy in the war as a whole. Paywar planning is likely to be at its best when the long-range objectives, political or military, have been as clearly defined as the medium- and short-range goals. Otherwise there is likely to be waste motion, even motion at cross-purposes. General Robert A. McClure has told how our paywar in Europe came a cropper by widely publicizing to the enemy our strict adherence to the Geneva convention—a policy that seemed obviously safe in the absence of policy statements to the contrary. "It was a good 'selling point' to prospective prisoners of war," General McClure says. "Very late in the Normandy campaign it was discovered, by chance, that we would not necessarily adhere to the provision of 'early return to your homes.' The decision to use prisoners of war for reconstruction labor did not reach the psychological warriors until after we had committed our Governments to a course of action they did not intend to follow."

It is probably easier for a government that has come into power through revolution, and has thereby learned the lesson of waiting and looking far ahead, to plan in long-range terms. A totalitarian government, where power is centralized, has a considerable advantage in this regard over a democracy, where public opinion must enter into every basic decision and where policy may vary with the shifting winds of politics. Again, it is notoriously more difficult for a wartime coalition of governments to make and state clear long-range policy than for a single power to do so. And it is a truism that if policy and objectives are short-range and opportunistic, then not only paywar operations but military and political operations also may be wasteful or harmful.

The planner of paywar must therefore use to the full such long-range policy directives as he can get. America's paywar messages addressed to occupied Europe in World War II furnished an interesting example of this problem when it came to deciding what should be said to the French people. One of the objectives was obviously to strengthen and encourage the French resistance movement. At the same time, political exigencies led the US Government to the decision that it must work with the collaboration government of Petain. Thus, although the Resistance was actively opposing the Petain government, it was decided that none of the US propaganda should attack Petain, on the theory that, whereas the United States would aid anyone who opposed the Nazis, long-range policy did not indicate the wisdom of aiding Frenchmen to fight Frenchmen.

The solution, however, lies only in small part with the planner of paywar. It is the policy maker himself who is obligated not only to plan in as long-range terms as possible but also to state long-range policy clearly and fully for his paywar operators and to consider the potential effect of an intended policy on his world relations. Even short-range military action should, in future more often than in the past, be designed with an eye to its psychological effect on longer-range military and political objectives. The short-range goals may be deceptively clear. Thus it seemed desirable at the time to bomb the monastery on Monte Cassino. But the use the Nazi propagandists were able to make of that action on our part, and its powerful effect throughout Italy and the Catholic world, lead us to believe now that a second look at that objective might have been indicated before the planes were dispatched by our commanders.

In practice, policy usually presents itself to the paywar operator as a directive, an official statement by a government or theater command, a public address by an official able to state policy (Roosevelt's and Churchill's speeches proved the best sources of policy for SHAZF paywar), or an act of a congress or parliament. Short-range military objectives usually appear in the form of a briefing or a command request for aid. Long-range objectives and timetables tend to be available in direct proportion to the degree of confidence in which high command holds paywar. In any case, before the paywar operator turns any policy or objectives into messages, he should drop in at Operations and Intelligence.

## OPERATIONS

Paywar's problem with operations is a problem of integration. This is a two-level problem. On one level, that of fitting paywar into a local situation, the field operator can do much toward solving the problem himself. This, equally in military and nonmilitary paywar, is in large part a matter of cultivating good personal relations with operating personnel (the -3 people—A-3, G-3, S-3—and the local embassy), and bringing them to see how paywar can help them, and, finally, of conducting paywar operations with a minimum of inconvenience to and interference with operations in general. Paywar, for example, must not monopolize local printing facilities or expect leaflets to take precedence over ammunition when a truck is going up to regiment. On a higher level, however—that of integrating paywar into the total national program—there is

not much the paywar operators can do. And yet this is far and away the more important of the two problem levels.

We have said that paywar is one of several instruments of policy that every nation has at its disposal. According to Harold Lasswell,<sup>3</sup> we may distinguish four such instruments: diplomacy, propaganda, economics, and arms. There is good reason to believe that three of these instruments of policy are, on the highest levels of policy in the United States, integrated pretty well into the national program. If a diplomatic action is to be taken—for example, if diplomatic recognition is to be withheld from Red China—there are reasonably good guarantees that the things the diplomats will do to that end will support and not weaken other US policies, will themselves be backed up by other US government action, and will not be decided on in the first place without careful study of how they fit into the total picture. Similarly with international economic decisions—for example, when money is to be allocated to prime the economic pump in Europe—there is a reason to believe that top-level officials in all departments concerned will enter into and affect the planning. When an important military decision is to be made—for example, when it was decided to resist Communist aggression in North Korea—the decision was undoubtedly coordinated not only with numerous nonmilitary programs in the US but with the policy makers of other nations as well. With all three of these weapons, in other words, there are prior guarantees of support for the weapons from other quarters when it is needed, and prior guarantees against actions being taken without regard for their implications for other programs, and thus against the Government's left hand acting at cross-purposes with its right hand.

But what happens to the fourth weapon at the top level?

Bruce Lockhart,<sup>4</sup> chief of British paywar in World War II, writes thus of his own government's attitude: "No serious impetus was ever given to our propaganda efforts from on top. It was due, I think, partly to the pressure of graver events and partly to ignorance of the subject in Whitehall. The ignorance bred skepticism, and together they were a formidable hurdle."

Daniel Lerner,<sup>5</sup> in his account of European paywar operations, speaks regretfully of "the lack of interest in psywar displayed by most top American officials responsible for the policies and conduct of the war."

Carroll<sup>6</sup> testified:

It was a curious fact, and I had confirmation of it later—that the President, who established the OWI, never knew what it was doing, and sometimes, apparently, confused it with the Office of Censorship. He had been opposed to the creation of the propaganda service and had



established (OWI) with considerable reluctance, under pressure from his advisors, whose primary aim was to provide an adequate flow of information to the American public. Once the organization was established, he did not want to be bothered about it. In his own right Roosevelt was a great propagandist, but he did not understand the systematic use of propaganda in total war.<sup>2</sup>

Carroll adds that Cordell Hull "knew even less than the President about OWI and cared about as much."

General McClure,<sup>3</sup> who commanded the psywar operation at SHAEF, writes ruefully: "An understanding of the proper source of Government policy, its actual communication to the field by a reliable, rapid channel, a feeling of belonging to a properly organized team owing allegiance to the commander under whom it was serving, and not to several independent Government agencies, would have solved most of the Psychological Warfare difficulties in SHAEF."

This matter of integrating psywar into the total international operation of a nation is the most important operational problem that psywar faces. It was not solved in World War II, as the preceding quotations indicate, and almost certainly has not been solved since. Yet until psywar is integrated into planning at the highest levels, the full potentialities of the weapon will never be exploited.

Need we say that the Russians have no such difficulty? Both their doctrine and their tradition give propaganda a conspicuous place in carrying out policy. They have never forgotten, as Lasswell<sup>4</sup> points out, that the revolution of 1917 was prepared by years of activity during which Party members devoted most of their energies to propaganda. Since 1917 they have seen propaganda help to knock off one after another of their neighbors. Essentially psywar means to them a highly effective and fantastically inexpensive instrument for achieving world domination. It is as much a part of their over-all operational plans as is the Red Army. With us, however, this lesson seems not yet to have been learned.

This, we repeat, is a problem for the chiefs, which psywar operators can affect only by gradually getting across to the chiefs how much easier their task would be if this country imitated the Russians a little in this regard. In local operations, however, the principle is the same—psywar, as one striking arm, must synchronize with the other striking arms—and psywar personnel can, we repeat, to some extent take the initiative. How necessary this is America learned the hard way in places such as Aachen, where leaflets and loudspeakers, improperly coordinated with

<sup>2</sup>Reprinted by permission of author and publisher.

military force, failed to bring about the surrender of the city's garrison, and where, consequently, more lives were spent than should have been required.

Properly used, political, military, and psychological effects can interact to make each other immeasurably stronger. An example of this was flying the Hump into China. The military effects of the supplies American planes were able to deliver to Chungking were significant. But even more important was the political effect of encouraging the Chinese government to resist. Perhaps most powerful of all—and immensely influential on Chinese resistance—was the demonstration of America's strength, skill, and determination to enemies and Allies.

Another convincing demonstration of the power of coordinated political, military, and propaganda actions was the Nazi campaign in Europe which Taylor so aptly called a "strategy of terror." The political pressure from Berlin, the screaming Stukas, and the threatening radio all drove toward the single goal of Nazi conquest.

In the practical sense, therefore, paywar is always dependent on operational capabilities in two fields. One is for political, military, and perhaps economic action of a given kind at a given time. It is, of course, essential to know operational capabilities and intentions before making promises and threats in paywar output. It is equally important to time and phase paywar with the operational schedule. The airlift into Berlin was an example. Even without a word of propaganda the lift was a magnificent piece of paywar. On the other hand, if our intentions and capabilities had been made known before the lift began, if our paywar operators had been able to tell the world what the Free World was prepared to do to resist aggression in Berlin, then the effect would have been still greater. For the audience would have been able to watch the whole action develop, like the plot of a story, with the conflicting intentions clear and the action clearly demonstrating a victory which counterpropaganda would have had a harder time befogging and belittling.

In the second place, paywar is dependent on operational capabilities for delivering a message in a given way at a given time. If, for example, no qualified paywar personnel are available when and where they are needed, the paywar weapon simply cannot make its contribution to the achievement of the national purpose. If none of the short-wave stations reach country A, then radio paywar to that country is, for the moment, out of the question. If no loud-speakers are available, obviously that method is impossible. If

It takes a week to print and disseminate a leaflet, the capacity of paywar to affect tactical situations will be smaller by far than it might have been if facilities were available for getting leaflets out on short notice. If an airplane is available only on Tuesdays to drop paywar materials, then other methods of dissemination must be used on the other six days unless, from paywar's point of view, they are to be wasted.

The extent of operational support now required by, for example, strictly military paywar, may be judged by a simple set of figures. In World War I all belligerents dropped a total of about 20,000,000 leaflets. In World War II the Western Allies alone dropped 1,250,000,000 leaflets. Approximately that same number were dropped by this country alone in the first 21 months of the Korean operation.

The extent of coordination required of a combat paywar officer is illustrated by a study made by the Army paywar training school. A combat paywar officer is expected to be responsible for effecting coordination with various military agencies concerning the following matters:

<u>Individual or Group</u>	<u>Activity</u>
G-1	Procurement of paywar specialists Obtaining information concerning prisoners of war
G-2	Provision of intelligence material for paywar purposes, including intelligence of the enemy in general and of the forces in contact in particular, and intelligence of enemy propaganda principles, organization, and technique Assistance in the planning of paywar operations Estimating effectiveness of friendly and enemy paywar operations Designating prisoners of war and others with information of value for paywar purposes, and those suitable for use in broadcasting, writing leaflets, and other activities of paywar interest Assistance in the planning and supervision of training and other activities concerning defense against enemy propaganda
G-3	Obtaining information concerning current and future operations

Individual or Group	Activity
	General staff coordination and supervision of the planning and conduct of paywar operations Surrender technique to be given to the enemy Training troops in paywar, to include defense against enemy paywar Allocation of ammunition for propaganda dissemination
G-4	Procurement of special supplies Transportation Storage areas
Civil Affairs or Military Government Officer	Obtaining information concerning displaced persons Reestablishment of information services
Signal Officer	Assignment of radio channels Provision of communication equipment, maintenance, and repair Provision of communication facilities Obtaining photographs suitable for propaganda purposes Effective signal security
Artillery Officer	Recommendations concerning allocations of ammunition for propaganda purposes Selection of units to fire propaganda missiles
Ordnance Officer	Obtaining information on technical matters relative to communications and weapons suitable for dis- semination of propaganda
Engineer Officer	Maintaining reproduction equipment
Surgeon	Caring for wounded prisoners
Public Informa- tion Officer	Obtaining press and photography releases Preventing conflict and contradiction between informa- tion released to the general public and the armed forces, and propaganda directed toward the enemy

Individual or Group	Activity
Troop Information and Education Officer	Suggesting effective indoctrination of troops against enemy propaganda Preventing serious conflict between propaganda directed toward the enemy and information supplied to the troops
Air Force Personnel	Leaflet and airborne loudspeaker missions Bombs and aircraft for propaganda missions

This listing, of course, applies specifically to an army paywar officer, but something like this relation must exist between the paywar planner and his related operational units not only in the other two services but also, with, however, very different entries, between the civilian operator and his embassy. In fact the relation should be even closer than that described, because the channels are not, as the listing might seem to imply, one-way streets. As the paywar officer gets help and advice from the officers named, so also should he be responsible for giving advice and information to them—opportunities he sees for the use of paywar, ways in which combat operations might be scheduled or directed for maximum psychological effectiveness, facts that fighting personnel at all levels should know about the use of paywar in general and his use of it in particular, information that should be given to troops by way of counteracting enemy propaganda. In other words the relation ideally is much more than support of paywar by operations. It is really integration of paywar into operations toward a common objective.

## INTELLIGENCE

Paywar intelligence is the only thing that keeps paywar from being an absorbing but exceedingly dangerous game of blindman's buff. Every other condition of the game conspires to make it just that—the distance over which the paywar operator must operate, the effort of the enemy to keep the true facts and situation hidden, the barriers of international suspicion, the difficulties of intercultural communication. The mission of intelligence is to see through

barriers like these and to maintain a continuing flow of information and evaluation, on the basis of which policy can be translated effectively into operations.

Actually, paywar needs two kinds of intelligence, which have sometimes been called "basic" and "output" intelligence. The purpose of the first of these is to provide, on a day-to-day basis, the clearest and most objective possible picture of the target. This includes its strengths and vulnerabilities, psychological and physical needs, attitudes and morale, programs and expressed policies, and the existing channels for reaching the target. The major requirement here is the highest possible degree of accuracy.

Output intelligence, on the other hand, is concerned not so much with accuracy as with verisimilitude. This is the flow of material from which the writing and production staffs of paywar are able to construct leaflets, scripts, and other messages. It includes incidents, names, statements, descriptions, maps, and other details that can be used directly to make paywar materials sound real. Output intelligence may even include such details as telephone numbers; in fact the British political intelligence division in World War II was several times asked to provide telephone numbers of German citizens for use in radio broadcasts.

These two kinds of intelligence are not always good neighbors. The kind of mind that is most useful in gathering basic intelligence is the social science mind, able to sift and weigh and evaluate. The kind of mind that is most useful in gathering output intelligence is the imaginative mind, able to see facts as a writer does, and fasten on the details which, given creative treatment, will make a paywar message. These two approaches may be good for each other. That is, the sober, careful attitude of the basic intelligence man will keep the output intelligence man from going off half-cocked. On the other hand, the constant pressure of the output man will tend to keep the basic intelligence man aware of the practical uses of his results. So it is in theory, at least. In practice, it has usually been found necessary to separate the two functions. In SHAEF, during World War II, two officers were separated from the main intelligence unit and assigned full-time to providing output intelligence; in addition the writers themselves gathered a good deal of such intelligence from prisoners and documents. In FEC, Tokyn, during the Korean operation, the basic intelligence function was assigned to an intelligence unit reporting directly to the commanding officers of the paywar section. Output intelligence—for example, preparation of background memoranda by means of which the writers could handle the specified themes for the

relatively unfamiliar Chinese and Korean targets—was assigned to an intelligence unit of the operational group.

There are two general sources for intelligence material of these kinds. One is the broad background of relatively unchanging fact which is represented, in a paywar operation, by previous training in the culture and physical nature of the target area, by reference books, and by paywar personnel who have lived in the target culture. This is chiefly a matter of previous preparation. When a paywar operation begins, it is too late to do much toward filling this gap except by drawing on what has been done before. When the Korean operation started, for example, we were short of paywar personnel trained and experienced in the Korean culture, although we did what we could by gathering reference materials and hiring Korean natives. The same situation will exist in future operations unless we meet it with a program of training, here and abroad, and an extensive program of fact gathering with a view to paywar needs.

The other source of material is the day-to-day input by which the picture is kept detailed and up-to-date. This comes from documents, from prisoners, from exiles and refugees, from observation, from our own secret agents, and from the publications and broadcasts of the target and related states. In a military operation it comes in large measure from prisoners. As Hertz<sup>2</sup> said of the operation against Lorient in World War II: "Our existence as a functioning tactical unit depended on intelligence from prisoners. We ate, slept, and drank with prisoners. Many nights I was awakened by members of our crew dragging in deserters, who sat on my bedroll, dripping the waters of the river Scorff as they told us the latest Winchell dope on what went on inside the fortress." Hertz was interested mostly in output intelligence. Prisoners were also a source of basic intelligence. As a matter of fact, interviews with prisoners were used during the European operation in 1944 and 1945 as a source from which to make up a constantly changing index of Wehrmacht morale, which was invaluable in timing psychological operations.

The outline of topics on which SHAEF interrogators questioned prisoners for paywar purposes is interesting as an illustration of the kinds of subject on which information is needed. After getting basic information on the prisoner's name, rank, unit, personal history, etc., the interrogator went through the following 19 topics:

- (1) Contacts with and reactions to Allied propaganda
- (2) Contacts with and reactions to German propaganda

- (3) Attitude toward last-ditch warfare
- (4) Expectation of outcome of war
- (5) Attitude toward possible Allied occupation
- (6) Specific concerns with possible postwar situation (revenge against civilian population; looting, destruction of property, rage; unemployment; lack of food)
- (7) Postwar expectations for Germany
- (8) Attitude toward National Socialism
- (9) Attitude toward Hitler personally
- (10) Attitude toward other Nazi leaders, including lower Party functionaries
- (11) Ideas on war guilt
- (12) Feeling of political responsibility (who should be held responsible?)
- (13) Fear of ill treatment as POW
- (14) Attitude toward senior leaders
- (15) Attitude toward immediate officers
- (16) Reactions to Allied weapons
- (17) Service conditions (food, health of unit, mail, types of reserves encountered, etc.)
- (18) Rivalries in Wehrmacht
- (19) Home-front situation (underground opposition, attitudes of and toward foreign workers, family life, morale effect of air raids, etc.)

This is, of course, not the only kind of POW interrogation. There are many other kinds of information which military intelligence can extract from prisoners—for example, on the movements, equipment, and training of their military units; names of officers; precise information on location of factories, transportation lines, and other bombing targets; etc. But questions like these are bound to be asked anyway, and the problem of paywar is to get its kind of question asked along with the others. That is why the SHAEF structured interview is worth study. Notice that it begins with an attempt to get a general picture of how many and what kind of leaflets and broadcasts were reaching the POW's unit, then asks a series of questions about expectations. There follow questions on the POW's feeling toward his leaders, toward the party, and toward the subject of war guilt and the kind of Germany that should come into existence after the war. Then the questions turn to more direct Wehrmacht experiences: service conditions, rivalries in the army, and reactions to the quality and effectiveness of Allied weapons. Finally, there are questions about what the soldier has heard of conditions on the home front. Thus the



interrogator should be able, if he gets good cooperation from his POW, to estimate what the prisoner knows about the war, the needs in him to which paywar might have appealed successfully, the main structure of his political attitudes, and his strong group loyalties and alliances. Furthermore, by finding out these things for a large number of prisoners, it is possible to plot the change over a period of weeks or months (for example, who they think is winning the war, their attitudes toward a possible occupation, their service conditions, and their attitudes toward their superior officers and toward the top men) and thus obtain a curve from which both morale and response trends can be deduced.

A basic problem, of course, is always the "thousand yards," that is, what happens to a soldier when he has ceased to be a fighting man and become a prisoner. It is very difficult to estimate what allowance to make in projecting a prisoner's attitudes to enemy soldiers still fighting. It is sometimes difficult, also, to know how much credence to put in prisoners' answers. Sometimes they lie to please their interrogators, sometimes to misinform them. An experienced interrogator can often tell when this is happening and minimize it with well-asked questions or allow for it in his estimates of the prisoner's reliability. Furthermore there is some safety in numbers in a case like this; one prisoner's report can be checked against others, and all against other evidence.

Other information, as we have said, comes in large quantities from documents. After D-Day we realized how much documentary material had not been available to us previously. As soon as we began to move into Brittany, we captured a wealth of personal letters, Army and civilian orders, textbooks and manuals, newspapers, magazines, and diaries, which proved to be a mine of intelligence information for paywar. The paywar man ordinarily has at his disposal one or a number of intelligence digests, and either he or some other agency monitors the enemy radio and examines such enemy leaflets and other publications as can be obtained.

The breadth and variety of questions put to paywar intelligence is startling to a person unfamiliar with it. For example, here are samples of the questions put to paywar intelligence in the Far East theater during the Korean operation:

Is the Chinese attitude toward surrender like that of the Japanese?

What percentage of the Chinese fighting in Korea are former Chinese Nationalist troops, and are they specially vulnerable to surrender propaganda?

What do the Chinese now think of Sun Yat-sen? (The intention was to make propaganda use of the way the Communists had put aside the principles of Sun.)

What keeps the guerrillas fighting?

How much is our radio being heard in North Korea?

What do the Koreans think of what the Communists have done to emancipate Korean women?

These are only samples. If we try to analyze more systematically what intelligence should know in order to fill out paywar's picture of its target, we come out with something like this:

#### **Physical aspects of the target**

Population figures, appearance of the country, climate, seasons, size and plan of cities, transportation system, plant life, crops, what the people especially value about the physical nature of the country, etc.

#### **Social background**

History of the country; group structure of the society; role habits of the people; values and beliefs, traditions and symbols; institutions; distribution of wealth and income and ways of earning money; leaders in different fields; their quality, reputation, and biographies (and their present whereabouts and habits, which often make good output intelligence); typical ways in which business, industrial, professional, farm, and labor families live; educational system of the country; recreational patterns; how social change is accomplished in the country; etc.

#### **Communications**

What is the literacy level in the country and how widely are the mass communications distributed through the population? What kind of mass communications are the people used to? How do experts in the target country use the communication system to change attitudes and bring about action? What special communication patterns such as color symbolism ought we know about? In general what do the people in the target know about given events? How and to what extent does the target government isolate its people against foreign propaganda? How can America get its propaganda in at least risk to its recipients?

#### **Propaganda line**

What is the target telling (a) its own people, (b) its allies, if any, (c) US Allies, (d) the United States?

**Political situation**

What is the political philosophy behind the target state? What is the organization of the government, nature and strength of the control system, relation of the government to everyday lives of the people? What are people's attitudes toward the government and different groups of government officials, the apparent long-range goals of the state, the apparent immediate goals, the capabilities of the government-in-power for suppressing deviant opinion, the groups or individuals that have political power and those that have power to inconvenience or overthrow the government, etc.?

**Military situation**

Nature and organization of the military service, its traditions, its equipment, the care it takes of troops, kind and amount of training, living conditions in the services, what troops think of US weapons, relation of military to civil power, attitudes of soldiers toward military leadership, evidence of cleavage if any in the services, heroes of the services, whereabouts of given units or of ships, apparent military plans and capabilities, etc.

**Personality needs and group relations**

Evidence of personality needs to which psywar might appeal, signs of frustration, indications of group tension or of significant deviance, general pattern of attitudes as nearly as it can be inferred from opinions and actions, evidences of strong attitude structures characterized by ego involvement and emotional bias, state of morale in armed forces and among civilians, groups which have power to reinforce deviance, etc.

**General assessment of target**

**Strengths**—points where attitude structures and action patterns are most likely to resist change but which, if changed, would represent substantial deterioration in enemy position.

**Vulnerabilities**—points where attitude structure and action patterns are most likely to be susceptible to change in a desired direction but which may or may not represent worth-while goals for attempted change.

**Trends**—of policy, propaganda line, public opinion, morale, deviance, and other factors of psywar importance

General assessment of US paywar's effect on target

What groups is US paywar reaching, and what are the known responses? (Some ways of arriving at information of this kind will be discussed in a later chapter.)

Obviously this outline is neither complete nor tailored to any particular kind or location of paywar. For tactical paywar, on a mountainside in Korea, one part of it would be much more important than others; for political broadcasting, as by the VOA, other parts would be important. However, this is not the place to go into the problem of how to expand these sections or how to gather the information.

And perhaps in a chapter like this, which must treat a great mass of material in a suggestive rather than inclusive way, we tend to be too general and not practical enough. Intelligence is extremely practical. It may help you to think of material like this in practical terms if you think of what a minister needs to know about one of his parishioners with whose beliefs and values he is concerned, or what a teacher needs to know about one of his pupils with whose social knowledge and attitudes he is concerned. Obviously, he needs to know as much as he can. To begin with, he is thoroughly familiar with the social milieu in which the parishioner or the student lives; if he himself has grown up in that milieu, so much the better. He even knows the person's history, and how his home looks, and probably the heroes he holds and the symbols he is used to hearing and seeing. He knows, or soon finds out, what the individual knows and believes about the subject under discussion, and he is in position to find out very soon how he can appeal to the individual; what inner needs and outer group relationships will have to be involved in any changes that are made. Furthermore he can watch the results of anything he says. That is what the preacher or the teacher needs to know as a minimum. But now move the preacher or teacher a thousand miles away and let him talk to persons he has never seen and who are not particularly anxious either to hear or see him. That is more like the situation of the psychological warrior. And intelligence, by one means or other, has to fill in the gap.

What, in practical terms then, does the paywar man need from intelligence? Obviously, the best and most complete picture he can get. Anything intelligence can do to help him along toward the kind of knowledge and understanding the minister or the teacher either has to begin with, or easily acquires—anything intelligence can do in that direction will be valuable. If intelligence can fill in the outline we have just given, then it will be doing its job well.

But suppose we have to cut the information to bare essentials: what are the essentials? For the answer to that, let us go back to the paywar process as we described it in Part II of this book. The paywar man needs to know from intelligence, more than anything else:

First, how he can get attention for his message, that is, what medium, what timing, what approach, what treatment, and perhaps what segment of a target?

Second, how he can talk to the target, that is, how can he clothe the subject with the right symbols so as to get his meaning across?

Third, what he has to change, that is, what are the attitudes and action patterns of the target with reference to the particular subject under discussion?

Fourth, what are the conditions of change, that is, what are the personality needs of the target to which a message can be made to appeal; and what are the group relations which can be made to reinforce the desired change or from which the target individuals will have to deviate?

And finally, when he has sent his messages, what are the results, that is, are the messages being received, and what kinds of responses are they eliciting?

As an example of the specific use that can be made of this kind of intelligence consider the accompanying leaflet message. This much-admired British leaflet of World War II was written in German but still retains its beauty and effectiveness in English translation. Many critics have remarked how well the leaflet fits the spirit of the German soldier, and Speier says that when you study this leaflet carefully, in the light of its situation and its intended audience, you will come to the conclusion that you will be hard put to find more vicious propaganda anywhere.

#### TO THE GERMEN WIKI MARCHES WEST

You are still alive. It is wonderful. Everything that lives is wonderful, even the green grass and the birds.

The dead and the rocks and the soil and the dung—they are nothing, for they have no life.

We who have life have everything, we possess fabulous wealth.

The rocks, the dead and the soil have nothing, are nothing.

Where will your road lead you, soldier? Are you going West? Are you going to Paris?

Do you know what is in the West, soldier? I shall tell you, soldier, listen.

In front of you are the English, you know that. The French and the Americans are behind them. You also know how they fire into the lines of your comrades. Perhaps they will retreat and new regiments will march ahead. Then they will fire again. Then the Allies retreat again.

But the firing never ceases . . .

There is something else in the West. I shall tell you what this "something" is. Nobody can tell you exactly where it is, but it surely is in the West.

Your grave lies in the West.

If you march West, you can't help finding it. Possibly it is far ahead of you, behind the mountains. But possibly it is very near you, perhaps you can see it. Today or tomorrow—nobody knows. But surely, the grave lies there, as surely as does the sunset.

Do you march West, soldier? Then, we say good-by to you. All of us who live say good-by.

There are only two things on earth, the living and the dead. The difference between these two things is greater than that between friend and foe, greater than that between man and animal. It is the greatest difference in this world. With the dead one you cannot marry, to the dead one you cannot be a friend, you can't talk with him, you don't touch him. If you march West, soldier, we say good-by, to who are alive.

Men and women, dogs and birds and insects—they shall not be with you any more . . .

Soldier, farewell.

Today, you are one of us; you are one with men and women and everything that lives. You are master of the rocks and the woods and all inanimate things.

Tomorrow you march West.

Soldier, farewell.

Do you hear our voices?

Farewell.

On a mountain in Korea or in the New York studios of the VOA these questions will still be the same.

One final word of warning should be said. Intelligence must continually be reevaluated in the light of accumulating evidence. Target information from behind the screen of war or the Iron Curtain of uneasy peace is scanty at best, often slow to come, confused, or concealed. The best, the latest, the most complete intelligence is none too good, as every paywar operator has found at times to his sorrow. As von Clausewitz said, "A great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part somewhat doubtful." Those are the conditions under which paywar asks its intelligence units to perform their daily miracle.

## SUMMARY

This chapter is a spelling out of the postulate with which the chapter began, that is, that paywar requires a series of managerial decisions and that these decisions must be made (1) within the framework of policy and objectives, (2) in conjunction with operational plans and in view of operational capabilities, and (3) in the light of fullest possible intelligence about the target.

It is well to remember that paywar can never be better than policy. If policy is confused, paywar can hardly expect to be clear. If policy is faulty, paywar can hardly expect to make up for the deficiencies. If policy is short-range and opportunistic, paywar can hardly be otherwise. It is the obligation of policy makers to make sound policy, and in the longest practicable terms, and to make that available to the paywar unit; and it is the obligation of the paywar operation not to make foreign policy but to take the policy already made and translate it into symbols, messages, campaigns.

Paywar has an operational problem on two levels. The more serious problem is on the level of top planning, and it centers around the question of whether political and military planners in a country such as the United States can understand paywar and integrate it into their plans of action along with the other weapons available to them. On the more familiar level it is the problem of coordinating paywar with going operations and getting logistic support—a complex problem, but one about which the paywar operator is better able to do something than he is about the high-level problem.

Paywar needs two kinds of intelligence: basic, which aims at the most accurate possible picture of a target, and output, which is a culling of materials about the target for use in paywar messages. Likewise, there are two broad sources of paywar intelligence: the broad background of relatively unchanging fact which comes out of previous training and experience in the target area, and out of such experience distilled into reference books and files; and the day-to-day input by which the picture is kept detailed and up-to-date, this input coming from documents, prisoners, exiles and refugees, observation, secret agents, publications, and broadcasts. Let us say again that gathering and use of intelligence are topics for a separate book. We have only tried to suggest some of the special relevance of intelligence to paywar. One special caution should be repeated here: paywar intelligence, which is scanty at best and withheld as much as possible by the enemy, must be continually reevaluated in the light of accumulating evidence.

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GROUP 1, 2, 3, 4

201

SECURITY **RESTRICTED** INFORMATION

**Chapter 7****FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE  
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DECISION**

We have remarked that the range of possibilities for paywar is not endless but certainly very large. There are always more campaigns to be waged and more targets to be hit than any nation can effectively wage or hit at any given time. A selection, often a highly difficult selection, must be made. Further selections must be made among themes, among media, among possible ways of expressing the message, and among the countless permutations and combinations possible in timing a group of messages.

All these decisions are complex and difficult. Each involves a large number of variables, each of which must be estimated and assigned a value despite the fact that there is not much experimental evidence or theory to which the operator can turn for guidance. Paywar, as we have said, is at the same time something less than a science and something less than an art, although it has elements of both science and art. Insofar as it is science, it puts its bets on the best and most complete evidence available, tries to function in terms of cool objective interpretation of such evidence, and looks forward to the day when laboratory and field studies will provide it with the developed theory it sorely needs. At present, however, the making of paywar decisions is mostly a matter of impressionistic or intuitive balancing of plusses and minuses of quite uncertain value. And here the experience, the skill, and the "art" of the old hand at the paywar game play an important role.

The chief decisions that enter into the planning of paywar are what campaign (what specific act, as part of that campaign?), purpose (that is, what specific response from the target audience is the objective of the campaign? of the specific act of paywar?), target, channel or channels, message (which means, how should the paywar man try to accomplish the desired change?), timing, and means of evaluation? These will be discussed in the following pages.

**DECIDING ON THE CAMPAIGN**

Psychological warfare, like military warfare, is for the most part organized into a series of campaigns. These employ a group of related themes for long enough to get the greatest cumulative effect without a significant loss of interest.

Leonard Doob<sup>1</sup> has made an ingenious effort to develop a systematic, semimathematical way of estimating the relative desirability of different campaigns. A mathematical weighting of the kind he has in mind is perhaps not feasible in all circumstances, but when the operator goes about deciding on a campaign he must ask himself questions such as the following, and be clear in his mind as to how he is answering them:

**Priority of Policy Points**

What particular points of our policy and program hold highest priority at any given time? This is obviously a fundamental question, one that must be answered at the very highest levels. The obligation of the paywar officer is not to decide it but to seek direction on it.

**Applicability of Psychological Warfare to Policy Points**

Which of these high-priority points is it possible to reinforce with paywar at this time? Certain policies make better paywar than others. For example, Wilson's Fourteen Points made better paywar than Roosevelt's policy of unconditional surrender. For some policies and programs the timing, as of a given moment, will not be right. For example, there may be more reason to maintain secrecy on a forthcoming military movement than to build up psychologically to it. This is partly a high-level policy decision, partly an expert operational decision. But it is clear that at any given moment certain high-priority items in a nation's military and diplomatic program will lend themselves better to paywar treatment than others, and some will not lend themselves to it at all. The operator, insofar as his directives leave him free to choose, will naturally want to allocate the scarce resources to those items that promise the biggest pay-off for the smallest expenditure of time, energy, and material.

Number of Campaigns Possible

How many of these possible and desirable campaigns can be successfully maintained at once? This again is an operational estimate, which should be made in terms of the importance and probable size of the campaigns, the facilities available for conducting them, and the capacity of the target audiences to absorb them. Skilled propagandists are always careful not to attempt too much at once. The Russians have maintained their peace campaign for two years, keeping it alive by varying the treatment; for example, petitions, international meetings, charges, counter-charges, and offers. While this campaign has been in progress, it has apparently dominated all Soviet paywar. In the meantime, however, they have developed and concluded a number of minor campaigns; for example, the charge that the UN Forces were using bacteriological warfare. The Soviet practice of concentrating on a few themes or campaigns at a time is, of course, part of the Leninist teaching, which affirms that agitation (communication to the many) should shoot the works on only a few ideas so that the masses may master them completely. The good paywar planner always has up his sleeve some possible and desirable campaigns that he is not using at the moment but will use when the moment is ripe or when the current campaigns have accomplished their objectives. The decisions as to when to taper off on one campaign and when to launch or step up the pace of another are among the most critical he is called upon to make. The following are some of the criteria in terms of which such decisions should be made.

Availability of Tools and Channels

For which of the possible and desirable campaigns are the necessary tools and channels available, and the targets exposed? The question here is, is the paywar operator in a position to deliver a campaign to the target he wants to hit? How complete, for example, is the communication monopoly in the target country? If a campaign requires airplanes, are planes available? If it requires radio, is there a signal into the country, and some evidence that it is being heard? If a campaign requires events (for example, supporting raids, or Point Four funds), is the paywar operator's government in a position to supply those events? If a campaign requires the operator to reach a special group within the target country (for example, policemen or telephone workers), has he a channel by which he can be sure of reaching them? Will there,

If he uses such and such a channel, be a spillover that will weaken his other campaigns (for example, will trade unionists hear and dislike what he is saying to policemen)?

### Most Promising Campaigns

Of the possible and desirable campaigns, which ones are most promising in terms of their likelihood of (a) gaining attention, (b) gaining acceptance, and (c) finding conditions favorable for the desired attitude change or action? Having decided that he can reach the target, the psywar planner must now put together the best intelligence he can get regarding the target with what he knows of the proposed campaign and of his own capabilities, and estimate the chances of making the campaign a success. What has the enemy been telling the target? What does the target population know and think about the topic of the proposed campaign? If the campaign is launched at moment X, is it likely to get a fresh hearing; to interest people by touching some of their needs and wants; to gain the propaganda initiative (for in psychological as in military warfare the advantage lies with attack)? Has the enemy succeeded in building up a resistance to this particular argument or this kind of campaign? Has the psywar operator the tools it will take to gain acceptance for the message? For example, has he a spokesman who will be accepted by the target, and evidence that will be believed? And, finally, is the prognosis favorable for the attitude change he wants to bring about? In view of the present beliefs and attitudes of the target, will the desired change be a small one (ordinarily, the smaller the easier) or a great one? Will the change require a short or a long campaign? (Panic, for example, can be brought about, if at all, in a relatively short time, but habits of cooperation can be instilled only by a sustained effort over a long period. Is the psywar operator in a position to reinforce the desired change with events? Is the desired change merely a matter of canalizing existing attitudes (in which case it may be accomplished easily), or will it require a fundamental reversal of stoutly held beliefs and attitudes? (In the latter case it will be extremely difficult, perhaps too difficult to be worth trying.) Will it be reinforceable by group attitudes, or require deviance from group norms and role patterns? (In which case, again, it will be extremely difficult.) Does the desired response lie within the limits set by the culture of the target audience? Is it inhibited by surveillance?

Risks

In the case of possible and desirable campaigns, what is there to lose (a) in future credibility, (b) in risk to our friends, and (c) in terms of giving the enemy an opening? These are the crucial negative questions. Credibility is a valuable asset in any propaganda operation and one that is to be bartered away only when there are extremely convincing reasons for thinking that the pay-off will be big. Concretely, the operator must be sure that the advantage to be gained by fooling the enemy will overbalance the loss involved in depriving the audience of grounds for trusting our propaganda in the future. Similarly, if a campaign makes it necessary for agents, friends, or potential friends in the target population to reveal themselves, or exposes them to the risk of retaliatory action by the enemy (imprisonment, confiscation of property, execution), then the planner must think a second or third time about whether it is worth undertaking. The presumption, of course, is always against such a campaign, although here, as with credibility, we must not think, as some current writing on paywar urges us to do, in terms of absolute prohibitions: never misrepresent the truth; never expose a friend to retaliatory action. The most we can say is this: Calculate carefully the probable costs and the probable gains and be mighty sure the latter are big enough to justify the former; if they are, go ahead and do it. This applies equally to the supposed rule of never giving the enemy an opening for his counterpropaganda. If by the time his counterpropaganda can be got under way this country can pick up the blue chips, the paywar operator needn't worry about the counterpropaganda.

The selection of a campaign is rarely so systematic as the preceding questions perhaps make it appear. Yet the questions to which we have directed attention do have to be raised and answered if paywar planning is to make sense. The planner is informed that campaigns A through J enjoy the highest priority in the minds of the nation's policy makers. Of these he knows that all except J will lend themselves to paywar treatment. At the same time he feels that he can maintain no more than four campaigns, say one major and three minor ones, at this time. Somehow, therefore, he must reduce his nine campaigns to four. He eliminates campaign I because the indicated target is not readily exposed to the kind of channels and facilities he has available. He then estimates the remaining campaigns in order of the likelihood of their succeeding. Campaign H he eliminates because it would lose him the credibility of the target audience, which he expects to need in later and more

important campaigns. Finally he selects campaigns A, B, C, and D as the most promising among the survivors.

The difficulty of this decision, as you will readily see, is that it must be based (a) on intelligence that is always less than a complete picture of the audience, (b) on a body of communication theory that is far from complete, and (c) on a balancing of elements that are not always strictly comparable. The last is especially troublesome. The planner must decide whether the fact that he has better channels and facilities for campaign X does or does not overbalance the fact that the target audience for campaign Y is likely to be more receptive. He must decide whether the somewhat greater ultimate importance of campaign M overbalances the considerably greater likelihood of success in campaign N. He must decide whether success in campaign R is worth losing the trust of the target audience, to which he might later want to direct campaigns S and T.

It is here that the experience and art of the planner tend to come to the fore. When the decision is close he will have to make the same kind of leadership decision that Dwight D. Eisenhower faced on June 4, 1944, when he sat alone on the coast of England with an invasion army ready and a weather forecast that was unpropitious for a seaborne invasion, and had to decide whether to postpone D-Day for a month or risk possible disaster.

### DECIDING ON THE PURPOSES

The process of planning paywar is a matter of a progressive sharpening of a plan in terms of given goals and objectives. High-priority national policies tend to have very broad objectives, such as the military defeat of country A or the counteracting of Communist influence the world over. Within such a policy, existing military plans may call for the capture of island B, for example, so that a highly desirable paywar campaign might be aimed at reducing the will to resist of enemy soldiers on island B. Within that campaign, addressed to a subordinate objective, there may well arise a number of objectives subordinate to the subordinate objective. One such objective might be the privatization of enemy soldiers. The paywar operator might try, that is to say, to turn their thoughts to their own hardships and problems, by way of softening them up for attack or invitations to surrender. Or he might try to encourage subversion, and to that end he might try to turn the soldiers against their immediate officers. Late in

the game, but only late in the game, he would presumably invite them to surrender. Further sharpening occurs as messages bearing upon these objectives are tailored to particular targets within the target. Let us suppose that once the invasion is under way a large group of the enemy is isolated in a strong defensive position. They can't hope to fight out of it, but they can hold up the US advance a long time and cause many casualties. The momentary goal of psywar planning must be to secure the submission of these men, with, of course, minimum losses for this country. But let us suppose further that discipline in the surrounded enemy unit is strict and group morale high. There is reason to think that only the commander has the power to surrender his garrison; at least for the present, then, it will be useless to appeal to the men individually. The message, therefore, must be addressed to the commander, although if this is not successful the psywar operator may have to try to bring about subversion among the men. He assigns a loudspeaker—perhaps a "talking tank"—to speak to the isolated enemy unit. And as he prepares the series of messages for the talking tank, he has in hand a problem that has assumed very sharp outlines indeed. For the objective of the messages he is preparing is now to stimulate target C within the target (the enemy commander) to make response D (surrender of such and such men) for enemy unit E on island B at specific time T.

When we speak of purpose in psywar, therefore, we usually mean the specific objective, that is, the actual response we want from the particular individuals who are to receive a given message or related series of messages. The message, be it noted, cannot be constructed without a clear definition of purpose, and purpose, on this level, is dictated in large part by the peculiarities, situational and/or cultural and/or psychological, of the particular target. And there is further sharpening as regards the medium or media, that will carry the message to the target. Thus, operational planning for psywar is a fourfold operation, in which none of the four elements—purpose, target, media, message—is completely master. It may be helpful to look at some of the interrelations of these elements. Let us, for example, consider the matter from the standpoint of purpose.

To begin with, purpose is restricted by certain limits set by the response that may be expected of the target. It would be futile to expect a grass-roots revolution from a people whose culture has taught them only submissiveness, and whose power elite ruthlessly eliminates every potential counterelite as soon as it



appears. Or the response may be a possible one, but the time may not yet have come for it. Surrender responses can hardly be expected from, for example, a victorious army, even if it is known its individual members are capable of surrendering when the going is tough. For the moment, all the psywar operator can do is plant the seeds of surrender, in anticipation of the day when his country shall have turned the tables on them militarily.

Similarly, purpose is limited by what may be said to a given target in a given message or series of messages. This limitation may be physical and have to do with length (for example, an airborne loudspeaker can hope to get across a sentence but not a paragraph or, for that matter, even a very long sentence), or it may be a limitation on subject matter imposed by policy makers topside. For instance, during World War II the policy restrictions on what might be said about the Japanese Emperor made it impossible to implement any purpose that had to do with destroying the Japanese people's faith in their highest leadership. Or the limitation may have to do with the ability of the target to receive a given kind of message; for example, a primitive people could hardly be expected to respond to complicated ideological conversion propaganda.

Purpose is also limited by the media available for reaching a projected target with a given message. For example, during the last war the inhabitants of certain concentration camps and forced labor groups would often have been ideal targets for psywar with a revolutionary purpose. But often also there was no way to reach those prisoners by mass communications.

Similar intereffects may be observed in connection with the other elements as well. Thus, choice of target is obviously governed by purpose. If the purpose is to foment dissatisfaction with leadership, the psywar message is aimed at those followers who are most likely to be receptive to such material and most likely to respond in the desired way; or to the leaders, with the intention of encouraging them to act in a way that will dissatisfy their followers. Choice of target is likewise governed by the availability of media to reach a given target: the moment may be ripe, according to psywar intelligence, to hit an enemy unit on such and such a hilltop, but if the psywar operator cannot, for whatever reason, get at it with his leaflets and loudspeakers, and leaflets and loudspeakers are all he has, then he must pass this target up in favor of some other one for which the moment is less ripe. Choice of target is restricted also by the possibility of constructing a suitable message to a given target, which is a

matter of its literacy level, customs, symbolism, and frame of attention.

Each message, in the same way, is put together with a constant eye to the fact that it is an arm of purpose. One of the commonest failings of inexperienced paywar practitioners is to permit themselves to be drawn away from their main purpose, into arguments with the opposition's paywar. Thus, early in World War II some Allied broadcasters boasted gleefully that they had made Goebbels "furious," although if pressed they would have had to admit that their real purpose was not with Goebbels at all and that, as far as real accomplishment was concerned, most of their cleverness had been wasted. But if the message is constructed to fit the purpose, it is also tailored to fit the target. It must gain their attention, must be expressed in symbols they understand, and take advantage of their predispositions. And, finally, it must fit the medium or media to be used. Radio imposes restrictions on a message different from the restrictions imposed by print. A poster or a magazine can carry some messages that would be out of the question in a loudspeaker broadcast. Leaflets ordinarily cannot carry up-to-the-moment news, but radio can.

And as the availability of media influences purpose, target, and message, so do purpose, target, and message influence choice of media. For example, the decision to use medium A rather than B or C should reflect a judgment that A is better adapted to the purpose in hand than B or C. If, for example, the purpose is to persuade a surrounded enemy unit to surrender, loudspeakers or leaflets or both will ordinarily be used, not books, magazines, or motion pictures. And there are, of course, medium choices much more subtle than that, as, for instance, the choices between the explanatory power of a picture or a diagram, the analytical power of straight printed prose, or the emotional and suggestive power of speech, and the reinforcement these can give each other when used in various combinations. Media are chosen, furthermore, with a view to getting the fullest and most economical coverage of the immediate target. An illiterate populace calls for pictures and the spoken media, not print. A submissive populace must be reached, in the main, through channels that lead first of all to an elite. A given group of leaders like any other audience will have a frame of attention that some media will be more likely than others to penetrate. The problem is to find the right channel or right combination of channels. Finally, media are chosen so as most effectively to carry the desired message. As the nature and requirements of the medium affect the way the message is

constructed, so the intended nature of the message affects the choice of medium. If the message is to be long, it can't be put on a leaflet or spoken over a loudspeaker. If it attempts to explicate a tactical situation, it will probably require a map and therefore have to be in print. The more timely and urgent the message, the more likely it is to be communicated by radio or speaker.

The interrelations the operator has to consider have merely been suggested in the preceding paragraphs. The points to grasp about them are that they are highly complex and yet derived from a single basic idea: the paywar planner must drive a four-horse team, every horse of which must pull its weight. In paywar it cannot be supposed that a message will necessarily be effective with target A because it has worked on target B, or effective via medium C because it has been communicated effectively via medium D. Target E, though ready to explode, is not the right target, for the moment anyhow, unless channel F is available for igniting the explosion. Message G would go best by ground loudspeaker but must be printed because no skilled loudspeaker team is available. Purpose H, though laudable, may be inappropriate, untimely, and even dangerous when viewed in the light of target, message, and media possibilities.

### CHOOSING THE TARGET

Purpose, then, derives from objective and objective from policy, but it should also be thought of as inseparable from target. The question that should always be in the back of our minds when making decisions about both purpose and target is this: What process of attitude formation or action within the target society would have to occur in order for us to accomplish the desired objective? This is the crux of the whole process of planning paywar. From his available intelligence, from his basic knowledge of the political and social structure of the target state, the planner must construct the best possible working model of how decisions are made and how change takes place within the given society. If, for example, his objective is to bring about surrenders by enemy troops (as in the previous example), he must decide whether discipline in the enemy army is so tight, and the particular unit of the enemy army so cohesive, that surrender can be accomplished only by the opposing commander. If the target is a whole society, and thus made up primarily of civilians, the paywar officer must

decide what segment or group of the populace has it in its power to make the desired change, or cause it to be made. In a totalitarian state, for instance, the chances are that only the top elite can do either: a dictator can formulate policy, even on life-and-death matters like peace and war, even if he has only a small part of the population really behind him. In Hitler's Germany, according to the estimate of H. V. Dicks,<sup>2</sup> which is given in detail later in this section, a bare 10 percent of the population were real Nazis, and only about 35 percent were even so much as actively sympathetic with the Nazi cause. The same percentage figure, or even a smaller one, turns up repeatedly in analyses of Soviet satellite states (Gromyko once boasted to a US diplomat that only 6 percent of the population of Rumania were supporters of the people's democracy, and that that was enough—in the twofold sense that the Soviet Union neither needed nor desired more extensive popular support). The reason is, of course, that in a totalitarian state it is almost impossible for a counterelite to come into being, and much more nearly impossible for one to come into power. Where the target is a genuine police state, the paywar operator must face clearly the question whether anything at all can be accomplished by paywar addressed to the general population, or even to potential counterelites. He must, that is to say, arrive at a hard-headed calculation as to what groups are in position to receive paywar messages and to do something about it. Where, in the given state, does the power of change lie—not necessarily right now but at least within the foreseeable future? What are the groups whose interests most noticeably diverge from the interests of the party in power? Within leadership itself, what are the interests and divergences that are most likely to lead to change in the desired direction? Where, within the groups that have some power of response and action, can the rewards of a desired change be convincingly presented? There will be found the targets.

Targets may be enemies, friends, or neutrals, according to what kind of paywar is being planned. The purpose may be to make the target population better friends or weaker enemies, or to direct their action in a way advantageous to us.

Targets may be the entire populations of countries; more often they are groups within those populations. In selecting targets within targets, the paywar planner deals with societies that are capable of being "broken down" in several ways. Any society will have its formal and institutional groups, some of which have been mentioned in an earlier section. These are the power groups (for example, the political elite, military officers), the economic-interest groups

(for example, farmers, air force), and the common-value groups (for example, religious groups), many of which are institutionalized into churches, unions, associations, etc. This is the breakdown most often used in paywar, whose operators have long since learned the value of the most detailed breakdown that can be had. For some purposes, to be sure, it is sufficient to distinguish the elite from the mass, or the farmers from the city people. But paywar has some missions that begin to be feasible only when we have separated out minority religious and ethnic groups and divided up the population in terms of its skills and responsibilities. In a modern war, specially skilled groups such as engineers and technicians may, as we have noted above, prove highly rewarding targets. In Korea, for example, the invading Communists paid special attention to, among others, communications workers, social science teachers, and physicians.

Another important kind of grouping, as we indicated in Chap. 4, is into classificatory and functional groups (for example, farmers as a classification, the National Grange as a functional grouping).

The paywar operator must think of his target population as also organized into a complex system of interpersonal relations. Among these the relation of opinion leaders to the rest of the population is especially important. When a communications specialist studies a community he always asks, "What are the authority points?" by which he means, Where do the people go for leadership in making up their minds on key issues? What newspapers do they trust? More important, what individuals do they seek opinions from? In consolidation paywar especially it is important to identify these opinion leaders; theoretically the primary target of such an operation might well be a single individual, who, once he was convinced or persuaded, would bring the rest of the target over as a matter of course.

The most obvious of the various breakdowns of target audiences that paywar can use is that into local communities, or, in military paywar, into units. Paywar may address a message to a single city that is in the path of an advancing army or a bombing run, or to a single military unit that is defending a desired objective. The population of a local community, of course, has a common interest stemming from the mere fact of living in the same spot; if one of them is bombed the chances are all of them will be bombed; if the local high school is totalitarianized, it means impoverishment of an educational institution to which all of them send their youngsters. A local community can, of course, be broken down into the formal and informal groupings mentioned

above. It has its power groups, its interest groups, its value groups, and its functional groups. It has its opinion leaders. Any given individual in the community may belong to any number of these groups. Perhaps he belongs to an economic-interest group, to a value group, and to two functional groups, whereas his next-door neighbor's memberships fall into an entirely different pattern. He will have certain persons with whom he usually talks over political problems, and there are identifiable persons or institutions on whom he relies for guidance in making up his mind. For example, one receiver of paywar might be an individual who belongs to no identifiable elite, is a member of the unskilled laborers group, is a staunch Roman Catholic, confines his talking about politics to his place of work and the neighborhood tavern, and depends chiefly on his parish priest and his union newspaper to guide his political decisions.

The fact that communities are so organized is highly important to the paywar operator, since it means that several channels lead to every individual in the target audience. The hypothetical man we have been talking about may be reached first of all through general propaganda directed to the community, then through propaganda directed to the special attention of the laboring group, then through his church group, then through the religious leaders and labor leaders, and perhaps through yet other channels that we have not mentioned. This means, among other things, that propaganda messages sent through these various channels must be planned in recognition of the fact that two messages intended for different groups may well reach the same individual, who if he hears very different things from the same source will quickly learn to distrust it. It also means that there are endless possibilities of reinforcing paywar effect by repeating and timing messages through different media to different though related targets. It means, finally, that a skillful paywar operator can supplement his generalized mass propaganda with specific propaganda addressed to key groups and opinion leaders and thus achieve an effect far beyond that to be expected from a shotgun approach.

In tactical paywar the choice of target may be somewhat simpler than the above example suggests. Military targets, as noted above, are often defined by sheer geographical location. The desired response may be simple and common to all members of the target, as is the case in surrender-invasion paywar. There may, that is to say, be no need to take into account groupings and relations within the military unit. But even in tactical paywar to a single unit, such breakdowns as will permit directing messages that will

exploit tensions and jealousies between officers and men, or between groups which feel themselves unequally treated, or between groups with different ethnic or religious or regional backgrounds often prove useful.

Wise selection of a target for a particular message, then, is always a matter of the operator's coming to an understanding with himself as to what grouping within the audience can and should be reached with it. This group's members will have certain common characteristics, and it is in terms of these that the paywar addressed to it will appeal, and seem important, to all of them. And it will have been selected, in part, because of their common ability to respond, if the paywar is successful, in the way designated by the purpose. Hence in order to be as sure as possible that the paywar will succeed, the paywar operator will try, at the planning stage, to delineate his target clearly and fully.

Careful delineation of the target is more necessary in paywar than in, say, domestic propaganda, because of the target's very remoteness. To take the other extreme, in face-to-face communication the operator can watch every reaction of the target and constantly readjust his aim to it. In communication mediated through newspapers, magazines, or radio in the operator's own country, the sender has numerous opportunities to establish actual contact with his audience, and has, at least in the United States, Britain, and a few other countries, a highly developed system of audience research. The latter's function is precisely that of spanning the gap between the sender and his listeners or readers (which, we repeat, is much narrower than that which confronts the psychological warrior); it tells the editor or program director who are in his audience, what they select from the material he gives them, and what they think of what they select. In paywar, however, such machinery or indeed anything remotely like it is seldom available. The communication is to a foreign culture, to which the communicator is, in many cases, denied access of any kind, and with which he is likely to be less than fully familiar. If the target is an enemy country, every effort is made by its government to keep the paywar communication from reaching the intended recipients to begin with and, in any case, to conceal or even misrepresent the reactions of those who do receive it.

Thus every slightest bit of information about the target is precious to the paywar operator, which is why both knowledge of the target culture and adequate day-by-day intelligence from within the target are indispensable to a sound paywar operation.

In the course of choosing his target, constructing a message, and selecting media to carry it, the paywar planner will therefore make every effort to piece together a "profile" of his target, or what Lineberger<sup>3</sup> calls a picture of the "propaganda man." Here are some questions the profile must answer: What kind of person is the paywar message going to? Who is the man at the other end of the circuit? What does he want out of the message he listens to? What are his reasons for listening? What are his attitudes on the topic under discussion? What does he believe in? Whom or what does he trust? What in general are his motivations for doing what he does? In what ways do his needs and wishes diverge from the pattern his government has set for him? What symbols are emotionally meaningful and moving to him? What are his group relations? What roles has he learned to play? What is he capable of by way of response? Can he be expected to take action against his leaders or even to develop negative attitudes toward them? (It was the general consensus of informed persons in World War II that the German people could not be expected to develop negative attitudes toward Hitler, or the Japanese against Hirohito.) What response, then, can he be expected to make (for example, suspicion, malingering, complaint, defection, surrender) that will be to the advantage of the communicator? Information like this is, of course, the result of continuous gathering and interpreting of intelligence. The paywar operator will therefore cumb the intelligence available to him and make every effort to fill out his picture of his audience, to assess the strengths and weaknesses of his targets, and to discover ways and means of exploiting them.

Here, for example, is a section of the standing directive for paywar against members of the German armed forces, prepared in June 1944 by Richard H. S. Crossman,<sup>4</sup> then deputy chief of the paywar division of SHAEF. Crossman, of course, had had the assistance and advice of General Robert McClure and other key men in Allied paywar. The document is of great interest to us at this point not only because it is an excellent example of sound paywar staff work, but also because it is essentially a delineation of the propaganda or target man. The directive reads:

*Note: Except where specifically stated, the following generalizations apply to the German Army, not to the Air Force or Navy. (Note: A distinction is made between the targets within the target.)*

*12. Strong points*

- (1) *The Habit of Discipline*—The habit (Note: "Habit" as strictly a cultural and not intentional peculiarity of target) of uncritical submission to authority, rather than any such



less enforcement of discipline from above, remains the strongest factor in German morale today. This factor may not decrease sharply until the German Army as a whole is broken on the battlefield (*Note: Prediction of future target reaction*), since the retreats and defensive battles to which the Wehrmacht is now committed automatically place greater reliance on higher authority than offensive campaigns of the 1940 type.

- (II) **Comradeship.** The ideal of comradeship has been heavily cultivated in the German Army, particularly since 1933. The German NCO forms a transitional stage between soldier status and officer status, a fact which strengthens this sense of comradeship. It has furthermore been immensely deepened by the Russian campaign. (*Note: Data evidently obtained from current intelligence, not previous knowledge of culture.*)
- (III) **Professional Pride.** The average German's conviction that the best life is the soldier's life, plus the social fact that the highest calling in Germany is the soldier's calling, constitutes a great source of strength. (*Note: A further cultural datum.*)

Added to this (*Note: Further drafts on current intelligence*) the German soldier, and often the non-German soldier serving in the Wehrmacht, is convinced:

- (a) that he is privileged to be serving in the finest army in the world, permeated with a code of soldierly honor which rules him and his officers alike;
- (b) that the Wehrmacht is the embodiment of the highest physical and spiritual attainments of German culture;
- (c) that the Wehrmacht is therefore the nonpolitical guardian of the future of the German race;
- (d) that, as a fighting machine, German "quality" can probably succeed in throwing back both Anglo-American and Russian "quantity." (*Note: Emphasis on extreme characteristic of mentality at which paywar messages must be directed are emphasized.*)

- (IV) **Material Interests.** The German Army represents, for the reasons stated in subparagraph (III) above, an honored career with considerable material benefits. (*Note: More current intelligence.*) (Pay allowances and especially food are good compared with civilian standards in Germany.) Thousands of officers (especially those of junior and field rank) and tens of thousands of NCO's (particularly in specialist trades) have signed on not simply for the duration, but for periods varying from 7-14 years, or longer, and are fighting not only to preserve the German Army as a war machine, but as a means of livelihood.

- (V) **The Bolshevik Bogey.** The guilty fear of Russian vengeance, linked with the Teutonic dislike of the Slav and general fear of Bolshevism, has convinced the average German soldier that "anything is better than the defeat in the East." (*Note: Emphasis on guilt feelings, as mechanism relevant to paywar's task, and as a high-priority need of target audience.*)

German propaganda has deliberately enlarged and intensified this fear, in the following ways.

- (a) It has largely succeeded in persuading the soldier that the Anglo-Americans are so dominated by the

Bolshevik Communism that they would be powerless to save Germany. (Note: Current intelligence again, with further clarification of propaganda men's attitudes.)

- (b) It has filled the gap created by the absence of specific United Nations policy on Germany with stories of forced labor in Russia, starvation, deportation, etc.
- (VI) *The Rewards of Victory in the West.* Learning from Mr. Churchill in 1940, the High Command has deliberately capitalized the threat of invasion from the West. It has:
  - (a) argued that, if the Anglo-American threat can be frustrated or confined, the German Armies can be switched to the East. This argument has been used to justify the retreats in the East.
  - (b) argued that a defensive victory in the West will form the basis for the speedy conclusion of a "compromise peace" either with the West or with the East, which would in fact be a German victory. (Note: Sketching in of domestic propaganda context into which messages will be sent and further delineation of profile are sketched in.)
  - (c) exploited the bombing of Germany to persuade the soldier that his only hope of regaining what he has lost lies in a German victory in the West.
  - (d) succeeded in convincing the German soldier that for these reasons one last tremendous effort must and can be made.

(VII) *Summary*

- (a) Taken by and large, it must be accepted that the German High Command has rendered the Army largely immune to the two Psychological Warfare campaigns which proved effective in 1918, i.e., Bolshevik propaganda, leading to soldiers' and workers' councils; and democratic propaganda, leading to a revolt of the civilian under arms against the professional soldier. (Note: Emphasis is on attitudes sure to be highly resistant to change.)

We should assume that the German Army in the West will, like von Arnim's Army in Toulain, fight on as a whole until it collapses as a whole. (Note: Emphasis is on difference in attitude between the elite and the rank and file.) Indeed defeatism is more widespread at the top than at the bottom.

- (b) The High Command has succeeded in actually raising fighting morale during the winter. (Note: Base current intelligence.)
- (c) For the reasons outlined in subparagraph. (i) above, no propaganda directed at the frontline German soldier is likely to be effective unless it sounds and smells more positive and authoritative than his own Army Order forbidding him to listen to it. (Note: Recognition that special effort is needed to overcome strongly held attitude backed up by group exertions and leadership.)
- (d) For the reasons outlined in subparagraph. (ii) and (iii) above, there is little prospect of dividing the German Army internally — i.e., setting men against

officers. (Note: Emphasis on attitudes likely to resist change altogether.) Furthermore, no propaganda aiming at inducing the surrender of German troops is likely to succeed unless it meets the fundamental objection that by surrendering the individual is letting down his comrades.

### 13. Weak Points

(1) *The Shaken Myth of Invincibility.* The long series of defeats suffered by the Wehrmacht in the Mediterranean and in Russia have shaken—but by no means shattered—the German soldier's faith in the mystic invincibility of German arms which carried his fighting morale up to a high tide of fanaticism in June 1940. (Note: Emphasis here, and in following sections, is on attitudes of target audience.) Within this general uneasiness are other specific doubts:

(a) *Doubt about the Führer.* Allied propaganda that disasters such as Stalingrad, Tunisia, the Ukraine battle, and the Crimea were largely due to the prestige policy of hanging on too long to too much, has gone home. Many German soldiers today feel that military operations are being dictated by political and often party considerations. The persecution of the OKW, and of the General Staff with party generals (notably the G. of S. Zeitzler) is largely blamed for this. (Note: Use of scapegoat mechanism.)

Note: At present, the average soldier, despite an awareness that he has made serious mistakes, is not inclined to blame Hitler, as the generals and other informed persons already do. (Note: Implied warning that propaganda attacking Hitler is unlikely to be effective.) Hitler is still his lucky talisman. Goering is also to some extent shielded. Of the German leaders, Himmler, Goebbels, and Ley are the most unpopular. Generally speaking, "The System" or the "Party bosses" are the commonest scapegoat.

(b) *Doubts about Equipment.* German Army equipment is good and the German soldier knows it. But his battle experience since 1941 has given him painful proof that, in some respects at least, Allied equipment is not only more plentiful, but better. (Allied MT in Africa, Russian PAK, Russian medium tanks in the East and Allied fighter planes on all fronts are examples.) (Note: Anxiety.)

The present "Underwaffe" slogan is in part a wishful-thinking reaction to this.

(c) *Doubts about the News.* Despite intense efforts by the High Command, it has not succeeded in making the German soldier accept unquestioningly its interpretation of events. Most German soldiers, when they get the opportunity, read or listen to Anglo-American propaganda and try to find a truth half-way between their own communiques and ours. They assume that "everything is propaganda" and that they, as intelligent people, can read between the lines. Without knowing it, they are of course trapped in Nazi propaganda. They regard as "propaganda lies" such facts as that Germany invaded Poland, or that England has some highly developed aerial services. They have the useful faculty of forgetting any facts inconvenient to their suppositions, and believing they were invented by Anglo-American propaganda. Their outlook is formed,

however, not by the direct output of the Propaganda Ministry, but by the educational and propaganda activities of the Wehrmacht. Nevertheless they are open to any propaganda which does not sound or read like "propaganda," and does not offend their sense of "military honor." Unconsciously still, but actively, the German soldier craves for an excuse to stop the useless slaughter which leaves his honor as a German soldier unscathed, and puts the blame on someone or something outside the Wehrmacht. (Note: Emphasis on search for rationalization and for a new scapegoat.) He needs, in brief: (I) facts which seem to him to be objective showing that, despite the courage of the Wehrmacht, someone at home has lost the war for Germany; (II) a picture of the future which portrays death and destruction for "the betrayers of Germany" and survival for the German people.

Evidence for the above analysis is provided by the growing success of: (a) Free German Committee broadcasts from Moscow, headed by General Seydlitz, and (b) Radio Cairo. Both these transmissions seem to contain an analysis of German fighting morale similar to that above.

- (d) *Doubts about the Luftwaffe.* Moreover, the Air War brings with it a cause of friction between the Air Force and the Army. German soldiers are beginning to talk like many British soldiers in 1940. This friction, and the resulting blame on "the authorities" is a real if minor chink in German fighting morale. (Note: Emphasis on potential dissension among German armed forces as paywar vulnerability.)

All these factors are important, in that they provide the soldier with scapegoats for his decline in fortune, and when things go wrong the German's natural reaction is: "I have been betrayed."

- (II) *Manpower.* This is perhaps the main operational worry of the German soldier. He is disturbed by the enormous losses in men and material which he knows the battles in Russia have cost the Wehrmacht. (Note: More statistics.) This uneasiness is heightened by the Allied propaganda barrage on this theme, contrasted with the silence of his own authorities, a silence all the more significant when it persists even under the new OKW policy of stimulating complete frankness on operational matters. This general manpower worry breaks down into other specific ones:

- (a) The worry that, because of manpower troubles, the ranks of the Wehrmacht are being increasingly filled with foreigners of some twenty nationalities, and that the quality of the army is therefore in danger of "pollution."
- (b) The worry that, with almost every one of its field divisions committed already to actual or potential battlefields, the German Army has no effective central reserve to sustain it.

Both (a) and (b) above apply with particular force to the target of this paper--the German troops in the West. (Note: Sharpening of target.) These troops have in their own formations large numbers

of foreigners; and most of these divisions have had proof, by their own experience of being switched from West to East and back, that no uncommitted central reserve exists. The great volume of German counterpropaganda on this point is further evidence of its importance.

- (III) *A War Gone Wrong.* In building up the picture of the shivering Wehrmacht in deadly battle against Bolshevism, the High Command inevitably raises in the German soldier's mind the question why Germany is fighting Britain and America, especially since Hitler denounced in *Mein Kampf* the fatal mistake of the two-front war. The High Command seeks to answer this question by denouncing Anglo-American impotence and arguing that the Jews of Wall Street and the City of London are in conspiracy with the Kremlin. But this argument does not quell a deep uneasiness.

There is also a feeling in the German soldier's mind that the defensive battles which he is now forced to fight are not the battles for which he was trained, nor the battles for which his equipment was designed. There is evidence that the OKW had great trouble, during 1943, in converting officers and men to the technique of the defensive battle which their previous training had largely neglected.

The fear of isolation, a feature of what the Germans used to ridicule as "Magical-mindlessness," is likely to be at its strongest among coastal formations in the West. They are particularly liable to the anxiety lest they be sacrificed as "human landmines." (Note: Further sharpening of the target.)

- (IV) *Loss of Honor.* An increasing number of soldiers are aware of, and uncomfortable about:

- (a) attrition, especially in Russia. They naturally want to push the blame onto the RM, or simply "those in authority."
- (b) the hostility of the occupied territories, including "Nordic" countries like Norway. The German wants to be liked, and the German soldier is puzzled why, despite the correctness of the Wehrmacht, he is so coldly received. He wants to have an explanation which blames someone outside the Army for this failure of the "New Order." (Note: More emphasis on scapegoat mechanism.)

- (V) *Respect for Eastern Powers.* The German has a sense of inferiority to both Britain and America. (Note: More cultural data.) Many Nazis, for instance, regard National Socialism as the method of making Germany a ruling race "like the British." The German feelings for Britain are a confused mixture of envy, respect, and contempt for the old-fashioned. Their feeling for America is different, since they do not feel toward it a racial unity like Britain or Germany, and are suspicious of its "capitalist imperialism." They profoundly respect its riches, production capacity and "modernism," and regard it as the continent of unlimited possibilities.

Intensive propaganda has failed to modify these traditional feelings. (Note: More current intelligence.) In particular, nearly all German soldiers are confident that

*they will be treated well as prisoners of war and hope for (if they do not expect) an Anglo-American occupation if the worst comes to the worst. Furthermore, they are feverishly anxious for Anglo-American appreciation of "the chivalry" of the Wehrmacht.*

(VI) *The Shadow of the Two-Front War.* It is improbable that German fighting morale in the West will be seriously undermined before a successful Anglo-American landing, provided there is no great German disaster in the East. But the moment we can announce a decisive breakthrough will be a moment of profound psychological crisis, greater even than the shock of Mussolini's collapse last year.

Meanwhile, the advance of the Russian troops into Europe must reduce the persuasiveness of the argument that Hitler is deliberately yielding space in the East to ensure victory in the West. Gradually the German soldier begins to ask whether Hitler's strategy is not precisely what United Nations strategy desires, and whether the Second Front is not having its effects even before it starts.

The Allied paywar officers were able also to make use of a penetrating analysis of German political attitudes, made on the basis of POW interviews and related sources by the British psychiatrist H. V. Dicks.<sup>3</sup> This analysis dealt with German males of military age, but from it the Allied officers could make a fairly confident extrapolation to the older people and to the female population. Here is Dicks's breakdown, as revised and developed by the authors of this volume:

**Hard-core Nazis** (about 10 percent of the population of this age group)

**Idealistic zealots**—the Rudolf Hesses and Alfred Rosenbergs of the Party

**Party toughs**—the gangster types such as Julius Streicher and Robert Ley, devoted more to the excitement of gangster activities than to Party ideas

**Concealed fanatics**—the Heinrich Himmlers, who found in Nazi ideas and brutalities a release for their own private frustrations and fantasies

**Modified Nazis** (about 25 percent)

**Pseudo doubters**—who take the authoritarian pattern for granted, defend the regime as a whole, but condemn certain acts such as atrocities and anti-Semitism

**Idealists**—the Baldur von Schirachs of Germany, who thought of Hitler as a glorious leader, and of Nazism as a glorious vision which mortal men had not quite been able to carry out

**Cynics**—those who have profited by association with Nazism, and thus feel they must sink or swim with it.

but are likely to become renegades when they see the prospects are hopeless

**The Unpoliticals (about 40 percent)**

**Rural people**—including most of the rural population of Germany, who were concerned with their own land and living

**Village artisans**—the old-world German, sticking to his work, largely unconcerned with politics

**Minor officials**—professional public servants, willing to work for any regime, playing it safe with the Nazis

**Professional soldiers**—who shared the concern of the minor officials for job and pension, and in many cases showed a far deeper loyalty to the Wehrmacht than to the Nazi state

**Passive Anti-Nazi (about 15 percent)**

**Disillusioned idealists**—attracted at first by the fine words and sentiments of the Nazis, later repelled by the violence, broken pledges, and losses

**The middle-aged**—who wanted peace and security more than anything else, and had turned hopefully to the Nazis after the difficulties of the Weimar Republic, but had found only unrest and war

**The very young**—who had missed the excitement of the first Nazi years, and had found Hitler Youth monotonous rather than romantic

**The opportunists**—who had accepted Nazism out of career-making motives, then found themselves in danger of losing all status, and acted thereafter out of self-interest and caste-loyalty

**Active Anti-Nazi (about 10 percent)**

**Political Anti-Nazis**—ranging from the National Conservatives to the Communists

**Religious Anti-Nazis**—some Roman Catholics and Evangelicals  
**Individuals**—who for reason of family background, intellectual training, or foreign experience, could not accept the tenets or policies of the Nazis

On the basis of these and other analyses, the Allied paywar campaigns could be directed with some confidence at specific targets within the target (that is, the Reich). As the war drew to an end, the picture of the German public was constantly revised on the basis of changing intelligence and disillusionment, political

apathy, weariness, and fear on the part of the people at home began to loom ever larger in the target sights of the psywar officers. The Wehrmacht began to display the characteristic of most modern armies, that is, the lack of training for and inability to adjust to defeat. Thus a decline in morale presented better and better targets for psywar, and in each group the momentum of the decline could be accelerated by appropriate themes, themes to convince the modified Nazis that they were supporting a lost cause, themes appealing to the unpolitical wish for renewed security and order, themes to convince the passive anti-Nazis that they had been betrayed, to give the active anti-Nazis hope and an outlet, to encourage in these ways the desired responses.

A study of Communist personality types in Czechoslovakia, made in 1948 by an anthropologist, is another illustration of the kind of target analysis that the practitioner of psywar will find useful. It was estimated that the active Communist groups represented less than 10 percent of the total Czech and Slovak adult population. In general the Communists had apparently joined the Party for reasons linked with their personal needs for security, status, and emotional satisfactions. Their unwillingness to merge themselves into the population as a whole and to identify themselves with their fellow human beings was impressive. They wanted not merely approval but adulation. It appeared that most of them disliked the so-called capitalist class, as represented to them by the Communists, only somewhat more than they did the Russians themselves. They were said to have had less self-confidence than most non-Communist Czechs and hence would find it easier to adjust to a Communist society in which they would have status than to a competitive one in which there would be little interest in them as individuals.

Most of them got a good deal of satisfaction out of their identification with the Party and, through it, with Russia and Communists all over the world. They felt, as Communists, a sense of importance, an identification with a numerically large group, a feeling of riding the waves of human destiny, and of having a body of answers as to what is wrong with the world.

The Czech Communists inevitably became strongly hostile to the United States. Because the Communists could enjoy a feeling of well-being only so long as their hopes of Communist world domination were going smoothly, the constant frustration of these hopes brought about by US foreign policy, Marshall Plan, and military actions induced powerful resentment against the cause of these frustrations. This resentment was expressed in unceasing exaggeration of American faults and belittling of American virtues.



The Communists identified themselves so completely with totalitarian aims that every hindrance to the "legitimate aspirations of progressive mankind" became for them a personal humiliation.

Even within the 10 percent of the population who were Communists, five distinct groups could be identified. These were:

The "fanatics," the ultra-loyal core.

The "idealists," who remained loyal despite misgivings, hoping that Communism would build a better world.

The "pan-Slavists," who tended to subordinate Party policy to pan-Slavic solidarity.

The "economists," who had little interest in Communist ideology and little patience with the class hostilities encouraged by Communist leadership, but were loyal because they believed Communism could raise the general living standard.

The "intellectuals," who were willing to serve as propagandists because of the importance it gave them.

Target delineation may, of course, be carried much farther than this. Given adequate intelligence, it would be perfectly possible to delineate the pertinent characteristics of Christians in North Korea, or of a specific union of communications workers, or of the students at a given university. Let us conclude here with one caution: the intended target audience for any given paywar message is rarely coterminous with the actual audience for that message. Paywar channels are rarely so sharp and well defined that they will cut off at the borders of the intended target. A radio signal will not pick out the receivers owned by Christians in North Korea. Leaflets cannot be made to fall only on the homes of trade unionists. A loudspeaker broadcasting to an isolated enemy unit will not be heard only by the commander of that unit; his men will hear it too. Indeed, only in person-to-person communication can one be fairly sure of the limits of his audience, and even then he cannot control the secondary audience. Thus the paywar planner needs to consider the extra audiences listening or looking over the shoulders of his intended audience. Will his message contradict what other messages have told this "extra" audience? Will it expose his intended audience to suspicion or risk? On the other hand, can he so design the message that the extra audience will be a "bonus" audience; that is, can he take advantage of the curiosity of the eavesdroppers to plant some useful facts and ideas?

**SELECTING THE CHANNEL**

The layman tends to think of paywar in terms of short-wave radio, or of radio and leaflets. Actually, of course, any channel by which man communicates to man may be a medium for paywar. The number of media available to a paywar planning officer are likely to be limited as much by his ingenuity as by his facilities.

**Three Neglected Channels**

Three kinds of channels are especially likely to be neglected by the paywar operator who thinks of channels mostly as mass-media channels. One of these is the face-to-face channel. The Communists have developed to a very high point the technique of the mass meeting (for example, peace congresses) with vast preparations, parades of distinguished men and women from many lands, and a dramatic backdrop of publicity. They have also used face-to-face methods extensively in their consolidation operations within their satellite states. By far the most numerous of all paywar employees of the Communist states is the agitator, who works individually as an evangelist for the cause, as an organizer, and as a channel for information both to and from Party headquarters. In a state like North Korea before the current war hardly a person got through a day without going to at least one political meeting, which might have been in his place of business, his trade or professional association, his school, or his neighborhood. The variety of meetings was almost endless. There were lectures, readings, discussions of current events, confessionals, political dramas, and parades. The largest parade in the history of Seoul was one organized by the occupying Communists in September 1950 as a final attempt to boost morale in the face of the Inchon invasion. The parade was supposed to celebrate the fact that the invaders had been thrown back into the sea, although a few days later the US Marines came in over the route of the parade. So far we have been speaking about face-to-face paywar in Communist-controlled territory. When Communist paywar is operating in countries that are still free, there are sharp limits on the number of meetings and parades that can be held, so that more emphasis goes on other face-to-face methods. Their covert agents, for example, over and above collecting information to send back from the place where they are stationed, plant rumors, make contact with dissident elements in the target population, and help plan and support subversion. Whether, or on what scale, the United States is using covert

agents abroad in this way, we shall probably not know until many years hence.

Another kind of paywar channel sometimes neglected is the use of events to communicate a message. We have already said that events have symbolic meaning beyond the immediate frame of reference, and it is apparent that military commanders and statesmen alike should think of the implications of their actions before they freeze their plans. But the paywar planner has it within his power to plan and use events with this purpose in mind. For example, no one would maintain that the success of the German blitz required, speaking in physical terms, the large-scale use of divebombers that accompanied it. Rather, they were intended to spread panic and disorganize resistance, and did serve admirably as a paywar weapon.

In South Korea at the time when large portions of it were occupied by the invading Communists, the appearance of an American plane in the sky, even at the low ebb of UN fortunes, was regarded by the South Korean people as a message of hope and encouragement from us, urging them to continue resistance. So, similarly, a bombing raid, an artillery barrage, a shipment of food to a neutral country, or the appointment of a certain person to a position of importance may be used as part of a well-conceived campaign of paywar and may serve to reinforce the part of the campaign that moves through mass-media channels.

A third kind of paywar channel often used during World War II was "gimmicks"—small articles that symbolize or carry with them a paywar message. For example, small bars of soap, tea bags, false ration cards, counterfeit money, and other useful items were dropped over occupied Europe, usually with wrappers carrying a printed message. A less formal version of the same technique was put into effect voluntarily and spontaneously by some of the Berlin airlift pilots, who often dropped small bags of candy where they would be picked up by German children. Gimmicks may either serve as a bait to get people to read or think about a paywar message or be a message themselves. They may arouse an emotional state or a series of memories that even the most skillful words could not be counted on to evoke. The actual effectiveness of gimmick operations is not well known as yet, and in the absence of good research evaluation the paywar planner will do well to pick his gimmicks carefully and think twice about where they are to be used. They are expensive, relatively slow, and are capable of backfiring if poorly adapted to the target, as, say, luxury items of dress would do if dropped on a population whose

food supply was near exhaustion. But they offer a real challenge to the planner's imagination and ingenuity.

The mass media, for paywar purposes, may usefully be broken down into three distinct groupings or categories: We may think of motion pictures, books, magazines, pamphlets, etc., as slow media, of radio and loudspeakers as fast media, and of leaflets, posters and newsheets, and newspapers and news operations as in the middle category, neither slow nor fast. News evidently requires the fastest media available to reach the target; if radio and loudspeaker are not available, newspapers or leaflets are at least more satisfactory for the purpose than books or pamphlets. Sometimes, in other words, the character of the material to be communicated clearly dictates the category the operator must use. However, other considerations than speed enter into his choice. For example, is it possible to get news in a satisfactory form into the newspapers of a target country? If not, is it practicable to drop newspapers or news leaflets on the target population? What kind of defense has the target country against news broadcasts beamed in its direction? What special advantages does this or that medium offer as a carrier for this message? Studies by some investigators suggest, for example, that auditory media more easily arouse emotionally held attitudes, whereas printed media work better in the case of difficult material because the reader can set his own pace and repeat at will. This illustrates the kind of questions the paywar planner must answer in choosing his medium.

The following pages are given over to a few notes on defenses that may be erected against each of the media, the strength and weakness of each as paywar channels, and the chief uses of each in paywar.

### Fast Media

Radio, (a) Defenses. The Communist countries have taken most of the actions against paywar radio (this country's and that of its Allies) that can be taken. They have confiscated radios. They have sealed radio receivers to the wave length of a Communist station or restricted radio listening to loudspeakers that can be fed only from a central and controlled source. They have decreed punishment for listening to the enemy (that is, capitalist-imperialist) radio. And they have struck at the enemy signal itself by jamming, that is, by interfering with it so that it becomes unintelligible. Russia is thought to have more than 100 transmitters used for jamming.

(b) Strengths and Weaknesses. Despite the fact that such defenses can be set up against radio, it remains the quickest and most dependable way to get messages into any target country where there are receivers. It can jump border controls and iron curtains. It does not require mediation between communicator and receiver by any third party (for example, the man who drops leaflets from a plane, the man who tacks up posters, the secondary communicator who reads a leaflet aloud to illiterates). It is the swiftest of all media. Because of its speed, and because of the entertainment it furnishes at low cost, it is vastly popular with a wide variety of audiences, and paywar by radio can thus hope for access to many kinds of homes. As a matter of fact, one of radio's great strengths as a paywar medium is that it combines wide coverage and great speed. On the other hand, and for the same reason, it is not always an effective medium for reaching a select audience. It does not let the listener set his own pace, or stop to reread difficult material, or stop to think; it does not, therefore, lend itself to difficult or technical material, material that calls for reflection on the part of the recipient, or even material that depends upon accurate reception of names or statistics. The human voice, to be sure, gives a personal quality to the messages broadcast and lends itself to persuasion. Even so, a good part of radio listening is undoubtedly done at a relatively low level of attention. That is why American commercials use the formula of shock and repetition as they do.

(c) Uses. Radio has seldom been used in tactical paywar because the target audiences do not, except, for example, in the siege of a fortress city, have receivers. Along with leaflets, however, it has been the chief channel for strategic paywar. It has been used to good effect in consolidation operations and, as the development of the VOA illustrates, it is one of the main channels for political paywar. In actual paywar practice it is for the most part a news and news commentary medium. In the Far East theater, more than half of paywar radio time has been devoted to news, the usual formula being just enough entertainment to bait the hook, a relatively small amount of persuasive material, and the remainder news and other information important to the target audience. Paywar radio is therefore mostly "talk" radio. The more rigorous the controls on radio listening in the target country, the more the broadcasts must be in short segments, often repeated, so that listeners who are able to use the radio for only a short time will still be able to get the essential message.

Loudspeakers. (a) Defenses. Defenses against loudspeakers are counternoise or attack at the source, that is, shooting down the airplane, blasting the tank, or otherwise putting the loud-speaker's carrier out of action.

(b) Strengths and Weaknesses. One strength of loudspeaker operations is obviously that defense against them is difficult. They have, moreover, the advantage of speed and immediacy, and that of being able to select a specific target and talk to it, which cannot be done by radio. But this strength is, from another point of view, a weakness. The coverage of loudspeakers is usually restricted to a radius of somewhere between a half mile and a mile. Where speakers are used in tactical paywar, moreover, the teams operating them must cope with all the dangers, inconveniences, and distractions that naturally arise in a combat zone, and the messages, besides being directed at men who have their hands full, can often hardly be heard over the noise of the battlefield. Loudspeakers, like radio, have the advantages that attach to communication via the human voice but even less than radio can count on accuracy of reception.

(c) Uses. Loudspeakers are chiefly useful in tactical situations where the target is specified and what is required is a timely message tailored to its peculiarities. An example of this would be paywar addressed to an isolated enemy unit in the hope of persuading it to surrender without further casualties. Another example would be directions broadcast to civilians from a "talking plane" in the hope of keeping them out of the way of advancing troops. In consolidation operations speakers are usually mounted on trucks and have proved extremely useful. Loudspeaker messages must be brief, simple, and often repeated. The greater the distractions against which they must compete, the more important this quality of the message.

#### Medium-speed Media

Leaflets. (a) Defenses. The chief defense against leaflets dropped from an airplane or delivered by artillery is to establish a penalty for picking them up and/or reading them. The defender may also attack the point of dissemination, that is, the airplane or the battery.

(b) Strengths and Weaknesses. Leaflets are usually small, the size of a page in the average book, or even smaller. This makes them relatively easy to conceal, and at the same time enables distribution in great quantities (in Korea, upward of 100

million per month). The small size, of course, restricts the amount of copy and supplementary maps, pictures, and diagrams they can carry. Leaflets, unlike radio and speaker broadcasts, can be retained and reread, studied, passed about, etc. For example, a large number of Communist troops who surrendered in Korea were carrying surrender-pass leaflets. Since, however, leaflets must be designed, printed, packaged, and delivered, they are much slower than radio and consequently not an effective medium for news except in situations where the recipients have no alternative source. In combat paywar, for example, leaflets with brief news summaries are fairly common. In general, leaflets are less useful against targets in which there is a high incidence of illiteracy, unless the message can be embodied in readily intelligible graphics.

(c) Uses. Leaflets are used mainly in tactical and strategic operations. They lend themselves much better than radio to tactical paywar because receivers are seldom available to combat troops, and in strategic paywar they offer the easiest means of communicating messages to regions where radios are scarce. They are restricted, however, to places where US airplanes can fly or US artillery can fire and therefore are normally unusable in political paywar. They are little used (except as handouts) in consolidation. Paywar operators in the past have employed them primarily for persuasive messages aimed at submission, subversion, privatization, or panic and capable of being expressed in a few words plus a drawing, photograph, or map.

Newspapers and Other News Operations. (a) Defenses. Censorship and control are the commonest defenses against enemy news. For example, the Communist countries have their own wire news service, Tass, which feeds their newspapers and is itself under constant surveillance by their censoring apparatus. The defense against newspapers or news sheets dropped on enemy territory is the same as that against leaflets, that is, punishment for picking them up and/or reading them.

(b) Strengths and Weaknesses. Newspapers are slower than radio but have, so to speak, higher specific gravity. If the paywar operator can get his news into the customary news channels of the target country, so that it appears there without notable distortion, his messages can often get through free of some of the stigma that attaches to propaganda. In many countries, moreover, printed news has a certain prestige that radio news still lacks. Printed news can be effectively combined with illustrations and with entertainment (for example, cartoons), and can

be read at the reader's own pace, reread if necessary, and filed away.

(c) Uses. Use and control of the news media is of course one of the basic procedures of consolidation paywar. The political paywar operator tries especially to get his news into the wire services and papers of target countries. This is next to impossible if America is at war with the target country, but in this case newspapers are sometimes printed in the target language and dropped from airplanes or otherwise smuggled in. Such publications are, of course, harder to deliver than news leaflets or radio news, although it was felt in World War II that German-language newspapers distributed by the Allies were quite effective. One variety of this technique is to print "black" newspapers, deliberately tear them up, and leave fragments around where the target population is likely to see and read them. A surprising amount of communication is sometimes accomplished by this method.

Posters and Newsheets. (a) Defenses. The defense against posters and newsheets is to police the bulletin boards and walls on which they can be posted. The rules and understandings of international relations for the most part discourage paywar use of this medium except in Allied countries, where the operators can count on cooperation from the authorities. In territory being consolidated, the chief defense against the consolidating power's posters is to deface them.

(b) Strengths and Weaknesses. Posters have the advantage of providing an ample space for display. They can carry illustrations and often present themselves very dramatically to the viewers. On the other hand they get rather brief reading and usually therefore must carry quite brief copy.

Even the newsheet type of poster must ordinarily be in large type, so as to be read by a number of people at the same time, and its news content is therefore scanty. On the other hand each poster can cover, as compared to a leaflet, a very large number of readers. Often, moreover, there is an advantage in encouraging the kind of discussion and group feeling that occurs among a cluster of persons reading the same poster.

(c) Uses. Posters are restricted mostly to consolidation operations and political operations in very friendly countries. The Russian Communists especially have used them with great effectiveness in their own and satellite territory. One of their favorite techniques is to present a great bank of identical posters, so that the passer-by is presented a dramatic invitation to read.



Slow Media

Books, Magazines, Pamphlets. (a) Defense. These media, for the most part, must pass through border controls and through commercial distribution systems. Thus a target country defends itself against them by controlling what passes the border and by owning or controlling the means of distribution. For example, no American books get into the Soviet Union except those that the Russians feel will not damage their own cause—for the most part, technical books and left-wing fiction. American magazines that reach the Soviet Union are similarly restricted.

(b) Strengths and Weaknesses. The slower media can, of course, treat their subject matter more fully than other types of printed matter. Their appeal is often to the intellectuals and idea men of a target. Their influence, therefore, is normally exerted over the long term; for example, Marx, Lenin, and the Communist Manifesto have operated as paywar in slow printed form for many years and continue to be effective. On the other hand it is easy to control the distribution of these media, and their use is restricted in any case by the literacy and educational level of the target population, as also by the fact that they cannot be absorbed in brief intervals as, for example, can radio and leaflets. One of their great advantages, especially evident in the case of magazines, is that color and illustration may be used, and fast color printing has recently made possible a new and highly promising printed medium, namely, cartoon books, which both the major contestants in the cold war have printed and distributed on a large scale. This gives paywar at least one slow printed medium that can be made to appeal to the lower educational groups and to the young, rather than to the educated and grownups alone. Not the least of its advantages is that it can be mass-produced and therefore costs relatively little.

(c) Uses. The slower printed media are used chiefly in political and consolidation operations. There is, however, a certain input of books into countries at war, and there have been several cases of clandestine distribution of cartoon books during 1950-1952.

Motion Pictures. (a) Defense. Any target country can control the exhibition of motion pictures within its frontiers merely by restricting entry and requiring permits for the use of projectors. When the Communists took over North Korea, for example, they eliminated the showing of all motion pictures that originated in capitalist countries. In certain other controlled areas they

have kept out all American films except those they regarded as reflecting badly on American civilization.

(b) Strengths and Weaknesses. Motion pictures have the advantage of great popularity with their audiences. They can reproduce an event or scene with lifelike fidelity, explaining a process or action via the simultaneous use of words, pictures, and movement. They are ordinarily shown to groups, and therefore have the power to arouse crowd reactions and stimulate discussion. On the other hand, as noted above, they are exceedingly easy to control and therefore lend themselves almost exclusively to friendly paywar operations.

(c) Uses. Motion pictures as paywar tools are limited almost entirely to political and consolidation operations. There is very little likelihood that one of our pictures could penetrate the Iron Curtain, for example, unless the Communists believed that its exhibition would be to their advantage.

### Media Questions

The planner typically asks a certain group of questions in selecting the media for his campaign. Among these are:

Which media are prominent in the target audience's focus of attention? The basic question is, Where do the people in the target audience go for their information and guidance on the subject matter with which the paywar message is to deal? In the absence of a full knowledge about this, the paywar planner can make useful deductions from statistics on literacy, newspaper circulation and distribution of radio receivers, reading and listening patterns, and, if the target covers up all these facts, the way its own propagandists use communication media for their own purposes.

To which of these media does the United States have access? Pravda is an excellent channel to the Russian people, but Americans haven't much chance of using it. It would doubtless be effective to drop leaflets on such and such a Russian province, but to send American airplanes over the Soviet Union would, within the present pattern of international practices, be regarded as a belligerent act. There may be relatively few short-wave radios in that same Russian province, but there are some, and Americans do have access to radio.

Which of the possible media are most suitable to the purpose and the message? A cartoon book would not likely be suitable for a dignified message signed by the Supreme Commander. A leaflet would furnish too little space for a refutation of Marxist doc-

trine; if the latter is the purpose in hand, what is indicated is a book. Explanation of a complicated process will probably require print, not radio. An announcement for which time is of the essence will usually require radio or loudspeaker.

Which media can be used with least danger to friends within the target country? Friends inside the country are so anxious to receive the psywar operator's communications as he is to send them. How can he minimize the risk they run in receiving his messages? Can he, for example, by dropping leaflets at night, make it easy for friends to pick them up unobserved? Can he make radio safer for them to listen to by repeating short segments of program again and again? In what situations should he use covert agents to make contacts with friends?

How can the United States use media so as to reach the largest percentage of the target? Coverage is only one consideration here, since secondary communication is, if anything, more important. In any tactical or strategic psywar except loudspeaker operations, the psywar operator is likely to reach only a tiny fraction of the target. Thus the question arises, how can America get its listeners or readers to pass the message on to others? It is known, for example, that the few anti-Communists who were able to retain radios in occupied Seoul formed little circles of known friends who acted as chains for relaying the news from Allied broadcasts around the city. In every society there are patterns by which such information circulates. The problem is to learn about and then stimulate those circulatory patterns—organizations, informal groupings, republication, rumor, gossip, etc.—and thus multiply the audience.

This brings us again to mention organizations, which are certainly one of the powerful media of psywar, although many people are not in the habit of thinking of them as such at all. It is the Russians, above all, who have shown Americans the importance of organizations in changing attitudes and affecting the exercise of power. Indeed, you can hardly think of a Russian campaign in which organizations have not played a significant part: the study groups in which intellectual converts are sought; the Party, which rewards and reinforces the converts, the unions, educational organizations, and social improvement groups into which Party members try to infiltrate in target countries; the political fronts, through which the Party works in trying to take over power; the mass organizations that regiment the life and thought of a people when the Communists have taken over. Organizations are useful psywar media to the Russians, and can

be to Americans, because (a) they will discuss and pass around any information planted in them, even by a single one of their members, (b) they can enforce conformity on their members, (c) they can reinforce the hesitant attitudes of their members, and (d) once convinced and won over, they have the power and numbers to act. In fact, it has been said that a map of the organizations of a target country is more important for propaganda purposes than any other single map intelligence can possibly obtain for paywar operators. Be that as it may, when the paywar operator chooses his media, he should always ask, how can I plant this message in the organizations that can do something about it?

### DEVISING THE MESSAGE

The most important moment in paywar is the moment when the message is turned loose to seek its target. We have already spoken of that peculiar but characteristic quality of communication that divorces a message from the communicator the moment he has spoken the words or written them on paper. Thereafter he can do no more about the message because everything that happens will have to happen between the message and its recipients. Thus all paywar decisions—the specifying of purpose, selection of target, choice of channel, timing and relation of one transmission to others, and, of course, the devising of the message itself—lead up to the crucial second at which the message is turned loose.

Let us recall now what it is we expect of that message when we let it go. A message is expected to (a) attract the attention of the target we have specified, (b) get its meaning across to that target in about the way we understand its meaning, and (c) start a response in that target in the direction we want it to move in.

A message designed to accomplish these things may be words, spoken or printed. It may be pictorial—a drawing, a photograph, a chart, or lights and shadows on a screen. It may be an event. It may be nonverbal sound, such as the Chinese bugle calls early in the Korean war or the roars of the wild animals that some ancient people used to take along to battle—a primitive but sometimes highly effective kind of paywar. It may be any combination of these. But whatever it is—whether a leaflet, a shout, a broadcast, a book, a motion picture, a plane overhead, an army maneuvering on the border, or a bugle call—

it must still be so devised as to go out by itself and accomplish the three tasks we have named.

For example, here is a Communist leaflet dropped on American troops in Korea. It offers you a chance to look at a psywar message through the eyes of its target rather than its source. How effective do you think this leaflet would have been? How could it have been made more effective? Is there anything in the copy that does not sound like common American idiom? If so, does that detract from the potential effectiveness?

#### DO YOU NOT MISS YOUR PARENTS, WIVES AND CHILDREN AT HOME?

Surely you have aged mothers at home who spend their days and nights weeping and sighing for you, and dear wives who fondle the youngsters crying for their absent fathers!

To those dear ones awaiting your letters and your homecoming, a news informing of your day's death must prove not only a shock but also an arrow of keen pain.

What an unworthy death it is that you should be sacrificed in a battlefield that has no personal interest whatsoever for you and in a way that has been staged by the Wall Street warmongers!

For what infernal cause are you wandering in this valley of death, when you have your flowering youth shining before you in all the ray of hope?

Cast aside all hesitation! Do not hesitate to surrender to the People's Army!

You will then be able to meet again your comrades who have come before you, and must return to your sweet home.

Wave this handbill high in the air and come over to us! That is the only way of saving your precious lives and of enabling you to return to your families.

The Korean People's Army never shoot at those who surrender. Come over to us in full confidence!

#### Symbols

And let us remind ourselves of one other feature of a message. Whatever it accomplishes, it must do by means of symbols. We have said in Chap. 2 something about the symbolic nature of psywar, but let us expand this statement a bit here and apply it more directly to the preparation of a message. The making of a message really involves a series of steps in using shorthand. The pictures in our minds are shorthand for the world of reality around us. For example, we have in our minds the symbol "mountain," which is shorthand for all the mountains we have ever seen or heard about. This symbol is very useful to us because it makes the world of experience and imagination both maneuverable and systematic. To make this world of experience transferable between individuals we develop the word mountain, which stands

for the picture of mountain we have in our heads. As we call the picture a "symbol," so we can call the word (which is another level of symbol) a "sign," and we recognize that it is shorthand one degree farther removed from reality. When we print the word "mountain" or speak it, we can call the sound waves or the ink marks a "sign-vehicle." We are then using shorthand three degrees removed from reality. And this is what a paywar message consists of. By themselves they mean nothing, these ink spots or sound waves. To a person who does not know English or to a person who has never seen or heard of a mountain, the ink spots or sound waves that make "mountain" will be meaningless. But we hope that the person who sees or hears our word "mountain" will have that word in his language and that it will stand for a picture in his mind not unlike the picture of a mountain in our minds. The question is, will it? On that, much of the success or failure of the message will depend.

Different individuals, different cultures, tend to use different shorthand systems. For a man who has lived all his life in New Hampshire the sign-vehicle "mountain" may call up a different picture than it calls up for a man who has lived all his life in the Colorado Rockies. In the case of different countries, and especially in the case of abstract words, the differences may be dramatic and striking. This poses great problems to the paywar operation.

An airplane flying over Korea at the present time symbolizes UN control of the air in the Korean war. This symbol is close to reality as ordinary Koreans experience it day in and day out, so that there is little chance of its being misinterpreted. Mountain is a symbol that is relatively close to reality for persons who have lived among mountains, or studied geography, or traveled. But take such a word as "democracy," which is as much a part of America's paywar as the airplanes this country flies over Korea. Whereas most Koreans grasp the meaning of the airplane, and the very meaning intended, do they get the American meaning of democracy when we speak of it to them? Does "democracy" symbolize to them the same system of values and pattern of behavior it symbolizes for Americans? American spokesmen in Korea very soon found that it does not.

The higher the level of abstraction, the greater the danger of the shorthand being misinterpreted. The farther apart the cultures, the greater the likelihood that the shorthand systems will not be the same.

We have been describing this relation in terms of cultures. We could also describe it in terms of personalities. Our target

will consist of persons, moving within a framework of social heredity that we call a "culture." These persons will, however, have had different experiences and will have established different patterns of needs, values, and attitudes. The relation between paywar source and paywar target, hanging as it does on a tiny thread of symbols, is therefore even more tenuous than we have described it; even within the same culture different persons may interpret a given paywar symbol differently.

Now what does this tenuous relation mean to the paywar man who has to devise a message? It does not mean that he should address all his targets in baby talk. It does mean that the unit that builds the message should have within it the highest possible concentration of knowledge of the target culture and language that its country can supply. So much is axiomatic. But it means even more than that. It points to the one indispensable quality of good paywar.

### Empathy

We call this quality "empathy," that is, the ability to arrive at a sympathetic understanding of other human beings. You can see this quality in some of your friends. They are understanding, whereas some others of your friends are not; they seem to know how you feel and how and when to talk to you, in a way that your other friends somehow do not. You yourself probably have great empathy for some persons and less or none at all for others, and greater empathy for any particular person at some time than at others. There are times, that is, when you feel that you can put yourself in that person's place and understand how he is feeling and why he is reacting as he is, and other times when you find him quite incomprehensible.

This is one quality above all others that the successful propagandist must have. It is learned rather than inherited at birth, and to some extent it may be learned consciously, through conscious effort at trying to think oneself into the position of someone else. The student of paywar can, for example, set himself the task of writing a propaganda leaflet as his target audience might write it, and confidently expect to grow and develop as a propagandist by repeating the experiment again and again. As has been suggested in Chap. 2, the American paywar student, for example, might make himself write the kind of paper a convinced Russian Communist might write on "Why I love Stalin," or "Why our system is better," or "Why I like the collective farm"—any-

thing, in other words, that would require him to imagine himself as knowing only what his target individuals know, feeling and thinking only the way they feel and think, about some of these key subjects.

The quality of empathy is so basic that it may be said to underlie everything we can say about how to write a message. Writing a message is not a matter of rigid rules, such as that paywar writing should be conversational, or that paywar writing should never be above ninth-grade difficulty, or that paywar writing should follow the rules of good advertising. The goal of paywar is to motivate a certain behavior; the test of paywar writing is therefore whether it will in fact do so. We are working here, in other words, with a practical, not an aesthetic, question. We know we have to gain the attention of our target, and in Chap. 3 we learned certain general ways of attracting attention. We know we have to get our meaning across, and we have learned some of the things we need to know about patterns of perception. We know what response we want to motivate and something about how that is done. But the specifics of the process—the application of this knowledge to a specific task and a specific target—require from the paywar operator the greatest possible empathy with the target he is trying to reach. The better he can think himself into the target individual's shoes, the better he will know what will attract attention, how to say it so that the meaning will be clear, and what devices and appeals will get the response he wants.

This is not intended to suggest that empathy is anything mysterious and mystical or that it can substitute for knowledge. It is not and cannot. Before the paywar operator decides on what level of difficulty he is to write, he must, for example, know something about the educational level of his target. He must know what the target is used to reading or listening to. Perhaps a conversational style will seem unduly familiar or a ninth-grade reading level too condescending. Whom would the target be likely to believe? The paywar operator, we are saying, has to know these things before he quotes authorities or attributes the message. Similarly he has to know whether the target has any particular color symbolism or other symbol patterns that limit what can be said to its individual members. In short the communicator must know the culture and, preferably, also the language very well. The paywar process has one cylinder missing unless this kind of knowledge enters deeply into the preparation of the message.



**Elements of an Effective Message**

What happens in a message? We usually say that the writer of a psywar message is manipulating the symbols of propaganda. But what exactly does this mean in terms of what goes on in a message?

It means, in the first place, that the writer must arrange his symbols in a way he thinks will attract the target's attention to them. There is a simple rule for that which you can add to what was said in Chap. 3 about novelty, contrast, and figure-ground relation, namely, invite attention, early in the auditory message or at a conspicuous place in the visual message, to a personality need.

This is what the advertisers are doing when they lure you to an ad by indexing it with a picture of a bathing beauty. This is what the radio commentator is doing when he introduces an item with "Flash!" or "Bulletin!" That is what the poster does in virtue of its pungent headline. In other words, these devices really index a message for us by classifying it under the needs it might meet for us. Thus the wise psywar operator will put in a headline or picture or cue phrase to stimulate interest by pointing out a need to which the message relates, and will thereby attract attention to it.

In the second place the writer of a message will use his symbols in a way that, he has reason to believe, will lead the recipient to accept its contents. Here we may suggest two additional rules:

Try to establish an atmosphere of authenticity and authority.

The psywar operator uses prestige spokesmen. He names names and cites figures. He tries whenever he can to include some item by which the audience can easily check his veracity. He uses pictures that will be recognized (the Communists, for example, have made good use of pictures of their American POWs). Above all, he tries to find out what sources and evidence the target's mind regards as credible.

Try to establish an atmosphere of consistency.

This means simply that the writer tries to avoid real or seeming contradictions. He tries to be sure that neither little slips in words nor big slips in policy or reporting shall creep into what he writes. He does this usually by establishing central policy lines that he must follow and constantly checking content against them.

The tone of the usual psywar message is friendly. The writer tries to draw his listeners with him into an in-group (on some basis) as opposed to some out-group. The Communists talk to our soldiers as one fighting man to another—"none of us want to fight this war; you are being 'used' by Wall Street and your politicians; don't stand for it; join us for peace." Commander Norden talked to the German sailors as one navy man to another. Sometimes it is necessary to adopt other tones, but generally acceptance is sought via a friendly approach and a relatively informal style.

In the third place, and most important, the writer will so manipulate symbols as to—let us recall Chap. 3—(a) arouse personality needs of the target individual and contribute ways of meeting those needs that will be favorable to the operator's side, and do this when the person is in a group situation where the appropriate actions have some possibility of occurring, and (b) make the actions urged or implied in the message seem important from the standpoint of the target's important current background grouping, and do this while the action seems appropriate to personality needs.

This is the heart of a message because it is here that the writer must call on all his knowledge of and empathy for the target and work out a paradigm that will lead to the kind of attitude change and action he wants.

Suppose, for example, that the target is a North Korean Catholic who has obvious frustrations because he is not allowed to practice his religion, and yet is caught up in a Communist union and a series of Communist groups that are pouring their dogma into him. This man will have urgent personality needs that we need not try to describe here, and he will need above all to resolve the conflict between his religion and the political philosophy and practice of his state. We can guess that his religious attitudes will be emotionally involved and that his memory of his church will be warm and nostalgic, but we can guess also that it will be practically impossible for him to take overt action against the Communist government without running the risk of severe punishment, even loss of life. The psywar operator can guess also that a number of symbols of the church will be for this man highly charged with emotion.

Now the question before the psywar operator, chewing his pencil in Seoul or Tokyo, is, How can he devise a message that will begin with these personality needs and suggest some desirable ways of meeting them, some things that will help America and that

the man can nevertheless do without being shot by the security police or landing in the People's Jail, thereby eliminating himself as one of America's friends behind the Curtain? It is an intensely practical problem and a grim one since it involves life and death. The writing of a paywar leaflet or script is not merely "expressing oneself" or "selling Americanism."

The message writer might decide that for the time being his goal should be merely to keep up the hope of such a target individual, so that he will not entirely give up Christianity and, without doing anything about it for the moment, remain psychologically prepared for future messages from us. Or the writer might decide that he should encourage the target individual to get together with other Catholics, hold secret church meetings, and form together a little island of anti-Communism. Or he might give the target individual a means of resolving his conflict by passive resistance to Communism, or sabotage, or malingering. Whatever he decides on as a goal, his task in the message will be (a) to identify and stimulate certain personality needs in his target and (b) to suggest some means of satisfying those needs that will be desirable from our point of view and yet within the limits set by that individual's social relations and personal values. That, essentially, is what happens in a message.

But there are certain additional proved rules of propaganda that the writer may very well wish to follow. For example:

Manipulate the words of propaganda in a fashion that will make people remember them.

He will use hard-hitting easily remembered slogans ("Make the world safe for democracy") and labels ("Huns"). He will manipulate stigma. That is, he will try to build up the enemy and his leaders (recall our pictures of the Japanese and of Hitler in World War II) into symbols of hate and rejection. He will not hesitate to write in terms of the two-valued orientation that the followers of Korybski so much deplore; that is, he will describe the choices before his target audience as bad (the enemy program) and good (America's program), black and white rather than shades of gray.

When possible, try to provide targets for aggression. He knows there will be some frustration in the target audience, and indeed he may try to build more (for example, by tantalizing enemy troops with reminders of the pleasures and comforts they are missing). His problem will then be to displace the resultant aggression against targets within the enemy structure, rather than against the opposite side. For example, he may try to

turn the aggression against enemy officers for having led the troops into such a situation, or against more favored groups within the army or the civilian group, or against the government for not having spared the target this frustration, or against special minority groups.

When possible, try to provide targets for identification, emulation, and love. He will try to get his target audience to identify themselves with well-known persons who have done something like what it is desired that the target audience should do, such as surrendering or becoming defectors or opposing the government in power or having in previous eras been friendly with the propagandist's government. He will try to encourage the target to emulate these persons, admire them, and even love them.

Try to arouse emotion where it will be to your benefit. The writer will seek to appeal to emotionally and ego-involved attitudes, to use rich symbols, and to stimulate the kind of emotionality under which propaganda seems to work the fastest change.

Repeat—with variations. For this the writer has the time-tested example of the advertiser, and the precept of every propagandist who has discussed the subject. "Don't contradict," says one of them. "Just assert and assert and assert." "The measure of a propagandist or a politician," says another, "is how many ways he can say the same thing."

Let us hasten to say that there are many kinds of paywar messages. Some straight news, for example, will have less need for some of these devices than will, let us say, a persuasive leaflet or an appeal to an enemy unit by radio. Whatever the kind of message, however, ultimately it has the same kind of purpose and the same need to be attended to, understood, accepted, and acted on.

Hitler's Rules. Comparison of the suggestions we have made in this book with Hitler's propaganda rules should be of great value. The rules may be summarized as follows:

1. The proper objective of propaganda is to indoctrinate, that is, to inculcate convictions.
2. Political propaganda must be addressed to the broad masses of the people.
3. Propaganda, in order to move people to action, must be supported by organization.
4. The opponent's attention must be engaged before he can be convinced.
5. The level of propaganda must be adjusted to the mental capacity of the most limited among the intended recipients.
6. Propaganda must concentrate on a few crucial points and repeat them endlessly.
7. Propaganda creates convictions by emotional appeals.

8. Propaganda must be cast in terms of simplified affirmation and negation.
9. Propaganda must have a flavor of aggressive strength.
10. Propaganda must not conflict with the actual needs and experiences of the recipients.
11. Propaganda must not be confined to words but must include corresponding action.
12. Propaganda must play on the powerful motives of hope, rooted aspirations, and fear of destruction.
13. The effectiveness of propaganda does not flow from the truth of its content.

There is another respect in which all messages are alike. In one proportion or other, every message is a combination of entertainment, information, and persuasion. We speak here of entertainment in its widest sense, to include shock, surprise, and the aesthetic pleasure to be derived from appearance and sound over and above the entertainment come-on familiar to, for example, the American radio listener. Entertainment's function in psywar is usually to bait the hook and attract attention and interest for the message itself, as Tokyo Rose, for example, played popular tunes as a bribe to get Americans to listen to her propaganda. Entertainment may, however, also be used indirectly for persuasion. Tokyo Rose's music was calculated to make American soldiers homesick and warsick. And when the Communists broadcast music on their radio they try to make sure that if their listeners relax it is to a Red Army song, or an ode to Stalin, or a symphony by a solid Soviet composer; "purposeful relaxation" they call it. Likewise information may be used indirectly for persuasion—news, for example. And sometimes persuasion becomes merely instructions: how to do something the listener is assumed to have decided upon already. But this is the general pattern of all psywar messages: an eye-catching leaflet informs you that certain of your buddies have been captured and are receiving good treatment, and tries to persuade you that you too will be well treated if you join them; an impressive bomber in the sky over Korea in the summer of 1950 informs South Korean watchers that the United Nations is still in the war and still powerful, and tries to persuade them that if they stay loyal and hold out they will be rewarded.

Here are some questions that commonly come up in or just before the stage of devising the message:

#### Black or White?

The psywar with which the readers of this volume will be concerned for the most part will be "white," that is, overt

propaganda. The choice as to when to use white and when to use black is nevertheless one of the fundamental decisions in the planning of paywar, and we pause now to consider some of the advantages and disadvantages of each form.

The strength and the weakness of white propaganda both derive from its essential characteristic, that is, the fact that its origin is openly avowed and that it acts as the official voice of the sender.

In some cases this is a notable advantage. In the paywar campaign built around Wilson's Fourteen Points, every effort was made to drive home the official nature of the messages. The Points, as you will remember, were a blueprint for a postwar world that offered the hope of peace and a better life to all Europe, to the vanquished nations as well as the victors. The paywar, in other words, was designed to exploit the full prestige and authority of the Allies. Wilson's own voice was recorded and used, as were the statements of other Allied leaders. The Points were released officially to news services and printed in official-looking leaflets. The intention, of course, was to assure the people of Central Powers that this attractive plan really represented Allied policy, and thus weaken their will to resist.

Likewise, surrender leaflets are so designed as to take full advantage of their whiteness. The Allied European surrender pass in World War II carried the flag of the Allies and the signature of their commander. The Korean surrender pass bears the symbol of the United Nations and the signature of the UN Supreme Commander. The purpose, of course, is to persuade the enemy soldier that the pass is a sure-enough official document, which will help him safely through the dangerous and distasteful process of surrender.

White propaganda also stresses its official character when it strikes back at the paywar output of the opposition. At the time of the landings at Anzio in World War II, the Allies attempted to arouse insecurity among certain German troops with a leaflet pointing out that the Allied armies were now in their rear. The leaflet, however, used at a crucial point the word "hesselschlacht," which means not landing in the rear but encirclement, another idea altogether (a reminder of the need for having leaflets written by experts in the language!). The German command at once seized on the mistake by printing a highly official-looking leaflet that carried a reproduction of the Allied leaflet and described the true position. This white counterpropaganda action did much to destroy the credibility of Allied propaganda in Italy.

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of the enemy country. Occasionally, black leaflets can be used (see in the examples of black propaganda quoted in Part I of this book), and there have been excellent examples of black radio (Sigismondo Leone and Gustav Siegfried Zinn). Both leaflets and radio, of course, have to be sent from a distance, as does white propaganda, but often have a better chance of acceptance—at least until their origin is discovered. Becker,<sup>6</sup> in his review of black propaganda in Europe, says that one of the most effective black printed operations consisted of printing black newspapers and then burning them up and scattering them. This was done at various times and for the distribution, and, Becker says, a surprising amount of the material thus disseminated got itself read.

As direct black propaganda, no holds are barred. Pornography, a similar device, goes up with the devices of informal attack can be used. This is also somewhat more difficult than white to create time of with propaganda. As a matter of fact, the enemy is constantly torn between the wish to answer and the wish to be answering to any spread the offending propaganda. Such a move, black propaganda can spread the impression that something is going on in the heart of the enemy's homeland and thus undermine confidence and security. This kind of attack is extremely difficult for the enemy (most black is what we have heard throughout this last "double" power) to handle.

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One other generalization is perhaps in point here. It seems fairly certain, on the basis of experience up to this time, that black operations are more effective in strategic than in tactical paywar, because the communication channels that black requires tend to be unavailable in combat situations. It may also be true that black propaganda is more useful in political paywar conflict than in consolidation paywar. Convincing evidence on this point, however, is not yet available.

### True or False?

A vast amount of unnecessary heat has been generated over the question of whether this country should always tell the truth in its paywar output. The question has been given emotional overtones by the argument that a democracy, founded as this form of government is on eighteenth century rationalism and dedicated to the discovery of truth by the self-righting process of public discussion, does not dare to stand before the world as a proponent of falsehood. And the "strategy of truth" in World War II is cited as an example of successful practice along this line.

Yet deception is an instrument that no nation can wholly dispense with if it wishes to affect attitudes and behavior in the outside world. It has, for example, been practiced by this country in every war it has fought. Furthermore the "strategy of truth" in World War II was paralleled by an extensive black propaganda operation, conducted by the Office of Strategic Services, dedicated to the strategy of victory rather than the strategy of truth.

Every country, to be sure, dictatorships as well as democracies, tries to keep its white propaganda as credible as possible. Goebbels insisted that the Nazis always told the truth in their propaganda, and even the Russians—in whose hands the Big Lie has become an unimpaired paywar weapon—pose virtuously as truth tellers.

This country, however, is above occasionally using its white propaganda media for deception when it can thus achieve a success that will not require other operations. It is simply a question of balancing the ledger. If white propaganda can be used for deception in a tactical situation and an important success won without impairing the credibility of subsequent output, then it had better be used. The success that can be gained must be balanced, in other words, against the dangers that must be skirted. Certainly no quantity of white propaganda is so valuable as its reputation for credibility. If a given use of white propaganda will damage this

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reputation in the future, then the deceptive use of white propaganda must promise great gains in order to be worth attempting. That is why white propaganda, as a general proposition, is and must be kept reliable and credible. This principle does not, of course, apply to black operations at all, nor does it exclude white operations like the sonic deception plan that covered the Normandy invasion, given their enormous prospective gains.

The further generalization may perhaps be offered that the longer the time range of white propaganda the greater the need for credibility. In tactical situations, deceptive white propaganda is usually a mere feint; it is addressed chiefly to the opposing military command, is regarded as a normal act of war, either succeeds at once or fails at once, and has no aftereffects except on the military situation itself. Strategic and political paywar are another matter. Promises made during battle and not kept after victory will rebound against the promiser. Even the Big Lie is not wholly successful in a conquered territory, unless accompanied by a ruthless disregard of human rights, a communication monopoly, and large-scale surveillance and coercion. This is perhaps the chief difference between American use of deceptive white propaganda and the use of it made by opponents of America, and brings us to the greatest argument for a strategy of truth. If America's enemies make promises they do not expect to keep, and by so doing secure the downfall of a people, they can still maintain order by police-state methods and a monopoly of propaganda. The United States does not employ police-state methods or set up propaganda monopolies. Thus America must be very careful about the long-range implications of its day-to-day white propaganda.

Even the most vigorous proponents of the strategy of truth do not insist on a strategy of the whole truth, of course, and this is really where the two viewpoints come together. In World War II and in Korea the United States omitted some unflattering truth and emphasized some more favorable truth. American operators told the truth they thought would contradict some of their opponents' allegations and ignored other truth that might not. They felt then, as most paywar planners feel now, that they are under no obligation to help America's enemies win the propaganda battle. Moreover, the target sometimes won't believe the truth anyway, as is illustrated by the following:

What the Yanks of America has to say about the Korean situation is no less plain and unambiguous... In the immediate past, people in America that Americans - all Americans - like the people, there is the most serious to people... The American people, the way, this is the only way.

new house or in a separate apartment with kitchen and bathroom. Very many married people prefer to live in the suburbs in a detached cottage with a garden.<sup>2</sup> And he further asserts that the 25 percent of earnings paid to rent includes gas and telephone and even carpet-cleaning. Carpets, of course, are mentioned here not by chance. The Voice of America wants to insinuate that carpets are as common a thing in America as gas rings.

Although it was true that prisoners in American POW camps received eggs for breakfast, further testing showed us that this notion was as preposterous to the Germans on the other side of the firing line that they simply laughed at the idea. Since this discredited the balance of our message, it became another favorable truth which we learned to suppress. The same, incidentally, applied to an important strategic propaganda theme, that of war production. We had to refrain from telling the Germans that Henry Kaiser put ships together in five days. Although this spectacular fact was true, we had to stress the less spectacular and more general fact that we were building several times the tonnage sunk by the U-boats. Intelligence as what the Germans believed, and what they would be expected to believe, forced us to do this.

Eventually, as the result of extensive prisoner interrogations, a basic theme on POW treatment was worked out, which found its widest application on the Western Front, instead of picturing captivity in the U.S. as the outrageous idyll which it really was, we used the slogan: "It's no fun being a prisoner-of-war!" and went on to show that it was a grim but tolerable fate for anyone who had fought hard but who nevertheless had been unable to evade capture. We did point out, however, that being a prisoner had certain redeeming features. The punch line to this type of appeal was: "Better Free Than a Prisoner-of-War, Better a Prisoner-of-War Than Dead." That line proved highly effective. Understatement, in this instance, was probably the only viable means of communicating with the enemy.<sup>3</sup>

### Security

Security poses a major problem at the stage of constructing the message. The psywar officer must, as we know, have access to current intelligence, but if he is always forbidden to use the information he obtains from it, he cannot carry out his purpose effectively.

Linebarger<sup>4</sup> gives a classic example of what happens to psywar when security gets too much in the way. The following are actual instructions given to US psywar officers in the Pacific during World War II:

"... Use the occasion of the Sacred Banyan Tree Festival to needle the Provisional President. Make a dramatic story of the President's life. Undermine his use of religion to bolster the dictatorship.

"Caution: do not mention religion. Do not engage in scurrilous personal attacks. Material concerning our information of the President's biography is highly classified and must not be used."

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Now obviously, in the face of such instructions, the assignment might never to have been given at all. Yet this is not an isolated case or an atypical one. Any experienced paywar operator can recall times when security kept from him the information he needed to wage a successful campaign. The problem is worse because much actual propaganda writing is done on a fairly low echelon, from which much classified information is automatically withheld. The theory of paywar can only point out that whenever a paywar objective has been chosen, one of the first questions must be whether sufficient security-cleared information can be made available to construct an effective campaign.

### **TIMING THE CAMPAIGN**

One of the greatest and most admired skills of the successful propagandist is his sense of when to speak and when to remain silent, when to answer and when not to answer, when to start and when to end a campaign in order to get maximum effect from it. This is partly a matter of his art, as described in earlier sections. But it is usually the result also of excellent intelligence concerning the target, plus experience in interpreting the intelligence so as to know when "the time is ripe," plus skill in exploiting the opportunity when he sees it.

We have referred several times to the Russian peace campaign of 1950 and 1951, which featured the Stockholm petition and numerous public utterances, including the talk by Malik that brought about armistice negotiations in Korea. This was a long campaign, carefully planned and spun out. Most important, it was timed with great skill. It began when some distraction was needed in order to turn the eyes of the world away from the Russians' own operations in Korea. It served both to displace the aggression of Russian and satellite subjects away from their own governments toward "capitalist-imperialist warmongers," and also to capitalize on the nationalistic anxieties of the people of Asia. Furthermore it seized the initiative from the Western Powers and threw them off balance. What more brilliant and audacious maneuver could Russia make than to cover up its own aggressive behavior with a peace movement that pulled all the ropes of world anxiety about war? Operations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation had begun as defenses against a potential Soviet aggression, but by a single, well-timed stroke these defenses against Russia were themselves made to appear aggressive and

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threatening. The Western Powers never fully recovered the initiative during this campaign.

Another example of excellent Russian timing was their proposal for a united Germany. This came at the time when it was best calculated to disrupt European rearmament and drive a wedge between France and the other Western Powers and between Western Germany and the other Western Powers. It so rocked the Western Powers back on their heels that they made no answer to the proposition for a number of days and then spoke only cautiously and defensively. In the propaganda battle for Germany this one move completely transferred the initiative and the favorable position to Russia.

Still another example of good timing, in this case in tactical paywar, occurred in Korea in the winter of 1950. Primitive paywar though it was, and reminiscent of Gideon's victory over the Midianites, still it was effective. The UN forces knew, of course, that Chinese armies were present in North Korea, but the numbers and intention of these armies were unknown. The Chinese maintained a complete nocturnal blackout until the night before the scheduled attack. At that time our reconnaissance planes returned with the report that all Communist-held Korea was aflame. Chinese campfires were burning on every hill and mountain. "The country is full of Chinese," said the troops. Next morning came the attack.

What are the decisive questions a paywar planner asks when he studies his intelligence and decides on the optimum moment to begin a campaign? Usually he asks such questions as these: Is the iron hot? Does intelligence show that the target audience is ready for such a campaign? A campaign that reaches an audience predisposed toward the desired change will have easy going. Propaganda that can canalize and direct existing tendencies in an audience will always work faster than propaganda that must completely change and convert an audience. Therefore the "optimum time" is the time when the audience promises to be most receptive, and when the proposed messages are most likely to be successful.

Will striking now beat the enemy to the punch? In the symbol war as in the bullet war, the advantage lies with attack. "Whoever speaks the first word to the world is always right," Goebbels said. This, of course, is not always true, but the characteristics of mass communication are such that a denial or rebuttal never completely catches up with the original message. Furthermore the facts learned first in a new situation are apt to be better

remembered. Therefore many paywar strategists often prefer to launch a new attack rather than to defend themselves against the enemy's. And the experienced propagandist always tries to get there first; for example, he tells the world about a new move before the enemy has had time to report, distract, and discredit it.

Is the way open? In this respect the optimum time is whenever the campaign is likely to get adequate attention from the target audience. Is the audience distracted by other campaigns or events? Are the channels, for one reason or other, closed or clogged?

Is help coming up? The time is optimum when the first statements of the campaign themes can be reinforced in the near future, by events, by varied repetition, by related propaganda.

How much will a campaign at this time contribute to the master timetable? Whether or not the present is the optimum time will, of course, depend in part on political and military plans to which paywar is to contribute. The timetable of the responses to be expected from a campaign at this time must therefore be anticipated, and the campaign undertaken only if it fits into the timetable for the American master plan. If you will remember some of the occasions on which an advertisement has played an important part in your purchase of a new automobile or some similar article, you will probably recall that you saw the ad at a time when you were ready to consider the purchase of a new car, and probably several weeks or months before you actually made the purchase. That time interval was an important one, for it gave you a chance to absorb what you had learned, gather together a related group of attitudes, and prepare action responses for the time when you and the dealer would actually stand before a demonstration car. Similarly, Goebbels began in 1939 to soften up France and Belgium for the blitz of 1940. Tactical paywar officers feel that it is worth while to plant the seed of surrender in enemy troops even when they are far in the rear and there is no immediate likelihood of their surrendering.

An often-used trick of timing is to release a paywar communication at the precise moment that the target audience can best check its authenticity against an event that will be readily observable within the target and thus will be widely known among the target audience. The purpose, of course, is to establish the target's faith in the creator's paywar. If the audience consciously checks even a single communication and finds it to be true, then they are more likely to believe future communications.

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One of the classic questions in paywar, then, is this: When is it wise to answer or refute enemy propaganda? Some of the most interesting passages in Garbo's diary deal with his reasons for speaking or keeping silent in the face of an enemy propaganda campaign. He tried continuously to estimate the effectiveness and the purpose of the enemy propaganda. If he felt the enemy output on a given issue was relatively ineffective, he kept silent. Likewise, if he felt that the enemy was fishing for information, he did not answer. And he did not answer if he felt he had no really effective answer, or if he felt that his reply might give greater circulation or credence to enemy claims. On the other hand he did regard it as necessary to deflate any prestige the enemy gained from claims of military successes, and to expose "blatant falsehoods" (such, he said, as the claim that the Germans had bombed Rome). Though bothered by enemy propaganda, and by his inability to inoculate his people from it, he still preferred, as a general proposition, to initiate his own attacks rather than defend himself against the enemy's. In this, most successful propagandists would agree with him.

How long should a campaign continue? Here intelligence about the target is really essential, for the only just answer is, of course, that it should go on as long as it continues to be effective. In practice, several campaigns are usually in progress at the same time. As soon as one campaign gets going, the general planner studies his intelligence to learn the target and begins to estimate how long he can continue to keep the campaign going through radio, pages, and media; to estimate the target and begin to estimate audience. At the same time he is making plans as to what campaign should follow the one just begun. The new one may be a continuation of the existing campaign, gets his new campaign ready to go, and keeps a careful eye on intelligence reports concerning the first campaign. Usually he starts the new campaign before the first one has ended. In any case the time comes when the first campaign appears to be pretty clear. If any further continuation is necessary, it is usually sufficient. In few cases the first campaign is so effective that it is continued at the same level of intensity. The first campaign is usually the most energetic and the most effective.

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## EVALUATING THE PRODUCT

No psywar campaign can be considered really well planned unless it includes provisions for evaluating the content, its effect, and the effect of the product.

Evaluation of the content is fairly simple. Formed critical judgments should be secured for their applicability to the in their various stages. They should be made for thematic and propaganda quality in translation or production in target culture, and for their appropriateness to this, it will be helpful if of the target language. It is made week by week, using quantitative analysis of the output in terms, different subjects, and different devices, methods, in order to compare the output with the intention of the policy planners. given to different parts of the effect is not at all simple. The way really and to come up with a way to test the effect of psywar is to go in on the

Evaluation of the audience and find out, by interviews and observations, what attitude change took place and what action was motivated. Even then, it is sometimes hard to determine just what was the "cause" of a given "effect." As was indicated in Chap. 4, attitude change is a complex process, and action may have many sources. Thus it is not always possible to estimate exactly how much credit should be given to a specific psywar operation even when the target audience is accessible.

In consolidation operations the target audience is accessible, and opinion surveys and other community studies will give the psywar operator a running record of what his material is accomplishing. In political operations it is occasionally possible to go into the target audience and make such studies, and it is sometimes possible to get opinion data that have been assembled in the target country itself, perhaps even by the target government. But the more delicate the relations between countries, and the more important it consequently becomes to evaluate the effect of a country's propaganda, the less likely the operator is to have access either to the target audience or to data obtained by others concerning it. For example, America should now have very little chance of getting such access to the Soviet Union or such data on the Russian audience. And in tactical and strategic operations the psywar operator is of course cut off even more sharply from the target he should like to study.

Thus the problem, in all types of psywar operations, is to predict or estimate the effect of a psywar operation without being able to measure directly the actual responses of the target audience.

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There are, in general, three ways to evaluate the effect of a paywar product in this difficult situation. Obviously each one is only an approximation. None of them is as satisfactory as an unbiased and steady study of the target audience itself would be. Yet an evaluation of what paywar is accomplishing is so enormously important to planning and practice that any paywar operation stands to gain tremendously from whatever it can learn from these methods.

### Experts

The simplest of these methods is the jury of experts. These should be persons who are thoroughly acquainted with the target country, its culture, and its people. They should preferably have lived in the target country for a long time and should have left it only very recently. Ideally they should be natives of the target country. Their absolute loyalty to the country that wants to use them as jury members must, however, be beyond question.

The procedure is for this jury to be asked to read or listen to the paywar material being directed at the target in question and predict what its effect will be within the target. Will it attract attention? Will it be understood? What reaction will it produce? Will it be accepted and believed? Will it change any minds or lead anyone to take the action desired? How could it be made more effective?

The jury, of course, can be asked to pretest as well as to posttest the paywar output. That is, a leaflet designed for the target can be shown to the jury before it has been disseminated, and the criticisms and predictions of the experts can be used either in revising it or in deciding when and where to disseminate it. This is also possible, though less convenient, in the case of radio broadcasts.

The report of the jury will be valid only to the extent that the jury is truly expert, that is, to the extent to which it can put itself in the place of the target audience and anticipate the processes by which the audience will respond to the paywar material.

### Sample of Persons

A second method of evaluation is the use of a sample of persons as similar as possible to the target audience. These can be refugees, defectors, POWs, or other natives available to the paywar planners. Continuous effort should be made to match the sample as closely as possible to the actual target audience. For

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example, if there is any reason to think that different groups within the target might react in different ways to the propaganda, then representatives of each of these groups should be included in the sample. Thus if three-fifths of the target population is illiterate, a sizable proportion (ideally, three-fifths) of the sample should be illiterate, so that their reactions will be reflected more prominently in the results than the reactions of literates. If there is a powerful trade union group in the target, with opinions and probable reactions of their own, then trade unionists should be represented in some such proportion in the sample.

Ideally, then, the sample should be a perfect miniature of the target audience. The picture as regards sex distribution, age distribution, geographical distribution, occupation distribution, economic status, educational levels, political viewpoints, etc., should be the same, in other words, as within the target. Practically, this is very hard if not impossible to achieve. It is considerably harder to put together a reliable miniature sample than to put together a panel of experts, for the miniature sample is only as good as it is really representative.

But if a representative sample can be obtained, then very useful results can be expected. The procedure is simply to expose the panel to the paywar material, and find out, from responses to before-and-after questions, what happens to the readers or listeners. Did they read or listen to all of it? What did they think of it? Did they understand it? Did they change any opinions as a result of it? What made them believe it, or kept them from believing it?

There are some real dangers involved in both methods, even when the experts using them are really expert and the sample is really representative. One of these dangers is that the members of the jury or the sample may give the opinions they think the questioner wants to hear. This is especially likely when the respondents are impoverished and insecure (for example, refugees, defectors, and prisoners highly dependent on the income or preferment promised them for their cooperation and perhaps reluctant to criticize the questioners' propaganda unfavorably). It is still more likely when prisoners of war are used for the jury or the sample, since they may give deliberately false answers in the hope of making the propaganda ineffective. The evaluators must therefore investigate potential jury or sample members as carefully as possible before retaining them, and subsequently test them from time to time with, for example, deliberately planted propaganda that is known to be poor or to differ in some important

way from the material previously given them, so as to find out whether their answers change with the changing material.

### Enemy Sources

The third kind of evaluation consists of a number of techniques all of which in one way or other belong under the rubric of intelligence. The paywar unit should use every available avenue of intelligence in its attempt to find out about the effects of its propaganda on the target. Here are some of the ways in which intelligence sources can be used:

Undercover Agents. These can be used as participant observers to report on the way paywar material is being received in their areas, and on the effects it produces. This is perhaps the most reliable single device, since the agent can discuss the paywar with members of the target audience, listen in on conversations about it, and observe any actions that appear to result from it. All this calls, of course, both for an able agent and a good channel through which he can report.

Prisoners of War. These can be interviewed soon after capture, and they can be asked what paywar material has come to their attention, what their own reactions are to it, what are the reactions of their fellow soldiers and superior officers, and what is the general state of opinion and morale in their military units.

Routine Intelligence. News, intercepted letters, captured documents, statistical reports, and information from defectors and other persons interviewed can and should be screened for information bearing upon the effectiveness of our paywar.

The Enemy's Actions. These often tell us something about the effects of our paywar messages. For example, variations in the number of surrenders are often revealing. So are the enemy's countermeasures. His counterpropaganda, monitored and analyzed, sometimes tells us which of our campaigns are proving especially bothersome. In the case of broadcasting, the programs he joins may tell us what we are accomplishing with what messages.

No paywar unit will rely on any one of these methods exclusively. Not to use all possible evaluative information out of available intelligence is inexcusable. Any operation will be able, without too much trouble, to set up a small jury of expert observers; a representative sample is not beyond the resources of most field operations. But the information obtained from any

one of these methods ought to be checked against what comes from the others; for example, what the jury says about a leaflet ought to be checked as often as possible with POWs who are being interviewed, and also with the information that comes out of the target country. When the judgments from the various methods tally, the presumption in favor of their validity is greatly increased.

## **SUMMARY**

You are aware by now that the large number of variables affecting paywar make paywar decisions immensely difficult. Although what are required above all by the operator in making paywar decisions are the skill and judgment that come with experience, the beginning or student paywar operator can acquire a framework in which to organize any experience he may acquire in this phase of the work by keeping clearly in mind the major variables that must be weighed and considered. If necessity requires it, this knowledge may even permit him to make the decisions for any operation he may be performing. These variables are choice of campaign, purpose, target, channel, message, timing, and means of evaluation.

Affecting the choice of campaign are priority of points of policy, applicability or inapplicability of paywar to particular policy points, the number of campaigns possible, the availability of tools and channels, the probable effectiveness of the various possible campaigns, and the risks that any campaign will bring to friends in the target country or to future credibility in the target country.

Affecting the choice of purpose are the situational, cultural, or psychological peculiarities of the target and also the interrelations between purpose, target, media, and message. Purpose derives from objective, and objective derives from policy, but purpose is also inseparable from the target.

Affecting the choice of target are determination of the specific attitude formation (or change) and action desired and determination of the individuals or groups within the target capable of bringing about the desired response. The latter may require vast and detailed knowledge of the target's social structure.

From this information the paywar operator will construct a complete statement of the characteristics—a target analysis—of the "propaganda man" he is trying to reach.

Affecting the choice of the channel for the message is, first, a knowledge of all the various media that might be used, that is, face-to-face public speaking or private conversation, use of events to communicate a message, gimmicks, fast media (radio and public-address loudspeakers), medium-speed media (leaflets, newspapers, and posters and newsheets), and slow media (books, magazines, pamphlets, and movies). Given the message, the target, and a complete knowledge of the media, the operator usually need only answer the media questions (Medium prominent in target's focus of attention? Accessible to operator? Suitable to purpose and message? Dangerous to friends in the target country? Able to reach largest percentage of target?) to make obvious the appropriate medium.

Affecting composition of the actual message are an understanding of the nature of symbols, an empathic approach, choice of black or white, true or false, and security considerations. You have seen that an effective message invites attention early to a personality need; establishes an atmosphere of authenticity, authority, and consistency; stays in people's minds; provides targets for aggression or identification, emulation, or love; arouses emotions beneficial to the objective of the message; and repeats, with variations.

Affecting the timing of the campaign are answers to such questions as: Is the iron hot? Will striking now beat the enemy to the punch? Is the way open? Is help coming? What will the campaign contribute to the master timetable?

And, finally, evaluation of the product is effected by a jury of persons expert in the target country, culture, and people; by samples of persons similar to the target audience; and by such enemy sources as undercover agents, POWs, routine intelligence, and the enemy's actions.

Clearly, this is one of the crucial chapters of this book, one that will bear not only study and restudy but also numerous practical exercises on the points it covers.

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## TRENDS IN PROPAGANDA, 1911-1945

1. Propaganda during World War II exhibited, on the whole, a higher degree of sobriety than propaganda during World War I; the incidence of highly emotionalized terms was probably lower.
2. Propaganda during World War II was, on the whole, less moralistic than propaganda during World War I; the incidence of preference statements as against fact statements was probably lower.
3. Propaganda during World War II tended to put a moderate ceiling on grosser divergences from presently or subsequently ascertainable facts, divergences that were more frequent in propaganda during World War I. Also, propaganda during World War II tended to give fuller information about relevant events than propaganda during World War I. . . .

The use of emotionalized language was, at the outset of World War II, almost completely absent in British propaganda. When, in the autumn of 1939, Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, referred to the Nazis as "Huns," thus using the stereotype current during World War I, he was publicly rebuked. Basically, that attitude persisted throughout the war in Britain and the United States. "We don't want to be driven into hate" was the tenor of opinion. There were modifications of this attitude: in the United States in regard to Japan, in Britain after the severe onslaught of bombing. However, hate campaigns remained largely unacceptable. In Germany, a similar attitude persisted: attempts of German propaganda to brand the bombing of German cities by British and later by American planes as barbarism, to speak of the crews of these planes as "night pirates" and of German raids against Britain as retaliatory largely failed to arouse indignant hate.

The waning power of moral argumentation in propaganda is best illustrated by the fact that one of the predominant themes of propaganda during World War I played no comparable part in World War II. The theme "Our cause is right; theirs is wrong" was secondary in the propaganda of the Western powers; its part in German propaganda was limited; only in Russian propaganda was its role presumably comparable to that it had played in World War I propaganda. In the democratic countries and in Germany, the moral argumentation was replaced by one in terms of indulgence and deprivation (profit or loss): "We are winning; they are losing;" and "There will be the blessings of victory; there the calamity of defeat." There is evidence indicating that both in the democracies and in Germany this type of appeal was eminently successful. In other words: success of propaganda was dependent on the transformation of supreme appeals into appeals to the ego.

The third area of difference, the increased concern for some agreement between the content of propaganda and ascertainable facts, and the increased concern for detailed information was to some considerable extent related to technological change. Thus, during World War I, the German people were never explicitly (and implicitly only much later) informed about the German defeat in the battle of the Marne in September 1914. A similar reticence during World War II would not have proved expedient, since in spite of curative measures, allied radio transmissions were widely listened to by Germans. However, technological progress was not the only reason for the change. The concern with credibility had increased, independently of the technology of communication. The tendency to back statements of one's own against those of enemy governments existed both in Germany and in the democracies, while it was limited in Germany, it was widely spread in Britain and the United States.<sup>210</sup>

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**Part IV**

**CODA**

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## Chapter 8

### A FINAL WORD

You have by now noticed that the type of decision we have been talking about in these pages is not unique to paywar. In greater or less degree such decisions lie behind all communication and in particular all communication that seeks to change attitudes or bring about action. The advertiser trying to control buying habits, the football coach trying to bring his team "up" for a big game, the revivalist trying to sway religious attitudes, the public relations counsel trying to bring about a favorable situation for his client, the political campaigner trying to sway votes, and even the teacher trying to create favorable attitudes toward learning and discrimination may each use many of the devices we have talked about, face many of the same decisions, and may even have his own type of policy direction, operational capabilities, and intelligence sources with which he must coordinate his messages if they are to accomplish as much as possible.

Yet in our political system, paywar is something distinct and different from all these activities which it resembles in so many ways. Perhaps the difference can most easily be made clear by pointing out that in a Communist state such as the Soviet Union, for example, such a distinction does not exist, or at least is much less definite. In the Soviet Union paywar outside the state merges with hardly a noticeable break into paywar within the state. The Communist educational system is merely an arm of the Party's over-all program of propaganda and agitation. In the Soviet Union the state readily uses paywar techniques to control buying habits, voting, attitudes toward the central government, and interest in sports. This merging of uses is hard for Americans to understand. For Americans, education is in large part the responsibility of the state, but it is used not to change attitudes in a state-determined direction but rather to give practice in solving problems and to impart facts and discriminative skills

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which will enable the student to decide for himself what his value patterns should be. Advertising, public relations, political campaigning, and football pep talks are, except in rare instances, not the province of the US Government at all. They are private programs within the framework of commerce, politics, or play. Paywar is in a different category altogether. It represents to Americans a state imposing its will on another state. And this is why paywar has been so foreign to us, why we have been vaguely ashamed to talk about it and slow to train people to use it, and why we consider it in general a messy business, the sooner gotten over with, the better.

It is a messy business, in the same sense that war is, or economic sanctions, or any of the other weapons of international power. It is something we Americans do not practice on our own people. It is something we do not confuse with education. It is something we should prefer not to use even internationally, and indeed we look forward to the time when the nations of the earth can elevate their conflicts to the level of discussion and when it will be unnecessary to use the power weapons. But meanwhile we are caught up in a tense world situation in which a ruthless and powerful aggressor threatens peace and security. Like Nazi Germany, Communist Russia and her allies use paywar with skill and put very large resources in money and manpower into it. Even in "cold" war we are placed in the position of having to defend ourselves against psychological attack in many parts of the world. Whenever the cold war has turned hot, paywar has been used by both sides as one weapon in the power arsenal.

Therefore, no matter what our wishes and feelings about paywar may be, we are in the position of having to use it. If we Americans use such a weapon, it behooves us to know how it works and how to use it as well as possible. The purpose of this volume is to help us along toward such knowledge.

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